/* tlspool/starttls.c -- Setup and validation handler for TLS session */
+#include "whoami.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <memory.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
#include <unistd.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <errno.h>
-#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
#include <gnutls/pkcs11.h>
#include <gnutls/abstract.h>
+#include <gnutls/dane.h>
+
+#include <p11-kit/pkcs11.h>
+
+#include <tlspool/commands.h>
+#include <tlspool/internal.h>
#include <libtasn1.h>
+#include <krb5.h>
+/* Plus, from k5-int.h: */
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5_context,
+ const krb5_keyblock *,
+ krb5_ticket * );
+
+
+#include <quick-der/api.h>
+#include <quick-der/rfc4120.h>
+typedef DER_OVLY_rfc4120_Ticket ticket_t;
+typedef DER_OVLY_rfc4120_Authenticator authenticator_t;
+typedef DER_OVLY_rfc4120_EncryptedData encrypted_data_t;
+
#include <tlspool/internal.h>
+#ifdef WINDOWS_PORT
+#include <winsock2.h>
+#else
+#include <poll.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <krb5.h>
+
+#ifndef __MINGW64__
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WINDOWS_PORT
+#include <windows.h>
+#define RECV_FLAGS 0
+#define SHUT_RD SD_RECEIVE
+#define SHUT_WR SD_SEND
+#else /* WINDOWS_PORT */
+#define RECV_FLAGS MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL
+#endif /* WINDOWS_PORT */
#include "manage.h"
#include "donai.h"
+#include "trust.h"
#if EXPECTED_LID_TYPE_COUNT != LID_TYPE_CNT
static gnutls_x509_privkey_t onthefly_subjectkey = NULL;
static pthread_mutex_t onthefly_signer_lock = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+static krb5_context krbctx_cli, krbctx_srv;
+static krb5_keytab krb_kt_cli, krb_kt_srv;
+static bool got_cc_cli, got_cc_srv;
+static int have_key_tgt_cc (
+ struct command *cmd, // in, session context
+ krb5_context ctx, // in, kerberos context
+ bool use_cc, // in, whether to use cc
+ krb5_kvno kvno, // in, kvno (0 for highest)
+ krb5_enctype enctype,// in, enctype (0 for any)
+ char *p11uri, // in/opt, PKCS #11 pwd URI
+ krb5_keytab kt, // in/opt, keytab
+ krb5_keyblock *key, // opt/opt session key
+ krb5_creds **tgt, // out/opt, tkt granting tkt
+ krb5_ccache *cc); // out/opt, cred cache
+static int have_service_ticket (
+ struct command *cmd, // in, session context
+ krb5_context ctx, // in, kerberos context
+ krb5_ccache cc_opt, // in/opt, credcache
+ krb5_principal cli, // in, client principal
+ krb5_creds **ticket);// out/opt, tkt granting tkt
+#endif
+
+
/* The local variation on the ctlkeynode structure, with TLS-specific fields
*/
struct ctlkeynode_tls {
int cryptfd; // Crypt-side connection
};
+/* A local structure used for iterating over PKCS #11 entries. This is used
+ * to iterate over password attempts, no more than MAX_P11ITER_ATTEMPTS though.
+ *
+ * When a password is requested but none is available, the password request
+ * will be passed to the user using the PIN callback mechanism. When this
+ * is done, a warning may be given that the TLS Pool overtakes control over
+ * the account (when thusly configured). In support of that option, the
+ * $attempt is counted and the respective $p11pwd is CK_INVALID_HANDLE.
+ * TODO: Perhaps interact for saving, such as entering an certain string?
+ *
+ * When a number of attempts needs to be made before success, then any
+ * objects that precede a succeeded $attempt can be removed. The same may
+ * be true for any objects after it.
+ *
+ * This mechanism is useful during password changes. When a new password is
+ * desired by the KDC, then a random object is created and returned twice.
+ * To support repeated delivery, the password is stored in $newpwd;
+ * In this case, the safest choice is still to leave the last $p11pwd.
+ *
+ * The caller may decide to invoke the password changing procedure, namely
+ * after manual entry as evidenced by the condition
+ * (attempts >= 0) &&
+ * (attempts < MAX_P11_ITER_ATTEMPTS) &&
+ * (p11pwd [attempt] == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ *
+ * TODO: This is a designed data structure, but not yet installed.
+ *
+ * TODO: It is more useful to abolish passwords, and truly use PKCS #11.
+ */
+#define MAX_P11ITER_ATTEMPTS 3
+struct pkcs11iter {
+ struct command *cmd; // The session command structure
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE p11ses; // The PKCS #11 session in motion
+ int attempt; // Starts at -1, incremented by pwd entry
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE p11pwd [MAX_P11ITER_ATTEMPTS];
+ // Sequence of $attempt objects returned
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newpwd; // Set when a new password was offered
+};
+
/* The list of accepted Exporter Label Prefixes for starttls_prng()
*/
char *tlsprng_label_prefixes [] = {
gnutls_datum_t pkcs3;
char *filename = cfg_tls_dhparamfile ();
int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
- bzero (&pkcs3, sizeof (pkcs3));
+ memset (&pkcs3, 0, sizeof (pkcs3));
if (filename) {
E_g2e ("No PKCS #3 PEM file with DH params",
gnutls_load_file (
if (flags & GNUTLS_PIN_SO) {
return GNUTLS_E_USER_ERROR;
}
- if (pin_callback (attempt, token_url, token_label, pin, pin_max)) {
+ if (pin_callback (attempt, token_url, NULL, pin, pin_max)) {
return 0;
} else {
return GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_PIN_ERROR;
//TODO:WHY?// free_p11pin ();
}
+static void cleanup_starttls_credentials (void);/* Defined below */
+static void cleanup_starttls_validation (void); /* Defined below */
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+static void cleanup_starttls_kerberos (void); /* Defined below */
+static int setup_starttls_kerberos (void); /* Defined below */
+#endif
+static int setup_starttls_credentials (void); /* Defined below */
/* The global and static setup function for the starttls functions.
*/
void setup_starttls (void) {
- int setup_starttls_credentials (void); /* Defined below */
const char *curver;
int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
char *otfsigcrt, *otfsigkey;
gnutls_global_set_log_level (9);
}
//
+ // Setup Kerberos
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+ E_g2e ("Kerberos initialisation failed",
+ setup_starttls_kerberos ());
+#endif
+ //
// Setup callbacks for user communication
gnutls_pkcs11_set_token_function (gnutls_token_callback, NULL);
gnutls_pkcs11_set_pin_function (gnutls_pin_callback, NULL);
setup_starttls_credentials ());
//
// Parse the default priority string
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+ E_g2e ("Failed to setup NORMAL priority cache",
+ gnutls_priority_init (&priority_normal,
+ "NONE:"
+ "%ASYM_CERT_TYPES:"
+ "+VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-DTLS-ALL:"
+ "+COMP-NULL:"
+ "+CIPHER-ALL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+MAC-ALL:"
+ "+ANON-ECDH:"
+ "+ECDHE-KRB:" // +ECDHE-KRB-RSA:+ECDHE-KRB-ECDSA:"
+ "+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+DHE-DSS:+RSA:"
+ "+CTYPE-SRV-KRB:+CTYPE-SRV-X.509:+CTYPE-SRV-OPENPGP:"
+ "+CTYPE-CLI-KRB:+CTYPE-CLI-X.509:+CTYPE-CLI-OPENPGP:"
+ "+SRP:+SRP-RSA:+SRP-DSS",
+ NULL));
+#else
E_g2e ("Failed to setup NORMAL priority cache",
- gnutls_priority_init (&priority_normal, "NONE:+VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-DTLS-ALL:+COMP-NULL:+CIPHER-ALL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+ANON-ECDH:+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+DHE-DSS:+RSA:+CTYPE-X.509:+CTYPE-OPENPGP:+SRP:+SRP-RSA:+SRP-DSS", NULL));
- // gnutls_priority_init (&priority_normal, "NORMAL:-RSA:+ANON-ECDH:+RSA:+CTYPE-X.509:+CTYPE-OPENPGP:+SRP:+SRP-RSA:+SRP-DSS", NULL));
+ gnutls_priority_init (&priority_normal,
+ "NONE:"
+ "+VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-DTLS-ALL:"
+ "+COMP-NULL:+CIPHER-ALL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+MAC-ALL:"
+ "+ANON-ECDH:"
+ "+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+DHE-DSS:+RSA:"
+ "+CTYPE-X.509:+CTYPE-OPENPGP:"
+ "+SRP:+SRP-RSA:+SRP-DSS",
+ NULL));
+#endif
//
// Try to setup on-the-fly signing key / certificate and gen a certkey
otfsigcrt = cfg_tls_onthefly_signcert ();
/* Cleanup the structures and resources that were setup for handling TLS.
*/
void cleanup_starttls (void) {
- void cleanup_starttls_credentials (void); /* Defined below */
//MOVED// cleanup_management ();
if (onthefly_subjectkey != NULL) {
gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit (onthefly_subjectkey);
gnutls_privkey_deinit (onthefly_issuerkey);
onthefly_issuerkey = NULL;
}
+
cleanup_starttls_credentials ();
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+ cleanup_starttls_kerberos ();
+#endif
remove_dh_params ();
gnutls_pkcs11_set_pin_function (NULL, NULL);
gnutls_pkcs11_set_token_function (NULL, NULL);
* GNUTLS_E_REHANDSHAKE which client or server side may receive when an
* attempt is made to renegotiate the security of the connection.
*/
-static int copycat (int local, int remote, gnutls_session_t wrapped, int client) {
+static int copycat (int local, int remote, gnutls_session_t wrapped, pool_handle_t client) {
char buf [1024];
struct pollfd inout [3];
ssize_t sz;
int have_client;
int retval = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
+client = INVALID_POOL_HANDLE;
inout [0].fd = local;
inout [1].fd = remote;
+#ifdef WINDOWS_PORT
+ have_client = 0;
+#else
inout [2].fd = client;
- have_client = inout [2].fd >= 0;
+ have_client = inout [2].fd != INVALID_POOL_HANDLE;
+#endif
if (!have_client) {
inout [2].revents = 0; // Will not be written by poll
//FORK!=DETACH// inout [2].fd = ctlkey_signalling_fd;
}
if (inout [0].revents & POLLIN) {
// Read local and encrypt to remote
- sz = recv (local, buf, sizeof (buf), MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL);
+ sz = recv (local, buf, sizeof (buf), RECV_FLAGS);
tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat received %d local bytes (or error<0) from %d", (int) sz, local);
if (sz == -1) {
tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_ERR, "Error while receiving: %s", strerror (errno));
} else if (sz == 0) {
inout [0].events &= ~POLLIN;
shutdown (local, SHUT_RD);
+#ifdef WINDOWS_PORT
+ setsockopt (remote, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (const char *) &linger, sizeof (linger));
+#else /* WINDOWS_PORT */
setsockopt (remote, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &linger, sizeof (linger));
+#endif /* WINDOWS_PORT */
gnutls_bye (wrapped, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
} else if (gnutls_record_send (wrapped, buf, sz) != sz) {
tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_ERR, "gnutls_record_send() failed to pass on the requested bytes");
} else if (sz == 0) {
inout [1].events &= ~POLLIN;
shutdown (remote, SHUT_RD);
+#ifdef WINDOWS_PORT
+ setsockopt (local, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (const char *) &linger, sizeof (linger));
+#else /* WINDOWS_PORT */
setsockopt (local, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &linger, sizeof (linger));
+#endif /* WINDOWS_PORT */
shutdown (local, SHUT_WR);
- } else if (send (local, buf, sz, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL) != sz) {
+ } else if (send (local, buf, sz, RECV_FLAGS) != sz) {
break; // communication error
} else {
tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat sent %d bytes to local %d", (int) sz, local);
tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat data connection polling returned a special condition");
break; // Apparently, one of POLLERR, POLLHUP, POLLNVAL
}
+#ifndef WINDOWS_PORT
if (inout [2].revents & ~POLLIN) {
if (have_client) {
// This case is currently not ever triggered
continue;
}
}
+#endif /* !WINDOWS_PORT */
}
tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Ending copycat cycle for local=%d, remote=%d", local, remote);
return retval;
//
// Setup a number of common references and structures
+ errno = 0;
*pcert = NULL;
cmd = (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (session);
if (cmd == NULL) {
//
// Setup the lidtype parameter for responding
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+ certtp = gnutls_certificate_type_get_ours (session);
+#else
certtp = gnutls_certificate_type_get (session);
+#endif
if (certtp == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "Serving OpenPGP certificate request as a %s", rolestr);
lidtype = LID_TYPE_PGP;
} else if (certtp == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "Serving X.509 certificate request as a %s", rolestr);
lidtype = LID_TYPE_X509;
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+ } else if (certtp == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
+ tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "Serving Kerberos Ticket request as a %s", rolestr);
+ lidtype = LID_TYPE_KRB5;
+#endif
} else {
// GNUTLS_CRT_RAW, GNUTLS_CRT_UNKNOWN, or other
- tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "Funny sort of certificate retrieval attempted as a %s", rolestr);
+ tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "Funny sort of certificate %d retrieval attempted as a %s", certtp, rolestr);
E_g2e ("Requested certtype is neither X.509 nor OpenPGP",
GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR);
return gtls_errno;
gnutls_privkey_init (
pkey));
if ((onthefly_subjectkey != NULL) && (strcmp (p11priv, onthefly_p11uri) == 0)) {
+ // Setup the on-the-fly certification key as private key
E_g2e ("Failed to import on-the-fly subject private key",
gnutls_privkey_import_x509 (
*pkey,
onthefly_subjectkey,
GNUTLS_PRIVKEY_IMPORT_COPY));
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+ } else if (lidtype == LID_TYPE_KRB5) {
+ // Fake a private key for Kerberos (we sign it out here, not GnuTLS)
+ E_g2e ("Failed to generate a private-key placeholder for Kerberos",
+ gnutls_privkey_generate_krb (
+ *pkey,
+ 0));
+#endif
} else {
+ // Import the PKCS #11 key as the private key for use by GnuTLS
if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
cmd->session_privatekey = (intptr_t) (void *) *pkey; //TODO// Used for session cleanup
}
0));
break;
case LID_TYPE_PGP:
- E_g2e ("MOVED: Failed to import OpenPGP certificate",
+ E_g2e ("MOVED: Failed to import OpenPGP public key",
gnutls_pcert_import_openpgp_raw (
*pcert,
&certdatum,
NULL, /* use master key */
0));
break;
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+ case LID_TYPE_KRB5:
+ if (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) {
+ //
+ // KDH-Only or KDH-Enhanced; fetch ticket for localid
+ // and a TGT based on it for service/remoteid@REALM
+ //
+ // First, try to obtain a TGT and key, in various ways
+ krb5_keyblock key;
+ krb5_creds *tgt = NULL;
+ krb5_creds *ticket = NULL;
+ krb5_ccache cc = NULL;
+ int status = 0;
+ memset (&key, 0, sizeof (key ));
+ status = have_key_tgt_cc (
+ cmd, krbctx_cli,
+ 1, 0, 0,
+ p11priv,
+ krb_kt_cli,
+ &key, &tgt, &cc);
+ if (status >= 1) {
+ // We never use this key ourselves
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents (krbctx_cli, &key);
+ }
+ if (status < 2) {
+ // Stop processing when no tgt was found
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ break;
+ }
+ //
+ // Store client identity in session object
+ if (0 != krb5_copy_principal (
+ krbctx_cli,
+ tgt->client,
+ &cmd->krbid_cli)) {
+ krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, tgt);
+ tgt = NULL;
+ if (cc != NULL) {
+ krb5_cc_close (krbctx_cli, cc);
+ cc = NULL;
+ }
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ break;
+ }
+ //
+ // Now find a service ticket to talk to, and its key
+ //TODO// Pass credcache instead?
+ status = have_service_ticket (
+ cmd, krbctx_cli,
+ cc,
+ cmd->krbid_cli,
+ &ticket);
+ if (cc != NULL) {
+ // We don't need cc anymore below
+ krb5_cc_close (krbctx_cli, cc);
+ }
+ if (status < 1) {
+ // Stop processing when no ticket was found
+ krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, tgt);
+ tgt = NULL;
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ break;
+ }
+ //
+ // Only for KDH-Only mode can the client rely on a
+ // server principal taken from the ticket;
+ // So only store krbid_srv for KDH-Only mode.
+ if ((gnutls_certificate_type_get_peers (cmd->session)
+ == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) &&
+ (0 != krb5_copy_principal (
+ krbctx_cli,
+ tgt->server,
+ &cmd->krbid_srv))) {
+ krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, ticket);
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ break;
+ }
+ krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, tgt);
+ tgt = NULL;
+ if (0 != krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (
+ krbctx_cli,
+ &ticket->keyblock,
+ &cmd->krb_key)) {
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ // continue, with E_g2e() skipping import
+ }
+ certdatum.data = ticket->ticket.data;
+ certdatum.size = ticket->ticket.length;
+ E_g2e ("MOVED: Failed to import Kerberos ticket",
+ gnutls_pcert_import_krb_raw (
+ *pcert,
+ &certdatum,
+ 0));
+ krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, ticket);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // For KDH-Only, the server supplies one of:
+ // - a TGT for user-to-user mode (for p2p exchanges)
+ // - an DER NULL to waive u2u mode
+ //TODO// E_g2e ("MOVED: Failed to import Kerberos ticket",
+ //TODO// gnutls_pcert_import_krb_raw (
+ //TODO// *pcert,
+ //TODO// &certdatum, //TODO:WHATSFOUND//
+ //TODO// 0));
+ int u2u = 0;
+ int status = 0;
+ krb5_creds *tgt = NULL;
+ //
+ // Determine whether we want to run in user-to-user mode
+ // for which we should supply a TGT to the TLS client
+ u2u = u2u || ((PIOF_STARTTLS_BOTHROLES_PEER & ~cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags) == 0);
+ u2u = u2u || (strchr (rid, '@') != NULL);
+ // u2u = u2u || "shaken hands on TLS symmetry extension"
+ u2u = u2u && got_cc_srv; // We may simply not be able!
+ //
+ // When not in user-to-user mode, deliver DER NULL
+ if (!u2u) {
+ certdatum.data = "\x05\x00";
+ certdatum.size = 2;
+ E_g2e ("Failed to withhold Kerberos server ticket",
+ gnutls_pcert_import_krb_raw (
+ *pcert,
+ &certdatum,
+ 0));
+ break;
+ }
+ //
+ // Continue specifically for user-to-user mode.
+ //TODO// Setup server principal identity
+ //
+ // Fetch the service's key
+ status = have_key_tgt_cc (
+ cmd, krbctx_srv,
+ 1, 0, 0, // Hmm... later we know kvno/etype
+ p11priv,
+ krb_kt_srv,
+ &cmd->krb_key, &tgt, NULL);
+ if (status == 1) {
+ // There's no use in having just the key
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents (krbctx_srv, &cmd->krb_key);
+ memset (&cmd->krb_key, 0, sizeof (cmd->krb_key));
+ }
+ if (status < 2) {
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ } else if (0 != krb5_copy_principal (
+ krbctx_srv,
+ tgt->server,
+ &cmd->krbid_srv)) {
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ }
+ certdatum.data = tgt->ticket.data;
+ certdatum.size = tgt->ticket.length;
+ E_g2e ("Failed to withhold Kerberos server ticket",
+ gnutls_pcert_import_krb_raw (
+ *pcert,
+ &certdatum,
+ 0));
+ krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, tgt);
+ tgt = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
default:
/* Should not happen */
break;
//TODO// Moved out (end)
+#ifdef ANCIENT_CODE_WHEN_DBERRNO_RAN_IN_PARALLEL
//
// Lap up any overseen POSIX error codes in errno
if (errno) {
cmd->session_errno = errno;
gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CIPHER_SUITES; /* Vaguely matching */
}
+#endif
//
// Return the overral error code, hopefully GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS
tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "Returning %d / %s from clisrv_cert_retrieve()", gtls_errno, gnutls_strerror (gtls_errno));
-printf ("DEBUG: clisrv_cert_retrieve() sets *pcert to 0x%xl (length %d)... {pubkey = 0x%lx, cert= {data = 0x%lx, size=%ld}, type=%ld}\n", (long) *pcert, *pcert_length, (long) (*pcert)->pubkey, (long) (*pcert)->cert.data, (long) (*pcert)->cert.size, (long) (*pcert)->type);
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: clisrv_cert_retrieve() sets *pcert to 0x%xl (length %d)... {pubkey = 0x%lx, cert= {data = 0x%lx, size=%ld}, type=%ld}\n", (long) *pcert, *pcert_length, (long) (*pcert)->pubkey, (long) (*pcert)->cert.data, (long) (*pcert)->cert.size, (long) (*pcert)->type);
return gtls_errno;
}
NULL, /* use master key */
0));
break;
+ case LID_TYPE_KRB5:
+ /* Binary information is currently moot, so do not load it */
+ break;
default:
/* Should not happen */
break;
(*chainlen)++;
chain = (gnutls_pcert_st *) calloc (*chainlen, sizeof (gnutls_pcert_st));
if (chain != NULL) {
- bzero (chain, (*chainlen) * sizeof (gnutls_pcert_st));
+ memset (chain,
+ 0,
+ (*chainlen) * sizeof (gnutls_pcert_st));
} else {
gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
}
-/* Fetch local credentials. This can be done before TLS is started, to find
- * the possible authentication forms that can be offered. The function
- * can additionally be used after interaction with the client to establish
- * a local identity that was not initially provided, or that was not
- * considered public at the time.
- */
-gtls_error fetch_local_credentials (struct command *cmd) {
- int lidrole;
- char *lid, *rid;
- DBC *crs_disclose = NULL;
- DBC *crs_localid = NULL;
- DBT discpatn;
- DBT keydata;
- DBT creddata;
- selector_t remote_selector;
- int gtls_errno = 0;
- int db_errno = 0;
- int found = 0;
- gtls_error certificate_onthefly (struct command *cmd);
- //
- // When applicable, try to create an on-the-fly certificate
- if (((cmd->cmd.pio_cmd == PIOC_STARTTLS_V2) &&
- (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALID_ONTHEFLY))
- || ((cmd->cmd.pio_cmd == PIOC_LIDENTRY_CALLBACK_V2) &&
- (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_lidentry.flags & PIOF_LIDENTRY_ONTHEFLY))) {
- gtls_errno = certificate_onthefly (cmd);
- if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) {
- // This includes GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS
-fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: otfcert retrieval returned %d\n", gtls_errno);
- return gtls_errno;
- } else {
-fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: otfcert retrieval returned GNUTLS_E_AGAIN, so skip it\n", gtls_errno);
- gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS; // Attempt failed, ignore
- }
- }
+/********** KERBEROS SUPPORT FUNCTIONS FOR TLS-KDH **********/
+
- //
- // Setup a number of common references and structures
- // Note: Current GnuTLS cannot support being a peer
- if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT) {
- lidrole = LID_ROLE_CLIENT;
- } else if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER) {
- lidrole = LID_ROLE_SERVER;
- } else {
- E_g2e ("TLS Pool command supports neither local client nor local server role",
- GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION);
- return gtls_errno;
- }
- lid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid;
- rid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
+/* Prepare the Kerberos resources for use by clients and/or servers.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+static int setup_starttls_kerberos (void) {
+ int k5err = 0;
+ char *cfg;
+ int retval = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
+ krb5_ccache krb_cc_tmp;
+ const char *cctype_cli = NULL;
+ const char *cctype_srv = NULL;
//
- // Refuse to disclose client credentials when the server name is unset;
- // note that server-claimed identities are unproven during handshake.
- if ((lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) && (*rid == '\0')) {
- tlog (TLOG_USER, LOG_ERR, "No remote identity (server name) set, so no client credential disclosure");
- E_g2e ("Missing remote ID",
- GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND);
- return gtls_errno;
- }
+ // Initialise
+ krbctx_cli = krbctx_srv = NULL;
+ krb_kt_cli = krb_kt_srv = NULL;
+ got_cc_cli = got_cc_srv = 0;
//
- // Setup database iterators to map identities to credentials
- if (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) {
- E_d2e ("Failed to create db_disclose cursor",
- dbh_disclose->cursor (
- dbh_disclose,
- cmd->txn,
- &crs_disclose,
- 0));
+ // Construct credentials caching for Kerberos
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ k5err = krb5_init_context (&krbctx_cli);
+ }
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ k5err = krb5_init_context (&krbctx_srv);
}
- E_d2e ("Failed to create db_localid cursor",
- dbh_localid->cursor (
- dbh_localid,
- cmd->txn,
- &crs_localid,
- 0));
//
- // Prepare for iteration over possible local identities / credentials
- char mid [128];
- char cid [128];
- if (gtls_errno != 0) {
- ; // Skip setup
- } else if (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) {
- memcpy (cid, rid, sizeof (cid));
- dbt_init_fixbuf (&discpatn, cid, strlen (cid));
- dbt_init_fixbuf (&keydata, mid, sizeof (mid)-1);
- dbt_init_malloc (&creddata);
- selector_t ridsel;
- donai_t remote_donai = donai_from_stable_string (rid, strlen (rid));
- if (!selector_iterate_init (&remote_selector, &remote_donai)) {
- E_g2e ("Syntax of remote ID unsuitable for selector",
- GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
- } else {
- E_d2e ("Failed to start iterator on remote ID selector",
- dbcred_iterate_from_remoteid_selector (
- crs_disclose,
- crs_localid,
- &remote_selector,
- &discpatn,
- &keydata,
- &creddata));
- }
- } else {
- dbt_init_fixbuf (&discpatn, "", 0); // Unused but good style
- dbt_init_fixbuf (&keydata, lid, strlen (lid));
- dbt_init_malloc (&creddata);
- E_d2e ("Failed to start iterator on local ID",
- dbcred_iterate_from_localid (
- crs_localid,
- &keydata,
- &creddata));
+ // Load the various configuration variables
+ cfg = cfg_krb_client_keytab ();
+ if ((k5err == 0) && (cfg != NULL)) {
+ k5err = krb5_kt_resolve (krbctx_cli, cfg, &krb_kt_cli);
}
- if (db_errno != 0) {
- gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_DB_ERROR;
+ cfg = cfg_krb_server_keytab ();
+ if ((k5err == 0) && (cfg != NULL)) {
+ k5err = krb5_kt_resolve (krbctx_srv, cfg, &krb_kt_srv);
}
-
- //
- // Now store the local identities inasfar as they are usable
- db_errno = 0;
- while ((gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) && (db_errno == 0)) {
- int ok;
- uint32_t flags;
- int lidtype;
-
- tlog (TLOG_DB, LOG_DEBUG, "Found BDB entry %s disclosed to %s", creddata.data + 4, (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT)? rid: "all clients");
- ok = dbcred_flags (
- &creddata,
- &flags);
- lidtype = flags & LID_TYPE_MASK;
- ok = ok && ((flags & lidrole) != 0);
- ok = ok && ((flags & LID_NO_PKCS11) == 0);
- ok = ok && (lidtype >= LID_TYPE_MIN);
- ok = ok && (lidtype <= LID_TYPE_MAX);
- tlog (TLOG_DB, LOG_DEBUG, "BDB entry has flags=0x%08x, so we (%04x/%04x) %s it", flags, lidrole, LID_ROLE_MASK, ok? "store": "skip ");
- if (ok) {
- // Move the credential into the command structure
- dbt_store (&creddata,
- &cmd->lids [lidtype - LID_TYPE_MIN]);
- found = 1;
- } else {
- // Skip the credential by freeing its data structure
- dbt_free (&creddata);
+ cfg = cfg_krb_client_credcache ();
+#if 0 /* Temporary bypass of cctype checks */
+ if ((k5err == 0) && (cfg != NULL)) {
+ k5err = krb5_cc_set_default_name (krbctx_cli, cfg);
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ k5err = krb5_cc_default (krbctx_cli, &krb_cc_tmp);
+ }
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ got_cc_cli = 1;
+ cctype_cli = krb5_cc_get_type (krbctx_cli, krb_cc_tmp);
+ krb5_cc_close (krbctx_cli, krb_cc_tmp);
}
- db_errno = dbcred_iterate_next (crs_disclose, crs_localid, &discpatn, &keydata, &creddata);
}
-
- if (db_errno == DB_NOTFOUND) {
- if (!found) {
- gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+#endif
+ cfg = cfg_krb_server_credcache ();
+#if 0 /* Temporary bypass of cctype checks */
+ if ((k5err == 0) && (cfg != NULL)) {
+ k5err = krb5_cc_set_default_name (krbctx_srv, cfg);
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ k5err = krb5_cc_default (krbctx_srv, &krb_cc_tmp);
+ }
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ got_cc_srv = 1;
+ cctype_srv = krb5_cc_get_type (krbctx_cli, krb_cc_tmp);
+ krb5_cc_close (krbctx_srv, krb_cc_tmp);
}
}
- if (crs_localid != NULL) {
- crs_localid->close (crs_localid);
- crs_localid = NULL;
+#endif
+ //
+ // Check for consistency and log helpful messages for the sysop
+ if (k5err != 0) {
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "Error during STARTTLS setup: %s (acting on %s)",
+ krb5_get_error_message (krbctx_cli, k5err),
+ cfg);
+ retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
}
- if (crs_disclose != NULL) {
- crs_disclose->close (crs_disclose);
- crs_disclose = NULL;
+ if (krb_kt_cli != NULL) {
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring the configured kerberos_client_keytab -- it is not implemented yet");
}
- return gtls_errno;
+ if (krb_kt_srv == NULL) {
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "No kerberos_server_keytab configured, so Kerberos cannot work at all");
+ retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
+/* TODO: Only for MIT krb5 1.11 and up
+ } else if (0 == krb5_kt_have_content (krb_ctx, krb_kt_srv)) {
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "Keytab in kerberos_server_keytab is absent or empty");
+ retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
+ */
+ }
+ if (krbctx_cli == NULL) {
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "No kerberos_client_credcache configured, so Kerberos cannot work at all");
+ retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
+#if 0 /* Temporary bypass of cctype checks */
+ } else if (!krb5_cc_support_switch (
+ krbctx_cli, cctype_cli)) {
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "Your kerberos_client_credcache does not support multilpe identities");
+ retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
+#endif
+ }
+ if (krbctx_srv == NULL) {
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_WARNING, "No kerberos_server_credcache configured, so user-to-user Kerberos will not work");
+#if 0 /* Temporary bypass of cctype checks */
+ } else if (!krb5_cc_support_switch (
+ krbctx_srv, cctype_srv)) {
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "Your kerberos_server_credcache does not support multilpe identities");
+ retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
+#endif
+ }
+ if (retval != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+ cleanup_starttls_kerberos ();
+ }
+ return retval;
}
+#endif
-/*
- * Check if a given cmd has the given LID_TYPE setup.
- * Return 1 for yes or 0 for no; this is used in priority strings.
+/* Cleanup Kerberos resources. This must be an idempotent function, because
+ * it is called when Kerberos panics as well as when
*/
-static inline int lidtpsup (struct command *cmd, int lidtp) {
- return 1; //TODO// Can we decide if we needn't authenticate?
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+static void cleanup_starttls_kerberos (void) {
+ if (krb_kt_srv != NULL) {
+ krb5_kt_close (krbctx_srv, krb_kt_srv);
+ krb_kt_srv = NULL;
+ }
+ if (krb_kt_cli != NULL) {
+ krb5_kt_close (krbctx_cli, krb_kt_cli);
+ krb_kt_cli = NULL;
+ }
+ if (krbctx_srv != NULL) {
+ krb5_free_context (krbctx_srv);
+ krbctx_srv = NULL;
+ }
+ if (krbctx_cli != NULL) {
+ krb5_free_context (krbctx_cli);
+ krbctx_cli = NULL;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/* Prompter callback function for PKCS #11.
+ *
+ * TODO: Use "struct pkcs11iter" as data, possibly interact with the user,
+ * and keep a score on where we stand with password entry and changes.
+ * Create clisrv_p11krb_setup() and clisrv_p11krb_cleanup() functions.
+ *
+ * In the current release for Kerberos, we have a very minimal mode for
+ * doing this. We may embellish it later or, preferrably, turn to a more
+ * PKCS #11 styled approach, perhaps PKINIT or FAST.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+static krb5_error_code clisrv_p11krb_callback (krb5_context ctx,
+ void *vcmd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *banner,
+ int num_prompts,
+ krb5_prompt prompts []) {
+ struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
+ int i;
+ krb5_prompt_type *codes = krb5_get_prompt_types (ctx);
+ int attempt = 0;
+ static const char *token_url = "pkcs11:manufacturer=Kerberos+infrastructure;model=TLS+Pool;serial=%28none%29";
+ static const char *token_label = "Kerberos infrastructure";
+ for (i=0; i<num_prompts; i++) {
+ //
+ // Visit each prompt in turn, setting responses or return failure
+ switch (codes [i]) {
+ case KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PASSWORD:
+ //TODO// Read a password from PKCS #11
+ //TODO// Do we need to cycle passwords to cover retry?
+ //TODO// Delete any failed passwords?
+ //TODO:FIXED//
+ if (attempt >= MAX_P11ITER_ATTEMPTS) {
+ return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
+ }
+ // Nothing in PKCS #11 --> so fallback on manual entry
+ if (!pin_callback (attempt,
+ token_url, "Enter Kerberos password:",
+ prompts [i].reply->data,
+ prompts [i].reply->length)) {
+ memset (prompts [i].reply->data, 0, prompts [i].reply->length);
+ return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
+ }
+ //TODO// Manage data structure
+ prompts [i].reply->length = strlen (prompts [i].reply->data);
+ return 0;
+ case KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_NEW_PASSWORD:
+ case KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_NEW_PASSWORD_AGAIN:
+ //TODO// Setup new password in PKCS #11
+ case KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH:
+ //TODO// Use FAST, PKINIT, and so on...
+ default:
+ // Unrecognised and unimplemented prompt types end here
+ return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/* Find a Kerberos keyblock and ticket to use for the localid. Do not look
+ * into services yet in this function. This function implements a simple
+ * procedure, based on optional arguments p11uri, keytab, credcache. It
+ * produces <key,tgt> or <key,NULL> or (for errors) <NULL,NULL>.
+ *
+ * The procedure followed, fully written out, is outlined below:
+ *
+ * IF have(credcache) AND acceptable (renewable) time
+ * THEN RETURN <key,tgt>
+ * ELSE IF have (keytab) AND found a suitable key
+ * THEN IF have(credcache) and it works
+ * THEN fetch cred tgt and key (auth with key in keytab)
+ * create credcache
+ * RETURN <key,tgt>
+ * ELSE RETURN <key,NULL>
+ * ELSE IF have(p11uri) AND it works
+ * THEN fetch cred tgt and key (auth with pwd in p11uri)
+ * create credcache
+ * RETURN <key,tgt>
+ * ELSE RETURN <NULL,NULL>
+ *
+ * The function returns a status value counting the number of values returned,
+ * so 0 means error, 1 means key only and 2 means key and tgt.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+static int have_key_tgt_cc (struct command *cmd, // in, session context
+ krb5_context ctx, // in, kerberos context
+ bool use_cc, // in, whether to use cc
+ krb5_kvno kvno, // in, kvno (0 for highest)
+ krb5_enctype enctype,// in, enctype (0 for any)
+ char *p11uri, // in/opt, PKCS #11 pwd URI
+ krb5_keytab kt, // in/opt, keytab
+ krb5_keyblock *key, // opt/opt session key
+ krb5_creds **tgt, // out/opt, tkt granting tkt
+ krb5_ccache *cc) { // out/opt, cred cache
+ int k5err = 0;
+ krb5_ccache newcc = NULL;
+ krb5_principal sought = NULL;
+ krb5_principal sought1 = NULL;
+ krb5_principal tgtname = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab_entry ktentry;
+ const char *svc = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.service;
+ const char *lid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid;
+ const char *liddom;
+ int lid1len;
+ char **realms;
+ char realm [128];
+ uint32_t nametype, nametype_alt;
+ time_t now = 0;
+ //
+ // Assertions, and initialise variables
+ assert ( cmd != NULL);
+ assert ( ctx != NULL);
+ assert ( key != NULL);
+ assert (*tgt == NULL);
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents (ctx, key);
+ if (cc != NULL) {
+ *cc = NULL;
+ }
+ //
+ // Construct the realm name
+ liddom = strrchr (lid, '@');
+ if (liddom != NULL) {
+ lid1len = ((intptr_t) liddom) - ((intptr_t) lid);
+ liddom++; // Skip '@'
+ } else {
+ liddom = lid; // localid is a host
+ lid1len = strnlen (lid, 128);
+ }
+ k5err = krb5_get_host_realm (ctx, liddom, &realms);
+ if ((k5err == 0) && (realms [0] != NULL) && (*realms [0] != '\0')) {
+ strncpy (realm, realms [0], sizeof (realm));
+ realm [sizeof (realm)-1] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ int i = 0;
+ do {
+ realm [i] = toupper (liddom [i]);
+ i++;
+ } while (liddom [i-1] != '\0');
+ }
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ krb5_free_host_realm (ctx, realms);
+ } else {
+ k5err = 0;
+ }
+ //
+ // Construct a sought principal name in a given naming style,
+ // and try to locate it in the existing cache.
+ // With @, try liduser@liddom@REALM or else liduser@REALM
+ // Without @, try svc/liddom@REALM
+ nametype = (lid == liddom) ? KRB5_NT_SRV_HST : KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL;
+retry:
+ nametype_alt = nametype;
+ switch (nametype) {
+ case KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL:
+ nametype_alt = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL;
+ k5err = krb5_build_principal_ext (ctx, &sought,
+ strlen (realm), realm,
+ strnlen (lid, 128), lid,
+ 0);
+ break;
+ case KRB5_NT_SRV_HST:
+ if (strcmp (svc, "http") == 0) {
+ svc = "HTTP";
+ }
+ k5err = krb5_build_principal_ext (ctx, &sought,
+ strlen (realm), realm,
+ strlen (svc), svc,
+ lid1len, lid,
+ 0);
+ break;
+ case KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL:
+ k5err = krb5_build_principal_ext (ctx, &sought,
+ strlen (realm), realm,
+ lid1len, lid,
+ 0);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ sought->type = nametype;
+ } else {
+ sought = NULL;
+ }
+ k5err = krb5_cc_cache_match (ctx, sought, &newcc);
+ if (k5err != 0) {
+ if ((nametype_alt != nametype) && (sought1 == NULL)) {
+ nametype = nametype_alt;
+ sought1 = sought;
+ sought = NULL;
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ //
+ // We failed to find an *existing* credentials cache
+ // for the local identity.
+ //
+ // Our new hope is to create a fresh credential, and add
+ // it to the current credcache. To that end, we now try
+ // to overrule k5err by getting hold of our default cc.
+ goto from_scratch;
+ }
+ //
+ // Construct the TGT name
+ k5err = krb5_build_principal_ext (ctx, &tgtname,
+ strlen (realm), realm,
+ 6, "krbtgt",
+ strlen (realm), realm,
+ 0);
+ if (k5err != 0) {
+ tgtname = NULL;
+ k5err = 0;
+ }
+ tgtname->type = KRB5_NT_SRV_INST;
+ //
+ // Try to get the service ticket for the TGT name from the cache
+ krb5_creds credreq;
+ memset (&credreq, 0, sizeof (credreq));
+ credreq.client = sought;
+ credreq.server = tgtname;
+ k5err = krb5_get_credentials (ctx,
+ /* KRB5_GC_USER_USER ?|? */
+ ( use_cc ? 0 : KRB5_GC_CACHED ),
+ newcc,
+ &credreq, tgt);
+ time (&now);
+ if ((k5err == 0)
+ && (now + 300 > (*tgt)->times.endtime)
+ && (now + 300 < (*tgt)->times.renew_till)) {
+ //TODO:NOTHERE// krb5_free_creds (ctx, *tgt);
+ //TODO:NOTHERE// *tgt = NULL;
+ // Try to renew the ticket
+ k5err = krb5_get_renewed_creds (ctx,
+ *tgt,
+ sought,
+ newcc,
+ NULL); /* krbtgt/REALM@REALM */
+ }
+ if ((k5err == 0)
+ && (now + 300 > (*tgt)->times.endtime)) {
+ // Thanks, but no thanks!
+ krb5_free_creds (ctx, *tgt);
+ *tgt = NULL;
+ k5err = 666;
+ }
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ // First case worked -- return <key,tgt> from credout
+ k5err = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (ctx,
+ &(*tgt)->keyblock,
+ key);
+ // On failure, key shows failure
+ if (cc != NULL) {
+ *cc = newcc;
+ newcc = NULL;
+ }
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+from_scratch:
+ //
+ // Prior attempts failed. Instead, look for keytab or p11uri presence.
+ // This is skipped when the use_cc option below welcomes krb5_creds.
+ if ((key->contents == NULL) && (p11uri == NULL) && (kt == NULL)) {
+ // We cannot obtain a new krbtgt
+ // We simply return what we've got (which may be nothing)
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if ((kt == NULL) && (!use_cc)) {
+ // We have nowhere to store a new krbtgt if we got it
+ // We simply return what we've got (which is at least a key)
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ //
+ // Either we have a keytab key, or we have a p11uri,
+ // so we can attempt to create a new credcache with a new krbtgt
+ if (use_cc) {
+ if (newcc == NULL) {
+ k5err = krb5_cc_default (ctx, &newcc);
+ if (k5err != 0) {
+ // Utter failure to do even the simplest thing
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+ *tgt = malloc (sizeof (**tgt));
+ if (*tgt == NULL) {
+ // Memory error
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ memset (*tgt, 0, sizeof (**tgt));
+ if ((sought != NULL) && (sought1 == NULL)) {
+ // We only tried one name
+ sought1 = sought;
+ sought = NULL;
+ }
+ do {
+ if (sought1 == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (p11uri == NULL) {
+ k5err = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab (
+ ctx,
+ *tgt,
+ sought1,
+ kt,
+ 0, /* start now please */
+ NULL, /* get a TGT please */
+ NULL); //TODO// opts needed?
+ } else {
+ //TODO// Prepare PKCS #11 access
+ k5err = krb5_get_init_creds_password (
+ ctx,
+ *tgt,
+ sought1,
+#ifdef TOM_IS_WEG
+ NULL, // Use callbacks for password
+ clisrv_p11krb_callback,
+#else
+ "1234",
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ cmd, /* callback data pointer */
+ 0, /* start now please */
+ NULL, /* get a TGT please */
+ NULL); //TODO// opts needed?
+ //TODO// End PKCS #11 access
+ }
+ krb5_free_principal (ctx, sought1);
+ sought1 = sought;
+ sought = NULL;
+ } while (k5err != 0);
+ if (k5err != 0) {
+ // Failed to initiate new credentials
+ krb5_free_creds (ctx, *tgt);
+ *tgt = NULL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ // Try to store the credential, if it was found
+ if (sought1 != NULL) {
+ k5err = krb5_cc_initialize (ctx, newcc, sought1);
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ k5err = krb5_cc_store_cred (ctx, newcc, *tgt);
+ }
+ }
+ // Copy the keyblock; any failure will show up in key
+ krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (ctx,
+ &(*tgt)->keyblock, //TODO:UNINIT// &ktentry.key,
+ key);
+ //
+ // We succeeded in setting up a new Ticket Granting Ticket!
+ if (cc != NULL) {
+ *cc = newcc;
+ newcc = NULL;
+ }
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ //
+ // As a last resort, dig up a key directly from the keytab;
+ // this is the only place where kvno and enctype are used
+ if (kt != NULL) {
+ //NOTE// Might be more direct as krb5_kt_read_service_key()
+ k5err = krb5_kt_get_entry (
+ ctx, kt,
+ sought,
+ kvno, enctype,
+ &ktentry);
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ k5err = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (ctx,
+ &ktentry.key,
+ key);
+ krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents (ctx, &ktentry);
+ // On failure, key shows failure.
+ if (cc != NULL) {
+ *cc = newcc;
+ newcc = NULL;
+ }
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+ //
+ // Nothing more to try, so we continue into cleanup
+cleanup:
+ //
+ // Cleanup and return the <key,tgt> values as they were delivered
+ if (sought1 != NULL) {
+ krb5_free_principal (ctx, sought1);
+ sought1 = NULL;
+ }
+ if (sought != NULL) {
+ krb5_free_principal (ctx, sought);
+ sought = NULL;
+ }
+ if (tgtname != NULL) {
+ krb5_free_principal (ctx, tgtname);
+ tgtname = NULL;
+ }
+ if (newcc != NULL) {
+ krb5_cc_close (ctx, newcc);
+ newcc = NULL;
+ }
+ if (key->contents == NULL) {
+ if (k5err != 0) {
+ const char *errmsg = krb5_get_error_message (ctx, k5err);
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON, LOG_ERR, "Kerberos error in have_key_tgt_cc: %s", errmsg);
+ krb5_free_error_message (ctx, errmsg);
+ }
+ if (*tgt != NULL) {
+ krb5_free_creds (ctx, *tgt);
+ *tgt = NULL;
+ }
+ if ((cc != NULL) && (*cc != NULL)) {
+ krb5_cc_close (ctx, *cc);
+ *cc = NULL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ } else if (tgt == NULL) {
+ if ((cc != NULL) && (*cc != NULL)) {
+ krb5_cc_close (ctx, *cc);
+ *cc = NULL;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ } else if ((cc == NULL) || (*cc == NULL)) {
+ return 2;
+ } else {
+ return 3;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/* Have a ticket for the remote service. Do this as a client. The client
+ * principal and realm are provided, and the ticket to be returned will
+ * also provide the accompanying key.
+ *
+ * This function will incorporate the peer TGT, when it is provided. This
+ * is the case in KDH-Only exchanges with a non-empty Server Certificate.
+ *
+ * TODO: We are not currently serving backend tickets, but these could be
+ * passed in as authorization data along with the credential request.
+ * Note however, that authorization data is copied by default from the TGT,
+ * but not necessarily from the request. Not without KDC modifications.
+ * But then again, the KDC should have responded with an error that it was
+ * missing backend services; this is not something the client should decide
+ * on, and certainly not after being requested by the service. The error
+ * and recovery could be implemented here (if we can get the error info out
+ * of the libkrb5 API). Alternatively, we might consider passing the
+ * authorization data in the authenticator since we get to control it.
+ * What will the specification say?
+ *
+ * The return value indicates how many of the requested output values have
+ * been provided, counting from the first. So, 0 means a total failure and
+ * anything higher is a (partial) success.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+static int have_service_ticket (
+ struct command *cmd, // in, session context
+ krb5_context ctx, // in, kerberos context
+ krb5_ccache cc_opt, // in/opt, credcache
+ krb5_principal cli, // in, client principal
+ krb5_creds **ticket) {// out, tkt granting tkt
+ int k5err = 0;
+ krb5_ccache cc = cc_opt;
+ krb5_flags u2u = 0;
+ krb5_principal srv = NULL;
+ krb5_data tkt_srv;
+ krb5_creds credreq;
+ //
+ // Sanity checks and initialisation
+ memset (&tkt_srv, 0, sizeof (tkt_srv));
+ memset (&credreq, 0, sizeof (credreq));
+ *ticket = NULL;
+ //
+ // Determine the optional cc parameter if it was not provided
+ //TODO// This can go if we always get it passed from have_key_tgt_cc()
+ if (cc == NULL) {
+ k5err = krb5_cc_cache_match (ctx, cli, &cc);
+ if (k5err != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+ //
+ // Build the server's principal name
+ const char *svc = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.service;
+ const char *rid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
+ const char *riddom;
+ char **realms;
+ char realm [128];
+ riddom = strrchr (rid, '@');
+ if (riddom != NULL) {
+ riddom++; // Skip '@'
+ } else {
+ riddom = rid; // localid is a host
+ }
+ k5err = krb5_get_host_realm (ctx, riddom, &realms);
+ if ((k5err == 0) && (realms [0] != NULL) && (*realms [0] != '\0')) {
+ strncpy (realm, realms [0], sizeof (realm));
+ realm [sizeof (realm)-1] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ int i = 0;
+ do {
+ realm [i] = toupper (riddom [i]);
+ i++;
+ } while (riddom [i-1] != '\0');
+ }
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ krb5_free_host_realm (ctx, realms);
+ } else {
+ k5err = 0;
+ }
+ if (strcmp (svc, "http") == 0) {
+ svc = "HTTP";
+ }
+ k5err = krb5_build_principal_ext (ctx, &srv,
+ strlen (realm), realm,
+ strlen (svc), svc,
+ strlen (rid), rid,
+ 0);
+ if (k5err != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ srv->type = KRB5_NT_SRV_HST;
+ //
+ // Construct credential request
+ credreq.client = cli;
+ credreq.server = srv;
+ //TODO// credreq.authdata may be used for backend service tickets
+ //
+ // See if our peer provided us with a TGT
+ // - we are sure of GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE because we implement it now
+ // - we must ensure that this is KDH-Only (remote GNUTLS_CRT_KRB)
+ // - we must ensure that the remote provided a non-empty ticket
+ if (gnutls_certificate_type_get_peers (cmd->session) == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
+ // This is KDH-Only -- and the server may present a TGT
+ const gnutls_datum_t *opt_srv_tkt;
+ unsigned int srv_tkt_count;
+ opt_srv_tkt = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (cmd->session, &srv_tkt_count);
+ if ((opt_srv_tkt != NULL) && (srv_tkt_count >= 1) && (opt_srv_tkt [0].size > 5)) {
+ // Looks good, we'll use only the first (normally only) one
+ credreq.second_ticket.data = opt_srv_tkt [0].data;
+ credreq.second_ticket.length = opt_srv_tkt [0].size;
+ u2u = KRB5_GC_USER_USER;
+ }
+ }
+ //
+ // Fetch the ticket for the service
+ k5err = krb5_get_credentials (ctx, u2u, cc, &credreq, ticket);
+ //
+ // Cleanup and return; the return value depends on k5err
+cleanup:
+ if ((cc != NULL) && (cc_opt == NULL)) {
+ //TODO// This can go if we always get it passed from have_key_tgt_cc()
+ krb5_cc_close (ctx, cc);
+ cc = NULL;
+ }
+ if (srv != NULL) {
+ krb5_free_principal (ctx, srv);
+ }
+ return (k5err == 0) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/* DER utility: This should probably appear in Quick DER sometime soon.
+ *
+ * Pack an Int32 or UInt32 and return the number of bytes. Do not pack a header
+ * around it. The function returns the number of bytes taken, even 0 is valid.
+ */
+typedef uint8_t QDERBUF_INT32_T [4];
+dercursor qder2b_pack_int32 (uint8_t *target_4b, int32_t value) {
+ dercursor retval;
+ int shift = 24;
+ retval.derptr = target_4b;
+ retval.derlen = 0;
+ while (shift >= 0) {
+ if ((retval.derlen == 0) && (shift > 0)) {
+ // Skip sign-extending initial bytes
+ uint32_t neutro = (value >> (shift - 1) ) & 0x000001ff;
+ if ((neutro == 0x000001ff) || (neutro == 0x00000000)) {
+ shift -= 8;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ target_4b [retval.derlen] = (value >> shift) & 0xff;
+ retval.derlen++;
+ shift -= 8;
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+typedef uint8_t QDERBUF_UINT32_T [5];
+dercursor qder2b_pack_uint32 (uint8_t *target_5b, uint32_t value) {
+ dercursor retval;
+ int ofs = 0;
+ if (value & 0x80000000) {
+ *target_5b = 0x00;
+ ofs = 1;
+ }
+ retval = qder2b_pack_int32 (target_5b + ofs, (int32_t) value);
+ retval.derptr -= ofs;
+ retval.derlen += ofs;
+ return retval;
+}
+
+
+/* DER utility: This should probably appear in Quick DER sometime soon.
+ *
+ * Unpack an Int32 or UInt32 from a given number of bytes. Do not assume a header
+ * around it. The function returns the value found.
+ *
+ * Out of range values are returned as 0. This value only indicates invalid
+ * return when len > 1, so check for that.
+ */
+int32_t qder2b_unpack_int32 (dercursor data4) {
+ int32_t retval = 0;
+ int idx;
+ if (data4.derlen > 4) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((data4.derlen > 0) && (0x80 & *data4.derptr)) {
+ retval = -1;
+ }
+ for (idx=0; idx<data4.derlen; idx++) {
+ retval <<= 8;
+ retval += data4.derptr [idx];
+ }
+done:
+ return retval;
+}
+uint32_t qder2b_unpack_uint32 (dercursor data5) {
+ uint32_t retval = 0;
+ int ofs = 0;
+ if (data5.derlen > 5) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (data5.derlen == 5) {
+ if (*data5.derptr != 0x00) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ // Modify the local copy on our stack
+ data5.derlen--;
+ data5.derptr++;
+ }
+ retval = (uint32_t) qder2b_unpack_int32 (data5);
+done:
+ return retval;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+/* TODO: Debugging function for printing (descr,ptr,len) ranges */
+static inline void prange (char *descr, uint8_t *ptr, int len) {
+ fprintf (stderr, "%s #%04d: %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x...%02x %02x %02x %02x\n",
+ descr, len,
+ ptr [0], ptr [1], ptr [2], ptr [3],
+ ptr [4], ptr [5], ptr [6], ptr [7],
+ ptr [len-4], ptr [len-3], ptr [len-2], ptr [len-1]);
+}
+static inline void prangefull (char *descr, uint8_t *ptr, int len) {
+ fprintf (stderr, "%s #%04d:", descr, len);
+ while (len-- > 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, " %02x", *ptr++);
+ }
+ fprintf (stderr, "\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/* The callback function that retrieves a TLS-KDH "signature", which is kept
+ * outside of GnuTLS. The callback computes an authenticator encrypted to
+ * the session's Kerberos key.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+static gtls_error cli_kdhsig_encode (gnutls_session_t session,
+ gnutls_datum_t *enc_authenticator,
+ gnutls_datum_t *dec_authenticator,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *hash,
+ int32_t checksum_type) {
+ //
+ // Variables, sanity checking, initialisation
+ struct command *cmd;
+ int k5err = 0;
+ authenticator_t auth;
+ QDERBUF_INT32_T derv5;
+ QDERBUF_INT32_T dernametype;
+ QDERBUF_INT32_T dercksumtype;
+ krb5_keyblock subkey;
+ gnutls_certificate_type_t peercert;
+ QDERBUF_INT32_T dersubkey;
+ krb5_timestamp now_s;
+ char derctime [100];
+ krb5_int32 now_us;
+ QDERBUF_INT32_T dercusec;
+ cmd = (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (session);
+ memset (&auth, 0, sizeof (auth));
+ memset (&subkey, 0, sizeof (subkey));
+ assert (cmd->krbid_cli != NULL);
+ assert (cmd->krb_key.contents != NULL);
+ static const uint8_t auth_packer [] = {
+ DER_PACK_rfc4120_Authenticator, DER_PACK_END };
+ static const uint8_t encdata_packer [] = {
+ DER_PACK_rfc4120_EncryptedData, DER_PACK_END };
+ //
+ // Setup secure hash in authenticator (never optional for TLS-KDH)
+ auth.cksum.cksumtype = qder2b_pack_int32 (dercksumtype, checksum_type);
+ auth.cksum.checksum.derptr = hash->data;
+ auth.cksum.checksum.derlen = hash->size;
+ //
+ // Optionally include a subkey (namely, for KDH-Only)
+ peercert = gnutls_certificate_type_get_peers (session);
+ if (peercert == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
+ // This is KDH-Only, for which we MUST create a random subkey
+ k5err = krb5_c_make_random_key (
+ krbctx_cli,
+ ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+ &subkey);
+ if (k5err != 0) {
+ return GNUTLS_E_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ auth.subkey.keytype = qder2b_pack_int32 (dersubkey, subkey.enctype);
+ auth.subkey.keyvalue.derptr = subkey.contents;
+ auth.subkey.keyvalue.derlen = subkey.length;
+prange ("cli_K", subkey.contents, subkey.length);
+ }
+ //
+ // Setup the client realm and principal name
+ auth.crealm.derptr = cmd->krbid_cli->realm.data;
+ auth.crealm.derlen = cmd->krbid_cli->realm.length;
+ auth.cname.name_type = qder2b_pack_int32 (dernametype, cmd->krbid_cli->type);
+ // The SEQUENCE OF with just one component is trivial to prepack
+ auth.cname.name_string.derptr = cmd->krbid_cli->data [0].data;
+ auth.cname.name_string.derlen = cmd->krbid_cli->data [0].length;
+ //
+ // Setup the Kerberos version number (5)
+ auth.authenticator_vno = qder2b_pack_int32 (derv5, 5);
+ //
+ // Setup the obliged microsecond timer values (ignore error returns)
+ krb5_us_timeofday (krbctx_cli, &now_s, &now_us);
+ krb5_timestamp_to_string (now_s, derctime, sizeof (derctime));
+ derctime [sizeof (derctime)-1] = '\0';
+ auth.ctime.derptr = derctime;
+ auth.ctime.derlen = strlen (derctime);
+ auth.cusec = qder2b_pack_int32 (dercusec, now_us);
+ //
+ // Pack the decoded result into dec_authenticator
+ size_t declen = der_pack ( auth_packer,
+ (const dercursor *) &auth,
+ NULL // Measure length, no output yet
+ );
+ uint8_t *decptr = gnutls_malloc (declen);
+ if (decptr == NULL) {
+ return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
+ }
+ der_pack ( auth_packer,
+ (const dercursor *) &auth,
+ decptr + declen);
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents (krbctx_cli, &subkey);
+prangefull ("cli_A", decptr, declen);
+ size_t rawlen;
+ if (0 != krb5_c_encrypt_length (krbctx_cli,
+ cmd->krb_key.enctype,
+ declen,
+ &rawlen)) {
+ gnutls_free (decptr);
+ return GNUTLS_E_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ uint8_t *rawptr = gnutls_malloc (rawlen);
+ if (rawptr == NULL) {
+ gnutls_free (decptr);
+ return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
+ }
+ krb5_data decdata;
+ krb5_enc_data rawdata;
+ memset (&decdata, 0, sizeof (decdata));
+ memset (&rawdata, 0, sizeof (rawdata));
+ decdata.data = decptr;
+ decdata.length = declen;
+ rawdata.ciphertext.data = rawptr;
+ rawdata.ciphertext.length = rawlen;
+ if (0 != krb5_c_encrypt ( krbctx_cli,
+ &cmd->krb_key,
+ 11 /* stealing key usage from AP-REQ */,
+ NULL,
+ &decdata,
+ &rawdata)) {
+ gnutls_free (rawptr);
+ gnutls_free (decptr);
+ return GNUTLS_E_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ //
+ // Prepare the header information
+ QDERBUF_INT32_T deretype;
+ QDERBUF_UINT32_T derkvno;
+ encrypted_data_t encdata;
+ memset (&encdata, 0, sizeof (encdata));
+ encdata.etype = qder2b_pack_int32 (deretype, cmd->krb_key.enctype);
+ //NOT// encdata.kvno = qder2b_pack_int32 (derkvno, cmd->krb_key.kvno);
+ encdata.cipher.derptr = rawdata.ciphertext.data;
+ encdata.cipher.derlen = rawdata.ciphertext.length;
+ //
+ // Prepare for packing the header and rawdata as EncryptedData
+ size_t enclen = der_pack ( encdata_packer,
+ (const dercursor *) &encdata,
+ NULL // Measure length, no output yet
+ );
+ uint8_t *encptr = gnutls_malloc (enclen);
+ if (encptr == NULL) {
+ gnutls_free (rawptr);
+ gnutls_free (decptr);
+ return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
+ }
+ der_pack ( encdata_packer,
+ (const dercursor *) &encdata,
+ encptr + enclen);
+ gnutls_free (rawptr);
+ //
+ // Return our final verdict on the generation of the Authenticator
+ dec_authenticator->data = decptr;
+ dec_authenticator->size = declen;
+ enc_authenticator->data = encptr;
+ enc_authenticator->size = enclen;
+prange ("cli_D", decptr, declen);
+prange ("cli_E", encptr, enclen);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/* The callback function that verifies a TLS-KDH "signature", which is kept
+ * outside of GnuTLS. The callback verifies the authenticator against the
+ * provided session hash and returns the decrypted authenticator.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+static int srv_kdhsig_decode (gnutls_session_t session,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *enc_authenticator,
+ gnutls_datum_t *dec_authenticator,
+ gnutls_datum_t *hash,
+ int32_t *checksum_type) {
+ //
+ // Variables, sanity checks and initialisation
+ int k5err = 0;
+ struct command *cmd;
+ static const uint8_t encdata_packer [] = {
+ DER_PACK_rfc4120_EncryptedData, DER_PACK_END };
+ static const uint8_t auth_packer [] = {
+ DER_PACK_rfc4120_Authenticator, DER_PACK_END };
+ encrypted_data_t encdata;
+ cmd = (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (session);
+prange ("srv_E", enc_authenticator->data, enc_authenticator->size);
+ //
+ // Retrieve the session key and store it in cmd->krb_key.
+ //
+ // Prior setting of cmd->krb_key would be due to user-to-user mode
+ // having been setup with this as the server-supplied TGT key, in
+ // which case cmd->krb_key would need to be overwritten by the
+ // session key.
+ //
+ // When no prior cmd->krb_key is available, use the keytab to
+ // decode the client's ticket.
+ assert (gnutls_certificate_type_get_peers (session) == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB);
+ const gnutls_datum_t *certs;
+ unsigned int num_certs;
+ certs = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (cmd->session, &num_certs);
+ if (num_certs != 1) {
+ return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ }
+ krb5_data krbcert;
+ krb5_ticket *tkt;
+ krbcert.data = certs [0].data;
+ krbcert.length = certs [0].size;
+prange ("srv_C", certs [0].data, certs [0].size);
+ if (0 != krb5_decode_ticket (&krbcert, &tkt)) {
+ return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ }
+ if (cmd->krb_key.contents != NULL) {
+ // user-to-user mode
+ k5err = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part (
+ krbctx_srv,
+ &cmd->krb_key,
+ tkt);
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents (
+ krbctx_srv,
+ &cmd->krb_key);
+ } else {
+ // client-to-server mode
+ k5err = krb5_server_decrypt_ticket_keytab (
+ krbctx_srv,
+ krb_kt_srv,
+ tkt);
+ }
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ k5err = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (
+ krbctx_srv,
+ tkt->enc_part2->session,
+ &cmd->krb_key);
+ }
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ k5err = krb5_copy_principal (
+ krbctx_srv,
+ tkt->enc_part2->client,
+ &cmd->krbid_cli);
+ }
+ if (k5err == 0) {
+ if (cmd->krbid_srv != NULL) {
+ k5err = krb5_principal_compare (
+ krbctx_srv,
+ tkt->server,
+ cmd->krbid_srv);
+ // Server name changed since u2u setup => k5err
+ } else {
+ k5err = krb5_copy_principal (
+ krbctx_srv,
+ tkt->server,
+ &cmd->krbid_srv);
+ }
+ }
+ krb5_free_ticket (krbctx_srv, tkt);
+ if (k5err != 0) {
+ const char *errmsg = krb5_get_error_message (krbctx_srv, k5err);
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON, LOG_ERR, "Kerberos error in srv_kdhsig_decode: %s", errmsg);
+ krb5_free_error_message (krbctx_srv, errmsg);
+ return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ }
+ //
+ // Harvest the EncryptedData fields from the enc_authenticator
+ dercursor enctransport;
+ enctransport.derptr = enc_authenticator->data;
+ enctransport.derlen = enc_authenticator->size;
+prangefull ("EncData2unpack", enctransport.derptr, enctransport.derlen);
+ memset (&encdata, 0, sizeof (encdata));
+ if (0 != der_unpack ( &enctransport,
+ encdata_packer,
+ (dercursor *) &encdata,
+ 1)) {
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON, LOG_ERR, "Failed to der_unpack(EncryptedData) in server: %s", strerror (errno));
+ return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ if (encdata.kvno.derptr != NULL) {
+ //TODO//NOTYET//ANDWHY// return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ int32_t etype = qder2b_unpack_int32 (encdata.etype);
+ //
+ // Decrypt the EncryptedData fields into the dec_authenticator
+ krb5_enc_data rawdata;
+ krb5_data decdata;
+ memset (&rawdata, 0, sizeof (rawdata));
+ memset (&decdata, 0, sizeof (decdata));
+ rawdata.enctype = etype;
+ rawdata.ciphertext.data = encdata.cipher.derptr;
+ rawdata.ciphertext.length = encdata.cipher.derlen;
+prange ("srv_R", encdata.cipher.derptr, encdata.cipher.derlen);
+ decdata.data = dec_authenticator->data;
+ decdata.length = dec_authenticator->size;
+ if (0 != krb5_c_decrypt ( krbctx_srv,
+ &cmd->krb_key,
+ 11 /* stealing key usage from AP-REQ */,
+ NULL,
+ &rawdata,
+ &decdata)) {
+ return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ dec_authenticator->size = decdata.length;
+prange ("srv_D", decdata.data, decdata.length);
+ //
+ // Unpack the decrypted Authenticator
+ dercursor decsyntax;
+ decsyntax.derptr = decdata.data;
+ decsyntax.derlen = decdata.length;
+prangefull ("srv_A", decdata.data, decdata.length);
+ authenticator_t auth;
+ memset (&auth, 0, sizeof (auth));
+ if (0 != der_unpack ( &decsyntax,
+ auth_packer,
+ (dercursor *) &auth,
+ 1)) {
+ tlog (TLOG_DAEMON, LOG_ERR, "Failed to der_unpack(Authenticator) in server: %s", strerror (errno));
+ return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ //
+ // Validate the contents of the Authenticator
+ if (qder2b_unpack_int32 (auth.authenticator_vno) != 5) {
+ return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ if (auth.cksum.checksum.derptr == NULL) {
+ return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ if (auth.cksum.checksum.derlen < 16) {
+ return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ //TODO// Optionally, for KDH-Only, ensure presence and size of a subkey
+ //
+ // Produce the requested content from the Authenticator and return
+ *checksum_type = qder2b_unpack_int32 (auth.cksum.cksumtype);
+ hash->data = auth.cksum.checksum.derptr;
+ hash->size = auth.cksum.checksum.derlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+
+/********** VALIDATION EXPRESSION LINKUP TO GNUTLS **********/
+
+
+
+/*
+ * The following functions implement the various validation expression
+ * components in terms of the GnuTLS sessions of this code file.
+ * Some work is repeated in various expression variables, notably the
+ * lookup of a session's peer credentials, and possibly importing them
+ * into X.509 structures. We may at some point decide to instead do
+ * this ahead of time, ath the expense of some compleity and possibly
+ * slow-down of the start of the computations.
+ */
+
+
+
+/* valexp_store_final -- store the valexp outcome in cmd->valexp_result.
+ */
+static void valexp_store_final (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, bool result) {
+ ((struct command *) vcmd)->valexp_result = result;
+}
+
+/* valexp_valflag_set -- set a validation flag bit for an uppercase predicate.
+ */
+static void valexp_valflag_set (struct command *cmd, char pred) {
+ int len = strlen (cmd->valflags);
+ cmd->valflags [len++] = pred;
+ cmd->valflags [len ] = '\0';
+}
+
+/* valexp_valflag_start -- get a prior set bit with validation information.
+ * Where cmd->valflags is a string of uppercase letters that were ensured.
+ */
+static void valexp_valflag_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
+ pred &= 0xdf; // lowercase->uppercase
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, NULL != strchr (cmd->valflags, pred));
+}
+
+/* valexp_0_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function immediately sends failure on something impossible.
+ */
+static void valexp_0_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
+}
+
+/* valexp_1_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function immediately sends success on something trivial.
+ */
+static void valexp_1_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 1);
+}
+
+//TODO// valexp_L_start, valexp_l_start
+
+/* valexp_I_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function ensures that the remote peer provides an identity.
+ * TODO: We should compare the hostname as well, or compare if in remoteid
+ * TODO: We may need to support more than just X509/PGP certificates
+ */
+static void valexp_I_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
+ int ok = 1;
+ ok = ok && (cmd->remote_auth_type == GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE);
+ ok = ok && (cmd->remote_cert_count > 0);
+ // Accept most certificates, but not for example GNUTLS_CRT_RAW
+ ok = ok && (
+#ifdef GNUTLS_CRT_KRB
+ (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) ||
+#endif
+ (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) ||
+ (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) );
+ // peer-returned "certs" points into GnuTLS' internal data structures
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, ok);
+}
+
+/* valexp_i_start -- is opportunistic and will always succeed
+ */
+#define valexp_i_start valexp_1_start
+
+/* valexp_Ff_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This functin ensures that forward secrecy is applied.
+ * While _F_ only accepts DHE, _f_ will also accept DH.
+ * Note: GnuTLS does not seem to show DH that is not also DHE.
+ */
+static void valexp_Ff_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
+ gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx = gnutls_kx_get (cmd->session);
+ switch (kx) {
+ case GNUTLS_KX_UNKNOWN:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_RSA:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_RSA_EXPORT:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_PSK:
+ default:
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
+ break;
+ case GNUTLS_KX_DHE_DSS:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_DHE_RSA:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_SRP:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_SRP_RSA:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_SRP_DSS:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_DHE_PSK:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_ECDHE_RSA:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_ECDHE_ECDSA:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_ECDHE_PSK:
+ case GNUTLS_KX_ANON_ECDH: // Assume DHE is in fact implemented
+ case GNUTLS_KX_ANON_DH: // Assume DHE is in fact implemented
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 1);
+ break;
+ // case GNUTLS_KX_xxx_DH:
+ // valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, pred != 'F');
+ // break;
+ }
+}
+
+/* valexp_A_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function ensures that an anonymising precursor is used.
+ */
+#define valexp_A_start valexp_valflag_start
+
+/* valexp_a_start -- is opportunistic and will always succeed */
+#define valexp_a_start valexp_1_start
+
+/* valexp_Tt_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function ensures trust based on a trusted certificate/key list.
+ * In the _t_ case, self-signed certificates are also accepted.
+ */
+static void valexp_Tt_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
+ int flagval = 0;
+ unsigned int vfyresult;
+ int bad;
+ int i;
+ if (cmd->vfystatus != 0) {
+ goto setflagval;
+ }
+ if (cmd->remote_auth_type != GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE) {
+ goto setflagval;
+ }
+ //
+ // Handle self-signed peer certificates in a special way
+ if (cmd->remote_cert_count == 1) {
+ int bad = 0;
+ bad = bad || (pred == 'T'); // Reject self-signed
+ if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
+ vfyresult = 0;
+ bad = bad || gnutls_x509_crt_verify (
+ (gnutls_x509_crt_t ) cmd->remote_cert [0],
+ (gnutls_x509_crt_t *) &cmd->remote_cert [0], 1,
+ GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN,
+ &vfyresult);
+ // Apply the most stringent test. This includes all of
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID (always set, often with others)
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_EXPIRED
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA => oops...
+ // stopped with GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM
+ bad = bad || (vfyresult != 0);
+ if (!bad) {
+ flagval = 1;
+ goto setflagval;
+ }
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
+ //TODO// Prefer to actually check PGP self-signature
+ //TODO// But only value is check private-key ownership
+ flagval = 0;
+ goto setflagval;
+#ifdef GNUTLS_CRT_KRB
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
+ // Kerberos has authenticated the ticket for us
+ //TODO// Should we try reading from the ticket/auth?
+ flagval = 1;
+ goto setflagval;
+#endif
+ }
+ if (bad) {
+ goto setflagval;
+ }
+ }
+ if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
+ // Now check the certificate chain, taking CA bits into account
+ for (i=1; i<cmd->remote_cert_count; i++) {
+ vfyresult = 0;
+ bad = bad || gnutls_x509_crt_verify (
+ (gnutls_x509_crt_t ) cmd->remote_cert [i-1],
+ (gnutls_x509_crt_t *) &cmd->remote_cert [i], 1,
+ 0,
+ &vfyresult);
+ // Apply the most stringent test. This includes all of
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID (always set, often with others)
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_EXPIRED
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA => oops...
+ // stopped with GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
+ // GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM
+ bad = bad || (vfyresult != 0);
+ }
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
+ ; //TODO// Check PGP direct signature (and also use in self-sig)
+#ifdef GNUTLS_CRT_KRB
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
+ ; // Trust has already been validated through Kerberos
+#endif
+ }
+setflagval:
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, flagval);
+}
+
+/* valexp_Dd_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function validates through DNSSEC.
+ * While _D_ enforces DNSSEC, _d_ also accepts opted-out security.
+ */
+static void valexp_Dd_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
+ int flagval = 0;
+ dane_state_t stat;
+ unsigned int vfystat;
+ char *host;
+ char *proto;
+ int sox;
+ struct sockaddr peername;
+ socklen_t peernamesz = sizeof (peername);
+ uint16_t port;
+ host = strchr (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid, '@');
+ if (host == NULL) {
+ host = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
+ }
+ switch (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.ipproto) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP:
+ proto = "tcp";
+ break;
+ case IPPROTO_UDP:
+ proto = "udp";
+ break;
+ case IPPROTO_SCTP:
+ proto = "sctp";
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto setflagval;
+ }
+ sox = gnutls_transport_get_int (cmd->session);
+ if (sox < 0) {
+ goto setflagval;
+ }
+ if (getpeername (sox, &peername, &peernamesz) != 0) {
+ goto setflagval;
+ }
+ if ((peername.sa_family == AF_INET) &&
+ (peernamesz == sizeof (struct sockaddr_in))) {
+ port = ntohs (((struct sockaddr_in *) &peername)->sin_port);
+ } else if ((peername.sa_family == AF_INET6) &&
+ (peernamesz == sizeof (struct sockaddr_in6))) {
+ } else {
+ port = ntohs (((struct sockaddr_in6 *) &peername)->sin6_port);
+ goto setflagval;
+ }
+ //TODO// We might use online.c code instead?
+ if (dane_state_init (&stat, /*TODO:*/ 0) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+ goto setflagval;
+ }
+ if (dane_verify_session_crt (stat,
+ cmd->session,
+ host,
+ proto,
+ port,
+ 0,
+ DANE_VFLAG_FAIL_IF_NOT_CHECKED,
+ &vfystat) == DANE_E_SUCCESS) {
+ if ((pred == 'D') && (vfystat & DANE_VERIFY_UNKNOWN_DANE_INFO)) {
+ dane_state_deinit (stat);
+ goto setflagval;
+ }
+ flagval = ((vfystat & ~DANE_VERIFY_UNKNOWN_DANE_INFO) == 0);
+ }
+ dane_state_deinit (stat);
+setflagval:
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, flagval);
+}
+
+/* valexp_Rr_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function validates through a CRL.
+ * While _R_ requires the CRL to be present, _r_ accepts confirmed absense.
+ * TODO: This is not implemented yet.
+ */
+static void valexp_Rr_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ //TODO//;
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
+}
+
+/* valexp_Ee_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function validates certificate extensions for the named service.
+ * While _E_ required OIDs to be marked critical, _e_ also accepts non-crit.
+ */
+static void valexp_Ee_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ //TODO//;
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
+}
+
+/* valexp_Oo_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function validates with online/live information.
+ * While _O_ required positive confirmation, _o_ also accepts unknown.
+ * -> For X.509, look in OCSP or CRL or Global Directory
+ * -> For OpenPGP, redirect O->G, o->g
+ * -> For Kerberos, accept anything as sufficiently live / online
+ */
+static void valexp_Oo_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
+ int valflag = 0;
+ online2success_t o2vf;
+ char *rid;
+ gnutls_datum_t *raw;
+ if (cmd->remote_auth_type != GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE) {
+ // No authentication types other than certificates yet
+ goto setvalflag;
+ } else {
+ if ((pred >= 'a') && (pred <= 'z')) {
+ o2vf = online2success_optional;
+ } else {
+ o2vf = online2success_enforced;
+ }
+ rid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
+ raw = (gnutls_datum_t *) cmd->remote_cert_raw;
+ if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
+ valflag = o2vf (online_globaldir_pgp (
+ rid,
+ raw->data, raw->size));
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
+ // OCSP inquiry or globaldir
+ valflag = o2vf (online_globaldir_x509 (
+ rid,
+ raw->data, raw->size));
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
+ // Kerberos is sufficiently "live" to be pass O
+ valflag = 1;
+ goto setvalflag;
+#endif
+ } else {
+ // GNUTLS_CRT_RAW, GNUTLS_CRT_UNKNOWN, or other
+ goto setvalflag;
+ }
+ }
+setvalflag:
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, valflag);
+}
+
+/* valexp_Gg_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function validates through the LDAP global directory.
+ * While _G_ requires information to be present, _g_ also accepts absense.
+ * -> For X.509, lookup userCertificate
+ * -> For OpenPGP, lookup pgpKey
+ * -> For KDH, lookup krbPrincipalName
+ * -> For SRP, nothing is defined
+ * -> For OpenSSH, no TLS support
+ */
+static void valexp_Gg_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
+ int valflag = 0;
+ online2success_t o2vf;
+ char *rid;
+ gnutls_datum_t *raw;
+ if (cmd->remote_auth_type != GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE) {
+ // No authentication types other than certificates yet
+ goto setvalflag;
+ } else {
+ if ((pred >= 'a') && (pred <= 'z')) {
+ o2vf = online2success_optional;
+ } else {
+ o2vf = online2success_enforced;
+ }
+ rid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
+ raw = (gnutls_datum_t *) cmd->remote_cert_raw;
+ if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
+ valflag = o2vf (online_globaldir_pgp (
+ rid,
+ raw->data, raw->size));
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
+ //TODO// OCSP inquiry or globaldir
+ valflag = o2vf (online_globaldir_x509 (
+ rid,
+ raw->data, raw->size));
+#ifdef GNUTLS_CRT_KRB
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
+ valflag = 0;
+ //TODO// valflag = o2vf (online_globaldir_kerberos (
+ //TODO// rid,
+ //TODO// raw->data, raw->size));
+#endif
+ } else {
+ // GNUTLS_CRT_RAW, GNUTLS_CRT_UNKNOWN, or other
+ goto setvalflag;
+ }
+ }
+setvalflag:
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, valflag);
+}
+
+/* valexp_Pp_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function validates through pinning information.
+ * While _P_ requires pinning to be present, _p_ will Trust On First Use.
+ */
+static void valexp_Pp_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ //TODO//;
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
+}
+
+/* valexp_U_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function validates a matching username.
+ */
+static void valexp_U_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ //TODO//;
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
+}
+
+/* valexp_Ss_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function ensures that the local end is a server.
+ * While _S_ denies credentials also usable for clients, _s_ permits them.
+ */
+static void valexp_Ss_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
+ int flagval;
+ if ((pred == 'S') && (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT)) {
+ flagval = 0;
+ } else {
+ flagval = (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER) != 0;
+ }
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, flagval);
+}
+
+/* valexp_Cc_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
+ * This function ensures that the local end is a client.
+ * While _C_ denies credentials also usable for servers, _c_ permits them.
+ */
+static void valexp_Cc_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
+ int flagval;
+ if ((pred == 'C') && (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER)) {
+ flagval = 0;
+ } else {
+ flagval = (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT) != 0;
+ }
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, flagval);
+}
+
+
+static void valexp_error_start (void *handler_data, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ assert (0);
+}
+static void valexp_ignore_stop (void *handler_data, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ ; // Nothing to do
+}
+static void valexp_ignore_final (void *handler_data, struct valexp *ve, bool value) {
+ ; // Nothing to do
+}
+
+
+/* Given a predicate, invoke its start routine.
+ */
+static void valexp_switch_start (void *handler_data, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
+ switch (pred) {
+ case 'I':
+ valexp_I_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ valexp_i_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'F':
+ case 'f':
+ valexp_Ff_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'A':
+ valexp_A_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ valexp_a_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ case 't':
+ valexp_Tt_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ case 'd':
+ valexp_Dd_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'R':
+ case 'r':
+ valexp_Rr_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'E':
+ case 'e':
+ valexp_Ee_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'O':
+ case 'o':
+ valexp_Oo_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'G':
+ case 'g':
+ valexp_Gg_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ case 'p':
+ valexp_Pp_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'U':
+ valexp_U_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ case 's':
+ valexp_Ss_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ case 'C':
+ case 'c':
+ valexp_Cc_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
+ break;
+ default:
+ // Called on an unregistered symbol, that spells failure
+ valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return a shared constant structure for valexp_handling with GnuTLS.
+ * This function does not fail; it always returns a non-NULL value.
+ */
+static const struct valexp_handling *have_starttls_validation (void) {
+ static const struct valexp_handling starttls_valexp_handling = {
+ .handler_start = valexp_switch_start,
+ .handler_stop = valexp_ignore_stop,
+ .handler_final = valexp_store_final,
+ };
+ return &starttls_valexp_handling;
+}
+
+
+
+/* If any remote credentials are noted, cleanup on them. This removes
+ * any remote_cert[...] entries, counting up to remote_cert_count which
+ * is naturally set to 0 initially, as well as after this has run.
+ */
+static void cleanup_any_remote_credentials (struct command *cmd) {
+ while (cmd->remote_cert_count > 0) {
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (
+ cmd->remote_cert [--cmd->remote_cert_count]);
+ }
+ memset (cmd->remote_cert, 0, sizeof (cmd->remote_cert));
+}
+
+/* Fetch remote credentials. This can be done after TLS handshaking has
+ * completed, to find the certificates or other credentials provided by
+ * the peer to establish its identity. The validation expression routines
+ * can then refer to this resource, and won't have to request the same
+ * information over and over again. To this end, the information is stored
+ * in the session object. The arrays in which this information is stored
+ * are size-constrained, but that is also a good security precaution.
+ *
+ * The information ends up in the following variables:
+ * - remote_auth_type
+ * - remote_cert_type (if remote_auth_type == GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE)
+ * - remote_cert[...] (if remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE)
+ * - remote_cert_count is the number of entries in remote_cert (up to root)
+ *
+ * When certificates are used, the root certificate is looked up, for
+ * X.509 and PGP.
+ *
+ * After running successfully, a call to cleanup_any_remote_credentials()
+ * must be called to clean up any data in the cmd structure. This may be
+ * done on cmd at any time after initialisation, even multiple times and
+ * even when this call fails. This call actually cleans up anything it
+ * setup in the past, before setting up the data anew.
+ */
+static gtls_error fetch_remote_credentials (struct command *cmd) {
+ gtls_error gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
+ const gnutls_datum_t *certs;
+ unsigned int num_certs;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t x509peers [11]; // Peers + Root for GNUTLS_CRT_X509
+ int i;
+ bool got_chain = 0;
+ int peer_tad = -1;
+
+ // Did we run this before? Then cleanup.
+ cleanup_any_remote_credentials (cmd);
+ //INVOLVES// memset (cmd->remote_cert, 0, sizeof (cmd->remote_cert));
+ //INVOLVES// cmd->remote_cert_count = 0;
+ // Prepare as-yet-unset default return values
+ cmd->remote_auth_type = -1;
+ cmd->remote_cert_raw = NULL;
+ //
+ // Obtain the authentication type for the peer
+ cmd->remote_auth_type = gnutls_auth_get_type (cmd->session);
+ switch (cmd->remote_auth_type) {
+ case GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE:
+ // Continue loading certificates in the GnuTLS format
+ break;
+ case GNUTLS_CRD_ANON:
+ // No basis for any identity claim
+ cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid [0] = '\0';
+ return GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
+ case GNUTLS_CRD_SRP:
+ return GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
+ case GNUTLS_CRD_PSK:
+ return GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
+ default:
+ return GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR;
+ }
+ //
+ // Continue loading the certificate information: X.509, PGP, ...
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+ cmd->remote_cert_type = gnutls_certificate_type_get_peers (cmd->session);
+ certs = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (cmd->session, &num_certs);
+ // Note: server's certs _may_ be DER NULL due to mutual auth in Kerberos
+#else
+ cmd->remote_cert_type = gnutls_certificate_type_get (cmd->session);
+ certs = gnutls_certificate_get (cmd->session, &num_certs);
+#endif
+ if (certs == NULL) {
+ num_certs = 0;
+ }
+ // "certs" points into GnuTLS' internal data structures
+ if ((num_certs < 1) || (num_certs > CERTS_MAX_DEPTH)) {
+ return GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR;
+ }
+ cmd->remote_cert_raw = (void *) &certs [0];
+ //
+ // Turn certificate data into GnuTLS' data structures (to be cleaned)
+ if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
+ peer_tad = TAD_TYPE_X509;
+ for (i=0; i < num_certs; i++) {
+ E_g2e ("Failed to initialise peer X.509 certificate",
+ gnutls_x509_crt_init (
+ (gnutls_x509_crt_t *) &cmd->remote_cert [i]));
+ if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+ cmd->remote_cert_count++;
+ }
+ E_g2e ("Failed to import peer X.509 certificate",
+ gnutls_x509_crt_import (
+ cmd->remote_cert [i],
+ &certs [i], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER));
+ }
+ if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
+ peer_tad = TAD_TYPE_PGP;
+ E_g2e ("Failed to initialise peer PGP key",
+ gnutls_x509_crt_init (
+ (gnutls_x509_crt_t *) &cmd->remote_cert [0]));
+ if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+ cmd->remote_cert_count = 1;
+ }
+ E_g2e ("Failed to import peer PGP key",
+ gnutls_openpgp_crt_import (
+ cmd->remote_cert [0],
+ &certs [0], GNUTLS_OPENPGP_FMT_RAW));
+ if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Lookup the trusted party that the peers certificates is promoting.
+ // Note that even if the peer ends in a CA cert (which it may not
+ // always send along) then we can still add it ourselves again :-)
+ // Only worry might be that CA certs require no AuthorityKeyIdentifier.
+ if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
+ // Retrieve the AuthorityKeyIdentifier from last (or semi-last)
+ uint8_t id [100];
+ size_t idsz;
+ DBT rootca;
+ DBT anchor;
+ DBC *crs_trust = NULL;
+ int db_errno;
+ gnutls_datum_t anchor_gnutls;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t dbroot;
+ dbt_init_empty (&rootca);
+ dbt_init_empty (&anchor);
+ idsz = sizeof (id);
+ gtls_errno = gnutls_x509_crt_get_authority_key_id (
+ cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count-1],
+ id, &idsz,
+ NULL);
+ if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) {
+ // Only retry if the last is a signer, possibly CA
+ if (cmd->remote_cert_count == 1) {
+ // Permit self-signed certificate evaluation
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_count > 1) {
+ // Assume the last is a root cert, as it lacks authid
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (
+ cmd->remote_cert [--cmd->remote_cert_count]);
+ cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count] = NULL;
+ idsz = sizeof (id);
+ gtls_errno = gnutls_x509_crt_get_authority_key_id (
+ cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count-1],
+ id, &idsz,
+ NULL);
+ }
+ }
+ if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ // Get root cert from trustdb into remote_cert [_count++]
+ dbt_init_fixbuf (&rootca, id, idsz);
+ dbt_init_malloc (&anchor);
+ E_d2e ("Failed to create db_disclose cursor",
+ dbh_trust->cursor (
+ dbh_trust,
+ cmd->txn,
+ &crs_trust,
+ 0));
+ E_d2e ("X.509 authority key identifier not found in trust database",
+ dba_trust_iterate (
+ crs_trust, &rootca, &anchor));
+ while (db_errno == 0) {
+ // Process "anchor" entry (inasfar as meaningful)
+ uint32_t anchorflags;
+ uint8_t *trustdata;
+ int trustdatalen;
+ char *valexp; //TODO// Initiate this before cleanup
+ int tstatus = trust_interpret (&anchor, &anchorflags, &valexp, &trustdata, &trustdatalen);
+ dbt_free (&anchor);
+ if (tstatus != TAD_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
+ // Signal any DB error to bail out of this loop
+ db_errno = DB_KEYEMPTY;
+ } else if ((anchorflags & TAD_TYPE_MASK) != peer_tad) {
+ ; // Skip unsought trust database entry
+ } else if ((anchorflags & TAD_TYPE_MASK) == TAD_TYPE_X509) {
+ E_g2e ("Certificate chain too long",
+ (cmd->remote_cert_count >= CERTS_MAX_DEPTH)
+ ? GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR
+ : GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+ // Turn the anchor into an X.509 certificate
+ E_g2e ("Failet to initialise X.509 peer trust anchor",
+ gnutls_x509_crt_init ((gnutls_x509_crt_t *) &cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count]));
+ if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+ cmd->remote_cert_count++;
+ anchor_gnutls.data = anchor.data;
+ anchor_gnutls.size = anchor.size;
+ E_g2e ("Failed to import X.509 peer trust anchor",
+ gnutls_x509_crt_import (cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count-1], &anchor_gnutls, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER));
+ }
+ if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+ // Everything worked, we have a chain
+ got_chain = 1;
+ if (cmd->trust_valexp) {
+ free (cmd->trust_valexp);
+ }
+ cmd->trust_valexp = strdup (valexp);
+ } else {
+ // Signal arbitrary DB error
+ db_errno = DB_KEYEMPTY;
+ }
+ } else if ((anchorflags & TAD_TYPE_MASK) == TAD_TYPE_REVOKE_X509) {
+ //TODO// Possibly verify end cert revocation
+ } else {
+ /* Ignore entry, continue with the next */;
+ }
+ db_errno = dba_trust_iterate (crs_trust, &rootca, &anchor);
+ }
+ if (crs_trust != NULL) {
+ crs_trust->close (crs_trust);
+ crs_trust = NULL;
+ }
+ dbt_free (&anchor);
+ // No dbt_free (&rootca) because it is set to a fixed buffer
+ if (db_errno != DB_NOTFOUND) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
+ ; //TODO// Attempt to load PGP direct signer(s)
+ ; //OPTION// May use the _count for alternative signers!
+ ; //OPTION// May setup/reload a keyring based on trust.db
+#ifdef GNUTLS_CRT_KRB
+ } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
+ ; //TODO// Process as appropriate for Kerberos (store Ticket?)
+#endif
+ }
+ //
+ // Cleanup (when returning an error code) and return
+cleanup:
+ if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+ cleanup_any_remote_credentials (cmd);
+ }
+ while ((!got_chain) && (cmd->remote_cert_count > 1)) {
+ --cmd->remote_cert_count;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (
+ cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count]);
+ cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count] = NULL;
+ }
+ return gtls_errno;
+}
+
+
+/* Fetch local credentials. This can be done before TLS is started, to find
+ * the possible authentication forms that can be offered. The function
+ * can additionally be used after interaction with the client to establish
+ * a local identity that was not initially provided, or that was not
+ * considered public at the time.
+ */
+gtls_error fetch_local_credentials (struct command *cmd) {
+ int lidrole;
+ char *lid, *rid;
+ DBC *crs_disclose = NULL;
+ DBC *crs_localid = NULL;
+ DBT discpatn;
+ DBT keydata;
+ DBT creddata;
+ selector_t remote_selector;
+ int gtls_errno = 0;
+ int db_errno = 0;
+ int found = 0;
+ gtls_error certificate_onthefly (struct command *cmd);
+
+ //
+ // When applicable, try to create an on-the-fly certificate
+ if (((cmd->cmd.pio_cmd == PIOC_STARTTLS_V2) &&
+ (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALID_ONTHEFLY))
+ || ((cmd->cmd.pio_cmd == PIOC_LIDENTRY_CALLBACK_V2) &&
+ (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_lidentry.flags & PIOF_LIDENTRY_ONTHEFLY))) {
+ gtls_errno = certificate_onthefly (cmd);
+ if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) {
+ // This includes GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: otfcert retrieval returned %d\n", gtls_errno);
+ return gtls_errno;
+ } else {
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: otfcert retrieval returned GNUTLS_E_AGAIN, so skip it\n", gtls_errno);
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS; // Attempt failed, ignore
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Setup a number of common references and structures
+ // Note: Current GnuTLS cannot support being a peer
+ if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT) {
+ lidrole = LID_ROLE_CLIENT;
+ } else if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER) {
+ lidrole = LID_ROLE_SERVER;
+ } else {
+ E_g2e ("TLS Pool command supports neither local client nor local server role",
+ GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION);
+ return gtls_errno;
+ }
+ lid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid;
+ rid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
+
+ //
+ // Refuse to disclose client credentials when the server name is unset;
+ // note that server-claimed identities are unproven during handshake.
+ if ((lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) && (*rid == '\0')) {
+ tlog (TLOG_USER, LOG_ERR, "No remote identity (server name) set, so no client credential disclosure");
+ E_g2e ("Missing remote ID",
+ GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND);
+ return gtls_errno;
+ }
+ //
+ // Setup database iterators to map identities to credentials
+ if (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) {
+ E_d2e ("Failed to create db_disclose cursor",
+ dbh_disclose->cursor (
+ dbh_disclose,
+ cmd->txn,
+ &crs_disclose,
+ 0));
+ }
+ E_d2e ("Failed to create db_localid cursor",
+ dbh_localid->cursor (
+ dbh_localid,
+ cmd->txn,
+ &crs_localid,
+ 0));
+ //
+ // Prepare for iteration over possible local identities / credentials
+ char mid [128];
+ char cid [128];
+ if (gtls_errno != 0) {
+ ; // Skip setup
+ } else if (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) {
+ memcpy (cid, rid, sizeof (cid));
+ dbt_init_fixbuf (&discpatn, cid, strlen (cid));
+ dbt_init_fixbuf (&keydata, mid, sizeof (mid)-1);
+ dbt_init_malloc (&creddata);
+ selector_t ridsel;
+ donai_t remote_donai = donai_from_stable_string (rid, strlen (rid));
+ if (!selector_iterate_init (&remote_selector, &remote_donai)) {
+ E_g2e ("Syntax of remote ID unsuitable for selector",
+ GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
+ } else {
+ E_d2e ("Failed to start iterator on remote ID selector",
+ dbcred_iterate_from_remoteid_selector (
+ crs_disclose,
+ crs_localid,
+ &remote_selector,
+ &discpatn,
+ &keydata,
+ &creddata));
+ }
+ } else {
+ dbt_init_fixbuf (&discpatn, "", 0); // Unused but good style
+ dbt_init_fixbuf (&keydata, lid, strlen (lid));
+ dbt_init_malloc (&creddata);
+ E_d2e ("Failed to start iterator on local ID",
+ dbcred_iterate_from_localid (
+ crs_localid,
+ &keydata,
+ &creddata));
+ }
+ if (db_errno != 0) {
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_DB_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Now store the local identities inasfar as they are usable
+ db_errno = 0;
+ while ((gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) && (db_errno == 0)) {
+ int ok;
+ uint32_t flags;
+ int lidtype;
+
+ tlog (TLOG_DB, LOG_DEBUG, "Found BDB entry %s disclosed to %s", creddata.data + 4, (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT)? rid: "all clients");
+ ok = dbcred_flags (
+ &creddata,
+ &flags);
+ lidtype = flags & LID_TYPE_MASK;
+ ok = ok && ((flags & lidrole) != 0);
+ ok = ok && ((flags & LID_NO_PKCS11) == 0);
+ ok = ok && (lidtype >= LID_TYPE_MIN);
+ ok = ok && (lidtype <= LID_TYPE_MAX);
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+ // For current/simple Kerberos, refuse data after PKCS #11 URI
+ ok = ok && ((lidtype != LID_TYPE_KRB5) || (NULL == memchr (creddata.data + 4, '\0', creddata.size - 4 - 1)));
+#endif
+ tlog (TLOG_DB, LOG_DEBUG, "BDB entry has flags=0x%08x, so we (%04x/%04x) %s it", flags, lidrole, LID_ROLE_MASK, ok? "store": "skip ");
+ if (ok) {
+ if (cmd->lids [lidtype - LID_TYPE_MIN].data != NULL) {
+ free (cmd->lids [lidtype - LID_TYPE_MIN].data);
+ }
+ // Move the credential into the command structure
+ dbt_store (&creddata,
+ &cmd->lids [lidtype - LID_TYPE_MIN]);
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Storing cmd->lids[%d].data 0x%016x\n", lidtype-LID_TYPE_MIN, cmd->lids [lidtype-LID_TYPE_MIN].data);
+ found = 1;
+ } else {
+ // Skip the credential by freeing its data structure
+ dbt_free (&creddata);
+ }
+ db_errno = dbcred_iterate_next (crs_disclose, crs_localid, &discpatn, &keydata, &creddata);
+ }
+
+ if (db_errno == DB_NOTFOUND) {
+ if (!found) {
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ }
+ }
+ if (crs_localid != NULL) {
+ crs_localid->close (crs_localid);
+ crs_localid = NULL;
+ }
+ if (crs_disclose != NULL) {
+ crs_disclose->close (crs_disclose);
+ crs_disclose = NULL;
+ }
+ return gtls_errno;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check if a given cmd has the given LID_TYPE setup.
+ * Return 1 for yes or 0 for no; this is used in priority strings.
+ */
+static inline int lidtpsup (struct command *cmd, int lidtp) {
return cmd->lids [lidtp - LID_TYPE_MIN].data != NULL;
}
// - Configured security parameters (database? variable?)
// - CTYPEs, SRP, ANON-or-not --> fill in as + or - characters
if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
- char priostr [256];
+ char priostr [512];
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
snprintf (priostr, sizeof (priostr)-1,
// "NORMAL:-RSA:" -- also ECDH-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, ...DSA...
"NONE:"
+ "%%ASYM_CERT_TYPES:"
"+VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-DTLS-ALL:"
"+COMP-NULL:"
"+CIPHER-ALL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+MAC-ALL:"
"%cANON-ECDH:"
+ "+ECDHE-KRB:" // +ECDHE-KRB-RSA:+ECDHE-KRB-ECDHE:" // opt?
"+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+DHE-DSS:+RSA:" //TODO//
- "%cCTYPE-X.509:"
- "%cCTYPE-OPENPGP:"
+ "+CTYPE-SRV-KRB:+CTYPE-SRV-X.509:+CTYPE-SRV-OPENPGP:"
+ "%cCTYPE-CLI-KRB:"
+ "%cCTYPE-CLI-X.509:"
+ "%cCTYPE-CLI-OPENPGP:"
"%cSRP:%cSRP-RSA:%cSRP-DSS",
anonpre_ok ?'+':'-',
- lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_X509) ?'+':'-',
- lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_PGP) ?'+':'-',
+ 1 /* lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_KRB5)*/ ?'+':'-',
+ 1 /*lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_X509)*/ ?'+':'-',
+ 1 /*lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_PGP)*/ ?'+':'-',
//TODO// Temporarily patched out SRP
lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_SRP) ?'+':'-',
lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_SRP) ?'+':'-',
lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_SRP) ?'+':'-');
-// strcpy (priostr, "NONE:+VERS-TLS-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SIGN-ALL:+COMP-NULL"); //TODO:TEST//
-// strcpy (priostr, "NONE:+VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-DTLS-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SIGN-ALL:+COMP-NULL"); //TODO:TEST//
+#else
+ // It's not possible to make good decisions on certificate type
+ // for both sides based on knowledge of local authentication
+ // abilities. So we permit all (but would like to be subtler).
+ snprintf (priostr, sizeof (priostr)-1,
+ // "NORMAL:-RSA:" -- also ECDH-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, ...DSA...
+ "NONE:"
+ "+VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-DTLS-ALL:"
+ "+COMP-NULL:"
+ "+CIPHER-ALL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+MAC-ALL:"
+ "%cANON-ECDH:"
+ "+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+DHE-DSS:+RSA:" //TODO//
+ "%cCTYPE-X.509:"
+ "%cCTYPE-OPENPGP:"
+ "%cSRP:%cSRP-RSA:%cSRP-DSS",
+ anonpre_ok ?'+':'-',
+ 1 ?'+':'-',
+ 1 ?'+':'-',
+ //TODO// Temporarily patched out SRP
+ 1 ?'+':'-',
+ 1 ?'+':'-',
+ 1 ?'+':'-');
+#endif
tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "Constructed priority string %s for local ID %s",
priostr, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid);
E_g2e ("Failed to set GnuTLS priority string",
* - TLS hints -- Server Name Indication
* - User hints -- local and remote identities provided
*/
-int srv_clienthello (gnutls_session_t session) {
+static int srv_clienthello (gnutls_session_t session, unsigned int htype, unsigned int post, unsigned int incoming, const gnutls_datum_t *msg) {
struct command *cmd;
+ int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
char sni [sizeof (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid)]; // static
size_t snilen = sizeof (sni);
int snitype;
- int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
char *lid;
+tlog (LOG_DAEMON, LOG_INFO, "Invoked %sprocessor for Client Hello, htype=%d, incoming=%d\n",
+ post ? "post" : "pre",
+ htype,
+ incoming);
+
fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
errno = 0;
fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
+
+if (!post) {
//
// Setup a number of common references
cmd = (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (session);
if (cmd == NULL) {
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
}
- lid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid;
//
// Setup server-specific credentials and priority string
cmd->anonpre & ANONPRE_SERVER));
fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got gtls_errno = %d at %d\n", gtls_errno, __LINE__);
+} else {
+
+ //
+ // Setup a number of common references
+ cmd = (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (session);
+ if (cmd == NULL) {
+ return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
+ }
+ lid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid;
+
//
// Setup to ignore/request/require remote identity (from client)
fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
sni [sizeof (sni) - 1] = '\0';
}
fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got gtls_errno = %d at %d\n", gtls_errno, __LINE__);
+}
//
// Lap up any unnoticed POSIX error messages
* Credentials are generally implemented through callback functions.
* This should be called after setting up DH parameters.
*/
-int setup_starttls_credentials (void) {
+static int setup_starttls_credentials (void) {
gnutls_anon_server_credentials_t srv_anoncred = NULL;
gnutls_anon_client_credentials_t cli_anoncred = NULL;
gnutls_certificate_credentials_t clisrv_certcred = NULL;
if (!have_error_codes ()) /* TODO:GnuTLSversions E_g2e (...) */ gnutls_certificate_set_retrieve_function2 (
clisrv_certcred,
clisrv_cert_retrieve);
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_KDH
+ E_g2e ("Failed to set encoding callback for Kerberos Authenticators",
+ gnutls_authenticator_set_encode_function (
+ clisrv_certcred,
+ cli_kdhsig_encode));
+ E_g2e ("Failed to set decoding callback for Kerberos Authenticators",
+ gnutls_authenticator_set_decode_function (
+ clisrv_certcred,
+ srv_kdhsig_decode));
+#endif
if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
// Setup for certificates
tlog (TLOG_CERT, LOG_INFO, "Setting client and server certificate credentials");
/* Cleanup all credentials created, just before exiting the daemon.
*/
-void cleanup_starttls_credentials (void) {
+static void cleanup_starttls_credentials (void) {
while (srv_credcount-- > 0) {
struct credinfo *crd = &srv_creds [srv_credcount];
switch (crd->credtp) {
assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
return NULL;
}
+ *cmd->valflags = '\0';
cmd->session_errno = 0;
cmd->anonpre = 0;
orig_cmdcode = cmd->cmd.pio_cmd;
errno = pthread_join (ckn->owner, &retval);
fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: pthread_join returned %d\n", errno);
}
+ if (errno == 0) {
+ // We have now synchronised with the cancelled thread
+ // Cleanup any _remote data in ckn->session->cmd
+ cleanup_any_remote_credentials (
+ (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (
+ ckn->session));
+ }
if (errno != 0) {
tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_ERR, "Failed to interrupt TLS connection for renegotiation");
send_error (replycmd, errno, "Cannot interrupt TLS connection for renegotiation");
// that TLS has in this respect. Maybe we'll capture it one giant loop
// at some point, but for now that does not seem to add any relief.
renegotiate:
-printf ("DEBUG: Renegotiating = %d, anonpost = %d, plainfd = %d, cryptfd = %d, flags = 0x%x, session = 0x%x, got_session = %d, lid = \"%s\", rid = \"%s\"\n", renegotiating, anonpost, plainfd, cryptfd, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags, session, got_session, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid);
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Renegotiating = %d, anonpost = %d, plainfd = %d, cryptfd = %d, flags = 0x%x, session = 0x%x, got_session = %d, lid = \"%s\", rid = \"%s\"\n", renegotiating, anonpost, plainfd, cryptfd, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags, session, got_session, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid);
//
// If this is server renegotiating, send a request to that end
//TODO// Only invoke gnutls_rehandshake() on the server
if (renegotiating && (taking_over || anonpost) && (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)) {
-printf ("DEBUG: Invoking gnutls_rehandshake in renegotiation loop\n");
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Invoking gnutls_rehandshake in renegotiation loop\n");
gtls_errno = gnutls_rehandshake (session);
if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST) {
// Clients should not do this; be forgiving
gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
-printf ("DEBUG: Client-side invocation flagged as wrong; compensated error\n");
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Client-side invocation flagged as wrong; compensated error\n");
}
}
//
// Setup BDB transactions and reset credential datum fields
if (!anonpost) {
- bzero (&cmd->lids, sizeof (cmd->lids));
+ memset (&cmd->lids, 0, sizeof (cmd->lids));
manage_txn_begin (&cmd->txn);
}
//
// Permit cancellation of this thread -- TODO: Cleanup?
-//TODO:TEST// Defer setcancelstate untill copycat() activity
+//TODO:TEST// Defer setcancelstate until copycat() activity
/*
errno = pthread_setcancelstate (PTHREAD_CANCEL_ENABLE, NULL);
if (errno != 0) {
cmp = strncasecmp (anonpre_registry [anonpre_regidx].service,
cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.service,
TLSPOOL_SERVICELEN);
-printf ("DEBUG: anonpre_determination, comparing [%d] %s to %s, found cmp==%d\n", anonpre_regidx, anonpre_registry [anonpre_regidx].service, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.service, cmp);
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: anonpre_determination, comparing [%d] %s to %s, found cmp==%d\n", anonpre_regidx, anonpre_registry [anonpre_regidx].service, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.service, cmp);
if (cmp == 0) {
// anonpre_regent matches
cmd->anonpre = anonpre_registry [anonpre_regidx].flags;
cmd);
}
}
+ cmd->session = session;
//
// Setup client-specific behaviour if needed
if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT) {
// Setup for client credential installation in this session
//
// Setup client-specific credentials and priority string
-printf ("DEBUG: Configuring client credentials\n");
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Configuring client credentials\n");
E_g2e ("Failed to configure GnuTLS as a client",
configure_session (cmd,
session,
//
// Setup callback to server-specific behaviour if needed
if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER) {
-printf ("DEBUG: Configuring for server credentials callback if %d==0\n", gtls_errno);
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Configuring for server credentials callback if %d==0\n", gtls_errno);
if (!renegotiating) { //TODO:TEST//
if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
- gnutls_handshake_set_post_client_hello_function (
+ gnutls_handshake_set_hook_function (
session,
+ GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ GNUTLS_HOOK_BOTH,
srv_clienthello);
}
} //TODO:TEST//
// Setup server-specific credentials and priority string
#if 0
if (! (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT)) {
-printf ("DEBUG: Configuring server credentials (because it is not a client)\n");
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Configuring server credentials (because it is not a client)\n");
E_g2e ("Failed to configure GnuTLS as a server",
configure_session (cmd,
session,
//DROPPED// (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_GOT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
//DROPPED// (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_WARNING_ALERT_RECEIVED) &&
(gnutls_error_is_fatal (gtls_errno) == 0));
+ //
+ // Handshake done -- initialise remote_xxx, vfystatus, got_remoteid
+ E_g2e ("Failed to retrieve peer credentials",
+ fetch_remote_credentials (cmd));
if (gtls_errno == 0) {
const gnutls_datum_t *certs;
unsigned int num_certs;
got_remoteid = 0;
- switch (gnutls_auth_get_type (session)) { // Peer's cred type
+ switch (cmd->remote_auth_type) { // Peer's cred type
case GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE:
- certs = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (session, &num_certs);
- if ((certs != NULL) && (num_certs >= 1)) {
+ if (cmd->remote_cert_count >= 1) {
got_remoteid = 1;
}
- // "certs" points into GnuTLS' internal data structures
+#ifdef PHASED_OUT_DIRECT_VALIDATION
+ E_g2e ("Failed to validate peer",
+ gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2 (
+ session,
+ &cmd->vfystatus));
+#endif
+ cmd->vfystatus = 0;
break;
case GNUTLS_CRD_PSK:
// Difficult... what did the history say about this?
got_remoteid = 0;
+ cmd->vfystatus = GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
break;
case GNUTLS_CRD_SRP:
// Got a credential, validation follows later on
//TODO// SRP does not really auth the server
got_remoteid = 1;
+ cmd->vfystatus = GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
break;
case GNUTLS_CRD_ANON:
// Did not get a credential, perhaps due to anonpre
got_remoteid = 0;
+ cmd->vfystatus = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID | GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
break;
case GNUTLS_CRD_IA:
// Inner Application extension is no true credential
// Should we compare the client-requested service?
// Should we renegotiate into the ALPN protocol?
got_remoteid = 0;
+ cmd->vfystatus = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID | GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
break;
default:
// Unknown creds cautiously considered unauthentitcated
got_remoteid = 0;
+ cmd->vfystatus = ~ (unsigned short) 0; // It's all bad
break;
}
//
if (((cmd->anonpre & ANONPRE_EITHER) != 0)
&& want_remoteid && !got_remoteid) {
assert (anonpost == 0);
+ valexp_valflag_set (cmd, 'A');
// Disable ANON-protocols but keep creds from before
//TODO:ELSEWHERE// tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "Reconfiguring TLS over %d without Anonymous Precursor\n", cryptfd);
//TODO:ELSEWHERE// E_g2e ("Failed to reconfigure GnuTLS without anonymous precursor",
taking_over = 0;
//
+ // Run the validation expression logic, using expressions we ran into
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Prior to valexp, gtls_errno = %d\n", gtls_errno);
+ if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+ struct valexp *verun = NULL;
+ char *valexp_conj [3];
+ int valexp_conj_count = 0;
+ // Setup for validation expression runthrough
+ cmd->valexp_result = -1;
+ if ((cmd->trust_valexp != NULL) && (0 != strcmp (cmd->trust_valexp, "1"))) {
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Trust valexp \"%s\" @ 0x%016x\n", cmd->trust_valexp, (uint64_t) cmd->trust_valexp);
+ valexp_conj [valexp_conj_count++] = cmd->trust_valexp;
+ }
+ if (cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_VALEXP - LID_TYPE_MIN].data != NULL) {
+ // Interpret the entry, abuse p11uri as valexp
+ int ok;
+ uint32_t flags;
+ char *lid_valexp;
+ gnutls_datum_t ignored;
+ ok = dbcred_interpret (
+ &cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_VALEXP - LID_TYPE_MIN],
+ &flags,
+ &lid_valexp,
+ &ignored.data,
+ &ignored.size);
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: LocalID valexp \"%s\" @ 0x%016x (ok=%d)\n", lid_valexp, (uint64_t) lid_valexp, ok);
+ if (ok && (lid_valexp != NULL)) {
+ valexp_conj [valexp_conj_count++] = lid_valexp;
+ } else {
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Number of valexp is %d, gtls_errno=%d\n", valexp_conj_count, gtls_errno);
+ // Optionally start computing the validation expression
+ if ((gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) && (valexp_conj_count > 0)) {
+ valexp_conj [valexp_conj_count] = NULL;
+ verun = valexp_register (
+ valexp_conj,
+ have_starttls_validation (),
+ (void *) cmd);
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Registered to verun = 0x%016x\n", (uint64_t) verun);
+ if (verun == NULL) {
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ // When setup, run the validation expressions to completion
+ if (verun != NULL) {
+ while (cmd->valexp_result == -1) {
+ ; //TODO: Tickle async predicate run completion
+ }
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Finishing tickling \"async\" predicates for valexp\n");
+ if (cmd->valexp_result != 1) {
+ tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "TLS validation expression result is %d", cmd->valexp_result);
+ gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR;
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: valexp returns NEGATIVE result\n");
+ }
+else fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: valexp returns POSITIVE result\n");
+ valexp_unregister (verun);
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Unregistered verun 0x%016x\n", (uint64_t) verun);
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
// Cleanup any prefetched identities
for (i=LID_TYPE_MIN; i<=LID_TYPE_MAX; i++) {
if (cmd->lids [i - LID_TYPE_MIN].data != NULL) {
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Freeing cmd->lids[%d].data 0x%016x\n", i-LID_TYPE_MIN, cmd->lids [i-LID_TYPE_MIN].data);
free (cmd->lids [i - LID_TYPE_MIN].data);
}
}
- bzero (cmd->lids, sizeof (cmd->lids));
+ memset (cmd->lids, 0, sizeof (cmd->lids));
+ //
+ // Cleanup any trust_valexp duplicate string
+ if (cmd->trust_valexp != NULL) {
+ free (cmd->trust_valexp);
+ cmd->trust_valexp = NULL;
+ }
+ //
+ // Cleanup any Kerberos session key -- it served its purpose
+ if (cmd->krb_key.contents != NULL) {
+ // RATHER BLUNT: It shouldn't matter which krbctx_ is used...
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents (krbctx_srv, &cmd->krb_key);
+ memset (&cmd->krb_key, 0, sizeof (cmd->krb_key));
+ }
+ if (cmd->krbid_srv != NULL) {
+ // RATHER BLUNT: It shouldn't matter which krbctx_ is used...
+ krb5_free_principal (krbctx_srv, cmd->krbid_srv);
+ cmd->krbid_srv = NULL;
+ }
+ if (cmd->krbid_cli != NULL) {
+ // RATHER BLUNT: It shouldn't matter which krbctx_ is used...
+ krb5_free_principal (krbctx_srv, cmd->krbid_cli);
+ cmd->krbid_cli = NULL;
+ }
#if 0
/* This is not proper. gnutls_certificate_set_key() suggests that these are
//TODO// Or backup the (struct pioc_starttls) before handshaking
cmd->cmd.pio_cmd = orig_cmdcode;
cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid [0] =
- cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid [0] = 0;
+ cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid [0] = '\0';
//
// Respond to positive or negative outcome of the handshake
ckn->cryptfd = cryptfd;
ckn->plainfd = plainfd;
//DEBUG// fprintf (stderr, "Registering control key\n");
- if (renegotiating || (ctlkey_register (orig_starttls.ctlkey, &ckn->regent, security_tls, detach? -1: cmd->clientfd, forked) == 0)) {
+ if (renegotiating || (ctlkey_register (orig_starttls.ctlkey, &ckn->regent, security_tls, detach ? INVALID_POOL_HANDLE : cmd->clientfd, forked) == 0)) {
int copied = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
send_command (replycmd, -1); // app sent plainfd to us
if (preauth) {
tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Passed on %d remote bytes from anonymous precursor to %d\n", preauthlen, plainfd);
free (preauth);
preauth = NULL;
- copied = copycat (plainfd, cryptfd, session, detach? -1: cmd->clientfd);
+ copied = copycat (plainfd, cryptfd, session, detach ? INVALID_POOL_HANDLE : cmd->clientfd);
} else {
tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to pass on %d remote bytes from anonymous precursor to %d\n", preauthlen, plainfd);
}
} else {
- copied = copycat (plainfd, cryptfd, session, detach? -1: cmd->clientfd);
+ copied = copycat (plainfd, cryptfd, session, detach ? INVALID_POOL_HANDLE : cmd->clientfd);
}
// Renegotiate if copycat asked us to
if (copied == GNUTLS_E_REHANDSHAKE) {
// Disabling the flag causing LOCALID_CHECK
// ...and plainfd >= 0 so no PLAINTEXT_CONNECT
// ...so there will be no callbacks to cmd
-printf ("DEBUG: Goto renegotiate with cmd.lid = \"%s\" and orig_cmd.lid = \"%s\" and cmd.rid = \"%s\" and orig_cmd.rid = \"%s\" and cmd.flags = 0x%x and orig_cmd.flags = 0x%x\n", cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, orig_starttls.localid, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid, orig_starttls.remoteid, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags, orig_starttls.flags);
+fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Goto renegotiate with cmd.lid = \"%s\" and orig_cmd.lid = \"%s\" and cmd.rid = \"%s\" and orig_cmd.rid = \"%s\" and cmd.flags = 0x%x and orig_cmd.flags = 0x%x\n", cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, orig_starttls.localid, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid, orig_starttls.remoteid, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags, orig_starttls.flags);
goto renegotiate;
}
//DEBUG// fprintf (stderr, "Unregistering control key\n");
}
close (plainfd);
close (cryptfd);
+ cleanup_any_remote_credentials (cmd);
if (got_session) {
fprintf (stderr, "gnutls_deinit (0x%x) at %d\n", session, __LINE__);
gnutls_deinit (session);
projects / tlspool / blobdiff