1 /* tlspool/starttls.c -- Setup and validation handler for TLS session */
20 #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
21 #include <gnutls/pkcs11.h>
22 #include <gnutls/abstract.h>
23 #include <gnutls/dane.h>
25 #include <p11-kit/pkcs11.h>
27 #include <tlspool/commands.h>
28 #include <tlspool/internal.h>
33 /* Plus, from k5-int.h: */
34 krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5_context,
35 const krb5_keyblock *,
39 #include <quick-der/api.h>
40 #include <quick-der/rfc4120.h>
41 typedef DER_OVLY_rfc4120_Ticket ticket_t;
42 typedef DER_OVLY_rfc4120_Authenticator authenticator_t;
43 typedef DER_OVLY_rfc4120_EncryptedData encrypted_data_t;
45 #include <tlspool/internal.h>
52 #include <sys/types.h>
53 #include <sys/socket.h>
58 #include <arpa/inet.h>
60 #include <netinet/in.h>
66 #define SHUT_RD SD_RECEIVE
67 #define SHUT_WR SD_SEND
68 #else /* WINDOWS_PORT */
69 #define RECV_FLAGS MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL
70 #endif /* WINDOWS_PORT */
77 #if EXPECTED_LID_TYPE_COUNT != LID_TYPE_CNT
78 #error "Set EXPECTED_LID_TYPE_COUNT in <tlspool/internal.h> to match LID_TYPE_CNT"
82 /* This module hosts TLS handlers which treat an individual connection.
84 * Initially, the TLS setup is processed, which means validating the
85 * connection. If and when this succeeds, a continued process is needed
86 * to encrypt and decrypt traffic while it is in transit.
88 * Every TLS connection (including the attempt to set it up) is hosted in
89 * its own thread. This means that it can abide time to wait for PINENTRY,
90 * LOCALID or LIDENTRY responses. It also means a very clear flow when the
91 * time comes to destroy a connection.
93 * While encrypting and decrypting traffic passing through, the thread
94 * will use its own poll() call, and thus offload the potentially large
95 * one of the main thread, which is supposed to be a low-traffic task.
96 * The set of file descriptors used by the session-handler threads are
97 * in contrast very small and can easily be started for every single
98 * packet passing through.
100 * Might the user terminate a process while this one is waiting for a
101 * callback command request, then the main TLS pool thread will take
102 * care of taking down this thread. To that end, it sets the followup
103 * pointer that normally holds a callback response to NULL, and then
104 * permits this thread to run again. This will lead to a shutdown of
105 * this process, and proper closing of all connections. The remote peer
106 * will therefore see the result of a local kill as a connection reset.
108 * In case one of the end points of the connection is terminated, a
109 * similar thing will happen; the thread will terminate itself after
110 * a cleanup of any outstanding resources. This, once again, leads
111 * to passing on the reset of a connection between the encrypted and
112 * side of the connection.
118 * GnuTLS infrastructure setup.
119 * Session-shared DH-keys, credentials structures, and so on.
121 static gnutls_dh_params_t dh_params;
124 gnutls_credentials_type_t credtp;
128 #define EXPECTED_SRV_CREDCOUNT 3
129 #define EXPECTED_CLI_CREDCOUNT 3
130 static struct credinfo srv_creds [EXPECTED_SRV_CREDCOUNT];
131 static struct credinfo cli_creds [EXPECTED_CLI_CREDCOUNT];
132 static int srv_credcount = 0;
133 static int cli_credcount = 0;
134 static const char onthefly_p11uri[] = "pkcs11:manufacturer=ARPA2.net;token=TLS+Pool+internal;object=on-the-fly+signer;type=private;serial=1";
135 static unsigned long long onthefly_serial; //TODO: Fill with now * 1000
136 static gnutls_x509_crt_t onthefly_issuercrt = NULL;
137 static gnutls_privkey_t onthefly_issuerkey = NULL;
138 static gnutls_x509_privkey_t onthefly_subjectkey = NULL;
139 static pthread_mutex_t onthefly_signer_lock = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
142 static krb5_context krbctx_cli, krbctx_srv;
143 static krb5_keytab krb_kt_cli, krb_kt_srv;
144 static bool got_cc_cli, got_cc_srv;
145 static int have_key_tgt_cc (
146 struct command *cmd, // in, session context
147 krb5_context ctx, // in, kerberos context
148 bool use_cc, // in, whether to use cc
149 krb5_kvno kvno, // in, kvno (0 for highest)
150 krb5_enctype enctype,// in, enctype (0 for any)
151 char *p11uri, // in/opt, PKCS #11 pwd URI
152 krb5_keytab kt, // in/opt, keytab
153 krb5_keyblock *key, // opt/opt session key
154 krb5_creds **tgt, // out/opt, tkt granting tkt
155 krb5_ccache *cc); // out/opt, cred cache
156 static int have_service_ticket (
157 struct command *cmd, // in, session context
158 krb5_context ctx, // in, kerberos context
159 krb5_ccache cc_opt, // in/opt, credcache
160 krb5_principal cli, // in, client principal
161 krb5_creds **ticket);// out/opt, tkt granting tkt
165 /* The local variation on the ctlkeynode structure, with TLS-specific fields
167 struct ctlkeynode_tls {
168 struct ctlkeynode regent; // Structure for ctlkey_register()
169 gnutls_session_t session; // Additional data specifically for TLS
170 pthread_t owner; // For interruption of copycat()
171 int plainfd; // Plain-side connection
172 int cryptfd; // Crypt-side connection
175 /* A local structure used for iterating over PKCS #11 entries. This is used
176 * to iterate over password attempts, no more than MAX_P11ITER_ATTEMPTS though.
178 * When a password is requested but none is available, the password request
179 * will be passed to the user using the PIN callback mechanism. When this
180 * is done, a warning may be given that the TLS Pool overtakes control over
181 * the account (when thusly configured). In support of that option, the
182 * $attempt is counted and the respective $p11pwd is CK_INVALID_HANDLE.
183 * TODO: Perhaps interact for saving, such as entering an certain string?
185 * When a number of attempts needs to be made before success, then any
186 * objects that precede a succeeded $attempt can be removed. The same may
187 * be true for any objects after it.
189 * This mechanism is useful during password changes. When a new password is
190 * desired by the KDC, then a random object is created and returned twice.
191 * To support repeated delivery, the password is stored in $newpwd;
192 * In this case, the safest choice is still to leave the last $p11pwd.
194 * The caller may decide to invoke the password changing procedure, namely
195 * after manual entry as evidenced by the condition
197 * (attempts < MAX_P11_ITER_ATTEMPTS) &&
198 * (p11pwd [attempt] == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
200 * TODO: This is a designed data structure, but not yet installed.
202 * TODO: It is more useful to abolish passwords, and truly use PKCS #11.
204 #define MAX_P11ITER_ATTEMPTS 3
206 struct command *cmd; // The session command structure
207 CK_SESSION_HANDLE p11ses; // The PKCS #11 session in motion
208 int attempt; // Starts at -1, incremented by pwd entry
209 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE p11pwd [MAX_P11ITER_ATTEMPTS];
210 // Sequence of $attempt objects returned
211 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newpwd; // Set when a new password was offered
214 /* The list of accepted Exporter Label Prefixes for starttls_prng()
216 char *tlsprng_label_prefixes [] = {
217 // Forbidden by RFC 5705: "client finished",
218 // Forbidden by RFC 5705: "server finished",
219 // Forbidden by RFC 5705: "master secret",
220 // Forbidden by RFC 5705: "key expansion",
221 "client EAP encryption", // not suited for DTLS
222 "ttls keying material", // not suited for DTLS
223 "ttls challenge", // not suited for DTLS
224 "EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp",
225 "EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP",
226 "EXPORTER-ETSI-TC-M2M-Bootstrap",
227 "EXPORTER-ETSI-TC-M2M-Connection",
229 "EXPORTER_GBA_Digest",
230 "EXPORTER: teap session key seed", // not suited for DTLS
231 "EXPORTER-oneM2M-Bootstrap",
232 "EXPORTER-oneM2M-Connection",
236 /* The registry with the service names that are deemed safe for an
237 * anonymous precursor phase; that is, the service names that may offer
238 * ANON-DH initially, and immediately renegotiate an authenticated
239 * connection. See doc/anonymising-precursor.* for more information.
241 * The registry is ordered by case-independent service name, so it can
242 * be searched in 2log time. Service names are as defined by IANA in the
243 * "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry".
245 * The entries in the registry depend on the role played; either as a
246 * client or as a server. This refers to the local node, and depends on
247 * uncertainty of the remote party's TLS implementation and whether or
248 * not the protocol could lead to the remote sending information that
249 * requires authentication before the secure renogiation into an
250 * authenticated connection has been completed by this side. This is
251 * a protocol-dependent matter and the registry provided here serves to
252 * encapsulate this knowledge inside the TLS Pool instead of bothering
253 * application designers with it. Entries that are not found in the
254 * registry are interpreted as not allowing an anonymising precursor.
256 * Note that ANONPRE_EXTEND_MASTER_SECRET cannot be verified before
257 * GnuTLS version 3.4.0; see "imap" below for the resulting impact. This
258 * also impacts dynamic linking, because 3.4.0 introduces the new function
259 * gnutls_ext_get_data() that is used for this requirement.
261 #define ANONPRE_FORBID 0x00
262 #define ANONPRE_CLIENT 0x01
263 #define ANONPRE_SERVER 0x02
264 #define ANONPRE_EITHER (ANONPRE_CLIENT | ANONPRE_SERVER)
265 #define ANONPRE_EXTEND_MASTER_SECRET 0x10
266 struct anonpre_regentry {
270 struct anonpre_regentry anonpre_registry [] = {
271 /* This registry is commented out for now, although the code to use it seems
272 * to work fine. GnuTLS however, does not seem to support making the switch
273 * from ANON-ECDH to an authenticated handshake. Details:
274 * http://lists.gnutls.org/pipermail/gnutls-help/2015-November/003998.html
276 { "generic_anonpre", ANONPRE_EITHER }, // Name invalid as per RFC 6335
277 { "http", ANONPRE_CLIENT }, // Server also if it ignores client ID
278 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x030400
279 { "imap", ANONPRE_SERVER },
281 { "imap", ANONPRE_EITHER | ANONPRE_EXTEND_MASTER_SECRET },
283 { "pop3", ANONPRE_EITHER },
284 { "smtp", ANONPRE_EITHER },
286 * End of commenting out the registry
289 const int anonpre_registry_size = sizeof (anonpre_registry) / sizeof (struct anonpre_regentry);
292 /* The registry of Key Usage and Extended Key Usage for any given service name.
294 static const char *http_noncrit [] = { GNUTLS_KP_TLS_WWW_SERVER, GNUTLS_KP_TLS_WWW_CLIENT, NULL };
295 struct svcusage_regentry {
298 const char **oids_non_critical;
299 const char **oids_critical;
301 struct svcusage_regentry svcusage_registry [] = {
303 GNUTLS_KEY_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT |
304 GNUTLS_KEY_KEY_AGREEMENT,
309 GNUTLS_KEY_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE |
310 GNUTLS_KEY_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT |
311 GNUTLS_KEY_KEY_AGREEMENT,
316 const int svcusage_registry_size = sizeof (svcusage_registry) / sizeof (struct svcusage_regentry);
319 /* The maximum number of bytes that can be passed over a TLS connection before
320 * the authentication is complete in case of a anonymous precursor within a
321 * protocol that ensures that this cannot be a problem.
325 /* The priorities cache for "NORMAL" -- used to preconfigure the server,
326 * actually to overcome its unwillingness to perform the handshake, and
327 * leave it to srv_clienthello() to setup the priority string.
329 gnutls_priority_t priority_normal;
332 /* Map a GnuTLS call (usually a function call) to a POSIX errno,
333 * optionally reporting an errstr to avoid loosing information.
334 * Retain errno if it already exists.
335 * Continue if errno differs from 0, GnuTLS may "damage" it even when OK. */
336 #define E_g2e(errstr,gtlscall) { \
337 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { \
338 gtls_errno = (gtlscall); \
339 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { \
340 error_gnutls2posix (gtls_errno, errstr); \
345 /* Cleanup when GnuTLS leaves errno damaged but returns no gtls_errno */
346 #define E_gnutls_clear_errno() { \
347 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { \
352 /* Error number translation, including error string setup. See E_g2e(). */
353 void error_gnutls2posix (int gtls_errno, char *new_errstr) {
355 register int newerrno;
358 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
361 errstr = error_getstring ();
362 if (errstr != NULL) {
366 // Report the textual error
367 if (new_errstr == NULL) {
368 new_errstr = "GnuTLS error";
370 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "%s: %s",
372 gnutls_strerror (gtls_errno));
373 error_setstring (new_errstr);
375 // Translate error to a POSIX errno value
376 switch (gtls_errno) {
377 case GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS:
379 case GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM:
380 case GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE:
381 case GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION_PACKET:
382 case GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM:
383 case GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE:
384 case GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE:
385 case GNUTLS_E_X509_UNKNOWN_SAN:
386 case GNUTLS_E_DH_PRIME_UNACCEPTABLE:
387 case GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_PK_ALGORITHM:
388 case GNUTLS_E_NO_TEMPORARY_RSA_PARAMS:
389 case GNUTLS_E_NO_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHMS:
390 case GNUTLS_E_NO_CIPHER_SUITES:
391 case GNUTLS_E_OPENPGP_FINGERPRINT_UNSUPPORTED:
392 case GNUTLS_E_X509_UNSUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTE:
393 case GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_HASH_ALGORITHM:
394 case GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_PKCS_CONTENT_TYPE:
395 case GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_PKCS_BAG_TYPE:
396 case GNUTLS_E_NO_TEMPORARY_DH_PARAMS:
397 case GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM:
398 case GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM:
399 case GNUTLS_E_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_DENIED:
400 case GNUTLS_E_X509_UNSUPPORTED_OID:
401 case GNUTLS_E_CHANNEL_BINDING_NOT_AVAILABLE:
402 case GNUTLS_E_INCOMPAT_DSA_KEY_WITH_TLS_PROTOCOL:
403 case GNUTLS_E_ECC_NO_SUPPORTED_CURVES:
404 case GNUTLS_E_ECC_UNSUPPORTED_CURVE:
405 case GNUTLS_E_X509_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
406 case GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_STATUS:
407 case GNUTLS_E_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
408 #ifdef GNUTLS_E_NO_SELF_TEST
409 case GNUTLS_E_NO_SELF_TEST:
411 newerrno = EOPNOTSUPP;
413 case GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH:
414 case GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST:
417 case GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION:
418 case GNUTLS_E_REHANDSHAKE:
419 case GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_KEY_MISMATCH:
422 case GNUTLS_E_PUSH_ERROR:
423 case GNUTLS_E_PULL_ERROR:
424 case GNUTLS_E_PREMATURE_TERMINATION:
425 case GNUTLS_E_SESSION_EOF:
426 newerrno = ECONNRESET;
428 case GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET:
429 case GNUTLS_E_WARNING_ALERT_RECEIVED:
430 case GNUTLS_E_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED:
431 case GNUTLS_E_LARGE_PACKET:
432 case GNUTLS_E_ERROR_IN_FINISHED_PACKET:
433 case GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE_PACKET:
434 case GNUTLS_E_MPI_SCAN_FAILED:
435 case GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
436 case GNUTLS_E_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED:
437 case GNUTLS_E_COMPRESSION_FAILED:
438 case GNUTLS_E_BASE64_DECODING_ERROR:
439 case GNUTLS_E_MPI_PRINT_FAILED:
440 case GNUTLS_E_GOT_APPLICATION_DATA:
441 case GNUTLS_E_RECORD_LIMIT_REACHED:
442 case GNUTLS_E_ENCRYPTION_FAILED:
443 case GNUTLS_E_PK_ENCRYPTION_FAILED:
444 case GNUTLS_E_PK_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
445 case GNUTLS_E_RECEIVED_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
446 case GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE:
447 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS1_WRONG_PAD:
448 case GNUTLS_E_RECEIVED_ILLEGAL_EXTENSION:
449 case GNUTLS_E_FILE_ERROR:
450 case GNUTLS_E_ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND:
451 case GNUTLS_E_ASN1_IDENTIFIER_NOT_FOUND:
452 case GNUTLS_E_ASN1_DER_ERROR:
453 case GNUTLS_E_ASN1_VALUE_NOT_FOUND:
454 case GNUTLS_E_ASN1_GENERIC_ERROR:
455 case GNUTLS_E_ASN1_VALUE_NOT_VALID:
456 case GNUTLS_E_ASN1_TAG_ERROR:
457 case GNUTLS_E_ASN1_TAG_IMPLICIT:
458 case GNUTLS_E_ASN1_TYPE_ANY_ERROR:
459 case GNUTLS_E_ASN1_SYNTAX_ERROR:
460 case GNUTLS_E_ASN1_DER_OVERFLOW:
461 case GNUTLS_E_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_PACKETS:
462 case GNUTLS_E_TOO_MANY_HANDSHAKE_PACKETS:
463 case GNUTLS_E_SRP_PWD_PARSING_ERROR:
464 case GNUTLS_E_BASE64_ENCODING_ERROR:
465 case GNUTLS_E_OPENPGP_KEYRING_ERROR:
466 case GNUTLS_E_BASE64_UNEXPECTED_HEADER_ERROR:
467 case GNUTLS_E_OPENPGP_SUBKEY_ERROR:
468 case GNUTLS_E_CRYPTO_ALREADY_REGISTERED:
469 case GNUTLS_E_HANDSHAKE_TOO_LARGE:
470 case GNUTLS_E_BAD_COOKIE:
471 case GNUTLS_E_PARSING_ERROR:
472 case GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_LIST_UNSORTED:
473 case GNUTLS_E_NO_PRIORITIES_WERE_SET:
474 #ifdef GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR
475 case GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR:
477 #ifdef GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR
478 case GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR:
480 #ifdef GNUTLS_E_SOCKETS_INIT_ERROR
481 case GNUTLS_E_SOCKETS_INIT_ERROR:
485 case GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR:
486 case GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER:
492 case GNUTLS_E_EXPIRED:
493 case GNUTLS_E_TIMEDOUT:
494 newerrno = ETIMEDOUT;
496 case GNUTLS_E_DB_ERROR:
503 case GNUTLS_E_SRP_PWD_ERROR:
504 case GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS:
505 case GNUTLS_E_HASH_FAILED:
506 case GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED:
507 case GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR:
508 case GNUTLS_E_X509_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
509 case GNUTLS_E_KEY_USAGE_VIOLATION:
510 case GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND:
511 case GNUTLS_E_OPENPGP_UID_REVOKED:
512 case GNUTLS_E_OPENPGP_GETKEY_FAILED:
513 case GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED:
514 case GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_SRP_USERNAME:
515 case GNUTLS_E_INVALID_PASSWORD:
516 case GNUTLS_E_MAC_VERIFY_FAILED:
517 case GNUTLS_E_IA_VERIFY_FAILED:
518 case GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_SRP_USERNAME:
519 case GNUTLS_E_OPENPGP_PREFERRED_KEY_ERROR:
520 case GNUTLS_E_USER_ERROR:
521 case GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR:
524 case GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED:
527 case GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR:
528 case GNUTLS_E_CONSTRAINT_ERROR:
529 case GNUTLS_E_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
532 case GNUTLS_E_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FAILED:
533 newerrno = ECONNREFUSED;
535 case GNUTLS_E_INCOMPATIBLE_GCRYPT_LIBRARY:
536 case GNUTLS_E_INCOMPATIBLE_LIBTASN1_LIBRARY:
537 #ifdef GNUTLS_E_LIB_IN_ERROR_STATE
538 case GNUTLS_E_LIB_IN_ERROR_STATE:
542 case GNUTLS_E_RANDOM_FAILED:
545 case GNUTLS_E_CRYPTODEV_IOCTL_ERROR:
546 case GNUTLS_E_CRYPTODEV_DEVICE_ERROR:
547 case GNUTLS_E_HEARTBEAT_PONG_RECEIVED:
548 case GNUTLS_E_HEARTBEAT_PING_RECEIVED:
549 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_ERROR:
550 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_LOAD_ERROR:
551 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_PIN_ERROR:
552 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_SLOT_ERROR:
553 case GNUTLS_E_LOCKING_ERROR:
554 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_ATTRIBUTE_ERROR:
555 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_DEVICE_ERROR:
556 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_DATA_ERROR:
557 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE_ERROR:
558 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_KEY_ERROR:
559 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_PIN_EXPIRED:
560 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_PIN_LOCKED:
561 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_SESSION_ERROR:
562 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_SIGNATURE_ERROR:
563 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_TOKEN_ERROR:
564 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_USER_ERROR:
565 case GNUTLS_E_CRYPTO_INIT_FAILED:
566 case GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_REQUESTED_OBJECT_NOT_AVAILBLE:
567 case GNUTLS_E_TPM_ERROR:
568 case GNUTLS_E_TPM_KEY_PASSWORD_ERROR:
569 case GNUTLS_E_TPM_SRK_PASSWORD_ERROR:
570 case GNUTLS_E_TPM_SESSION_ERROR:
571 case GNUTLS_E_TPM_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
572 case GNUTLS_E_TPM_UNINITIALIZED:
573 case GNUTLS_E_OCSP_RESPONSE_ERROR:
574 case GNUTLS_E_RANDOM_DEVICE_ERROR:
576 newerrno = EREMOTEIO;
589 /* Generate Diffie-Hellman parameters - for use with DHE
590 * kx algorithms. TODO: These should be discarded and regenerated
591 * once a day, once a week or once a month. Depending on the
592 * security requirements.
594 static gtls_error generate_dh_params (void) {
596 int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
597 bits = gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits (
599 GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_LEGACY);
600 //TODO// Acquire DH-params lock
601 E_g2e ("Failed to initialise DH params",
602 gnutls_dh_params_init (
604 E_g2e ("Failed to generate DH params",
605 gnutls_dh_params_generate2 (
608 //TODO// Release DH-params lock
612 /* Load Diffie-Hellman parameters from file - or generate them when load fails.
614 static gtls_error load_dh_params (void) {
615 gnutls_dh_params_t dhp;
616 gnutls_datum_t pkcs3;
617 char *filename = cfg_tls_dhparamfile ();
618 int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
619 memset (&pkcs3, 0, sizeof (pkcs3));
621 E_g2e ("No PKCS #3 PEM file with DH params",
625 E_gnutls_clear_errno ();
626 E_g2e ("Failed to initialise DH params",
627 gnutls_dh_params_init (
629 E_g2e ("Failed to import DH params from PKCS #3 PEM",
630 gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3 (
633 GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
634 E_gnutls_clear_errno ();
636 if (pkcs3.data != NULL) {
639 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
641 // File failed to load, so try to generate fresh DH params
642 int gtls_errno_stack0;
643 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
644 tlog (TLOG_CRYPTO, LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to load DH params from %s; generating fresh parameters", filename);
645 E_g2e ("Failed to generate DH params",
646 generate_dh_params ());
647 gtls_errno_stack0 = gtls_errno;
648 //TODO// Acquire DH-params lock
649 E_g2e ("Failed to format DH params as PKCS #3 PEM",
650 gnutls_dh_params_export2_pkcs3 (
654 //TODO// Release DH-params lock
655 if ((gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) && (filename != NULL)) {
658 // Best effor file save -- readback will parse
659 pemf = fopen (filename, "w");
661 fwrite (pkcs3.data, 1, pkcs3.size, pemf);
663 tlog (TLOG_FILES, LOG_DEBUG, "Saved DH params to %s (best-effort)", filename);
665 E_gnutls_clear_errno ();
667 gtls_errno = gtls_errno_stack0;
669 gnutls_dh_params_t old_dh;
670 //TODO// Acquire DH-params lock
673 //TODO// Release DH-params lock
675 gnutls_dh_params_deinit (old_dh);
681 /* Remove DH parameters, to be used during program cleanup. */
682 static void remove_dh_params (void) {
684 gnutls_dh_params_deinit (dh_params);
690 /* A log printing function
692 void log_gnutls (int level, const char *msg) {
693 tlog (TLOG_TLS, level, "GnuTLS: %s", msg);
697 /* Implement the GnuTLS function for token insertion callback. This function
698 * refers back to the generic callback for token insertion.
700 int gnutls_token_callback (void *const userdata,
701 const char *const label,
703 if (token_callback (label, retry)) {
704 return GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
706 return GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_TOKEN_ERROR;
712 * Implement the GnuTLS function for PIN callback. This function calls
713 * the generic PIN callback operation.
715 int gnutls_pin_callback (void *userdata,
717 const char *token_url,
718 const char *token_label,
722 if (flags & GNUTLS_PIN_SO) {
723 return GNUTLS_E_USER_ERROR;
725 if (pin_callback (attempt, token_url, NULL, pin, pin_max)) {
728 return GNUTLS_E_PKCS11_PIN_ERROR;
733 /* Register a PKCS #11 provider with the GnuTLS environment. */
734 void starttls_pkcs11_provider (char *p11path) {
735 unsigned int token_seq = 0;
737 if (gnutls_pkcs11_add_provider (p11path, NULL) != 0) {
738 fprintf (stderr, "Failed to register PKCS #11 library %s with GnuTLS\n", p11path);
741 while (gnutls_pkcs11_token_get_url (token_seq, 0, &p11uri) == 0) {
743 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Found token URI %s\n", p11uri);
745 //TODO// if (gnutls_pkcs11_token_get_info (p11uri, GNUTLS_PKCS11_TOKEN_LABEL-of-SERIAL-of-MANUFACTURER-of-MODEL, output, utput_size) == 0) { ... }
746 gnutls_free (p11uri);
749 //TODO// Select token by name (value)
750 //TODO// if PIN available then set it up
751 //TODO:WHY?// free_p11pin ();
754 static void cleanup_starttls_credentials (void);/* Defined below */
755 static void cleanup_starttls_validation (void); /* Defined below */
757 static void cleanup_starttls_kerberos (void); /* Defined below */
758 static int setup_starttls_kerberos (void); /* Defined below */
760 static int setup_starttls_credentials (void); /* Defined below */
762 /* The global and static setup function for the starttls functions.
764 void setup_starttls (void) {
766 int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
767 char *otfsigcrt, *otfsigkey;
769 // Setup configuration variables
770 maxpreauth = cfg_tls_maxpreauth ();
772 // Basic library actions
773 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "Compiled against GnuTLS version %s", GNUTLS_VERSION);
774 curver = gnutls_check_version (GNUTLS_VERSION);
775 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "Running against %s GnuTLS version %s", curver? "acceptable": "OLDER", curver? curver: gnutls_check_version (NULL));
776 E_g2e ("GnuTLS global initialisation failed",
777 gnutls_global_init ());
778 E_gnutls_clear_errno ();
779 E_g2e ("GnuTLS PKCS #11 initialisation failed",
781 GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL));
783 // Setup logging / debugging
784 if (cfg_log_level () == LOG_DEBUG) {
785 gnutls_global_set_log_function (log_gnutls);
786 gnutls_global_set_log_level (9);
791 E_g2e ("Kerberos initialisation failed",
792 setup_starttls_kerberos ());
795 // Setup callbacks for user communication
796 gnutls_pkcs11_set_token_function (gnutls_token_callback, NULL);
797 gnutls_pkcs11_set_pin_function (gnutls_pin_callback, NULL);
799 // Setup DH parameters
800 E_g2e ("Loading DH params failed",
803 // Setup shared credentials for all client server processes
804 E_g2e ("Failed to setup GnuTLS callback credentials",
805 setup_starttls_credentials ());
807 // Parse the default priority string
809 E_g2e ("Failed to setup NORMAL priority cache",
810 gnutls_priority_init (&priority_normal,
813 "+VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-DTLS-ALL:"
815 "+CIPHER-ALL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+MAC-ALL:"
817 "+ECDHE-KRB:" // +ECDHE-KRB-RSA:+ECDHE-KRB-ECDSA:"
818 "+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+DHE-DSS:+RSA:"
819 "+CTYPE-SRV-KRB:+CTYPE-SRV-X.509:+CTYPE-SRV-OPENPGP:"
820 "+CTYPE-CLI-KRB:+CTYPE-CLI-X.509:+CTYPE-CLI-OPENPGP:"
821 "+SRP:+SRP-RSA:+SRP-DSS",
824 E_g2e ("Failed to setup NORMAL priority cache",
825 gnutls_priority_init (&priority_normal,
827 "+VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-DTLS-ALL:"
828 "+COMP-NULL:+CIPHER-ALL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+MAC-ALL:"
830 "+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+DHE-DSS:+RSA:"
831 "+CTYPE-X.509:+CTYPE-OPENPGP:"
832 "+SRP:+SRP-RSA:+SRP-DSS",
836 // Try to setup on-the-fly signing key / certificate and gen a certkey
837 otfsigcrt = cfg_tls_onthefly_signcert ();
838 otfsigkey = cfg_tls_onthefly_signkey ();
839 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: gtls_errno = %d, otfsigcrt == %s, otfsigkey == %s\n", gtls_errno, otfsigcrt? otfsigcrt: "NULL", otfsigkey? otfsigkey: "NULL");
840 if ((gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) && (otfsigcrt != NULL)) {
841 FILE *crtfile = NULL;
842 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: gtls_errno==%d when initialising onthefly_issuercrt\n", gtls_errno);
843 E_g2e ("Failed to initialise on-the-fly issuer certificate structure",
844 gnutls_x509_crt_init (&onthefly_issuercrt));
845 if (strncmp (otfsigcrt, "file:", 5) == 0) {
846 // Provisionary support for the "file:" prefix
849 crtfile = fopen (otfsigcrt, "r");
850 if (crtfile == NULL) {
851 E_g2e ("Failed to open on-the-fly issuer certificate file",
852 GNUTLS_E_FILE_ERROR);
853 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: gtls_errno==%d after failing to open file for onthefly_issuercrt\n", gtls_errno);
856 size_t len = fread (crt, 1, sizeof (crt), crtfile);
857 if (ferror (crtfile)) {
858 E_g2e ("Failed to read on-the-fly issuer certificate from file",
859 GNUTLS_E_FILE_ERROR);
860 } else if ((len >= sizeof (crt)) || !feof (crtfile)) {
861 E_g2e ("Unexpectedly long on-the-fly issuer certificate file",
862 GNUTLS_E_FILE_ERROR);
864 gnutls_datum_t cd = {
865 .data = (unsigned char *)(&crt[0]),
868 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: gtls_errno==%d before importing onthefly_issuercrt\n", gtls_errno);
869 E_g2e ("Failed to import on-the-fly certificate from file",
870 gnutls_x509_crt_import (onthefly_issuercrt, &cd, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER));
871 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: gtls_errno==%d after importing onthefly_issuercrt\n", gtls_errno);
876 if ((gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) && (otfsigkey != NULL)) {
877 E_g2e ("Failed to initialise on-the-fly issuer private key structure",
878 gnutls_privkey_init (&onthefly_issuerkey));
879 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: before onthefly p11 import, gtlserrno = %d\n", gtls_errno);
880 E_g2e ("Failed to import pkcs11: URI into on-the-fly issuer private key",
881 gnutls_privkey_import_pkcs11_url (onthefly_issuerkey, otfsigkey));
882 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: after onthefly p11 import, gtlserrno = %d\n", gtls_errno);
884 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: When it matters, gtls_errno = %d, onthefly_issuercrt %s NULL, onthefly_issuerkey %s NULL\n", gtls_errno, onthefly_issuercrt?"!=":"==", onthefly_issuerkey?"!=":"==");
885 if ((gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) && (onthefly_issuercrt != NULL) && (onthefly_issuerkey != NULL)) {
886 E_g2e ("Failed to initialise on-the-fly certificate session key",
887 gnutls_x509_privkey_init (&onthefly_subjectkey));
888 E_g2e ("Failed to generate on-the-fly certificate session key",
889 gnutls_x509_privkey_generate (onthefly_subjectkey, GNUTLS_PK_RSA, 2048 /*TODO:FIXED*/, 0));
890 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
891 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "Setup for on-the-fly signing with the TLS Pool");
893 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "Failed to setup on-the-fly signing (shall continue without it)");
894 gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit (onthefly_subjectkey);
895 onthefly_subjectkey = NULL;
898 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
899 E_gnutls_clear_errno ();
901 if (onthefly_subjectkey == NULL) {
902 if (onthefly_issuercrt != NULL) {
903 gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (onthefly_issuercrt);
904 onthefly_issuercrt = NULL;
906 if (onthefly_issuerkey != NULL) {
907 gnutls_privkey_deinit (onthefly_issuerkey);
908 onthefly_issuerkey = NULL;
912 // Finally, check whether there was any error setting up GnuTLS
913 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
914 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_CRIT, "FATAL: GnuTLS setup failed: %s", gnutls_strerror (gtls_errno));
918 //MOVED// // Setup the management databases
919 //MOVED// tlog (TLOG_DB, LOG_DEBUG, "Setting up management databases");
920 //MOVED// E_e2e ("Failed to setup management databases",
921 //MOVED// setup_management ());
922 //MOVED// if (errno != 0) {
923 //MOVED// tlog (TLOG_DB, LOG_CRIT, "FATAL: Management databases setup failed: %s", strerror (errno));
928 /* Cleanup the structures and resources that were setup for handling TLS.
930 void cleanup_starttls (void) {
931 //MOVED// cleanup_management ();
932 if (onthefly_subjectkey != NULL) {
933 gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit (onthefly_subjectkey);
934 onthefly_subjectkey = NULL;
936 if (onthefly_issuercrt != NULL) {
937 gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (onthefly_issuercrt);
938 onthefly_issuercrt = NULL;
940 if (onthefly_issuerkey != NULL) {
941 gnutls_privkey_deinit (onthefly_issuerkey);
942 onthefly_issuerkey = NULL;
945 cleanup_starttls_credentials ();
947 cleanup_starttls_kerberos ();
950 gnutls_pkcs11_set_pin_function (NULL, NULL);
951 gnutls_pkcs11_set_token_function (NULL, NULL);
952 gnutls_pkcs11_deinit ();
953 gnutls_priority_deinit (priority_normal);
954 gnutls_global_deinit ();
959 * The copycat function is a bidirectional transport between the given
960 * remote and local sockets, but it will encrypt traffic from local to
961 * remote, and decrypt traffic from remote to local. It will do this
962 * until one of the end points is shut down, at which time it will
963 * return and assume the context will close down both pre-existing
966 * This copycat actually has a few sharp claws to watch for -- shutdown
967 * of sockets may drop the last bit of information sent. First, the
968 * signal POLLHUP is best ignored because it travels asynchronously.
969 * Second, reading 0 is a good indicator of end-of-file and may be
970 * followed by an shutdown of reading from that stream. But, more
971 * importantly, the other side must have this information forwarded
972 * so it can shutdown. This means that a shutdown for writing to that
973 * stream is to be sent. Even when *both* sides have agreed to not send
974 * anything, they may still not have received all they were offered for
975 * reading, so we should SO_LINGER on the sockets so they can acknowledge,
976 * and after a timeout we can establish that shutdown failed and log and
977 * return an error for it.
978 * Will you believe that I had looked up if close() would suffice? The man
979 * page clearly stated yes. However, these articles offer much more detail:
980 * http://blog.netherlabs.nl/articles/2009/01/18/the-ultimate-so_linger-page-or-why-is-my-tcp-not-reliable
981 * http://www.greenend.org.uk/rjk/tech/poll.html
983 * This function blocks during its call to poll(), in a state that can easily
984 * be restarted. This is when thread cancellation is temporarily enabled.
985 * Other threads may use this to cancel the thread and have it joined with that
986 * thread which will subsume its tasks and restart the handshake. We might
987 * later make this more advanced, by using a cancel stack push/pull mechanisms
988 * to ensure that recv() always results in send() in spite of cancellation.
990 * The return value of copycat is a GNUTLS_E_ code, usually GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS.
991 * For the moment, only one special value is of concern, namely
992 * GNUTLS_E_REHANDSHAKE which client or server side may receive when an
993 * attempt is made to renegotiate the security of the connection.
995 static int copycat (int local, int remote, gnutls_session_t wrapped, pool_handle_t client) {
997 struct pollfd inout [3];
999 struct linger linger = { 1, 10 };
1001 int retval = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
1003 client = INVALID_POOL_HANDLE;
1004 inout [0].fd = local;
1005 inout [1].fd = remote;
1009 inout [2].fd = client;
1010 have_client = inout [2].fd != INVALID_POOL_HANDLE;
1013 inout [2].revents = 0; // Will not be written by poll
1014 //FORK!=DETACH// inout [2].fd = ctlkey_signalling_fd;
1016 inout [0].events = POLLIN;
1017 inout [1].events = POLLIN;
1018 inout [2].events = 0; // error events only
1019 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Starting copycat cycle for local=%d, remote=%d, control=%d", local, remote, client);
1020 while (((inout [0].events | inout [1].events) & POLLIN) != 0) {
1022 assert (pthread_setcancelstate (PTHREAD_CANCEL_ENABLE, NULL) == 0);
1023 pthread_testcancel (); // Efficiency & Certainty
1024 polled = poll (inout, have_client? 3: 2, -1);
1025 assert (pthread_setcancelstate (PTHREAD_CANCEL_DISABLE, NULL) == 0);
1027 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat polling returned an error");
1028 break; // Polling sees an error
1030 if (inout [0].revents & POLLIN) {
1031 // Read local and encrypt to remote
1032 sz = recv (local, buf, sizeof (buf), RECV_FLAGS);
1033 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat received %d local bytes (or error<0) from %d", (int) sz, local);
1035 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_ERR, "Error while receiving: %s", strerror (errno));
1036 break; // stream error
1037 } else if (sz == 0) {
1038 inout [0].events &= ~POLLIN;
1039 shutdown (local, SHUT_RD);
1041 setsockopt (remote, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (const char *) &linger, sizeof (linger));
1042 #else /* WINDOWS_PORT */
1043 setsockopt (remote, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &linger, sizeof (linger));
1044 #endif /* WINDOWS_PORT */
1045 gnutls_bye (wrapped, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
1046 } else if (gnutls_record_send (wrapped, buf, sz) != sz) {
1047 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_ERR, "gnutls_record_send() failed to pass on the requested bytes");
1048 break; // communication error
1050 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat sent %d bytes to remote %d", (int) sz, remote);
1053 if (inout [1].revents & POLLIN) {
1054 // Read remote and decrypt to local
1055 sz = gnutls_record_recv (wrapped, buf, sizeof (buf));
1056 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat received %d remote bytes from %d (or error if <0)", (int) sz, remote);
1058 //TODO// Process GNUTLS_E_REHANDSHAKE
1059 if (sz == GNUTLS_E_REHANDSHAKE) {
1060 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "Received renegotiation request over TLS handle %d", remote);
1061 retval = GNUTLS_E_REHANDSHAKE;
1063 } else if (gnutls_error_is_fatal (sz)) {
1064 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "GnuTLS fatal error: %s", gnutls_strerror (sz));
1065 break; // stream error
1067 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "GnuTLS recoverable error: %s", gnutls_strerror (sz));
1069 } else if (sz == 0) {
1070 inout [1].events &= ~POLLIN;
1071 shutdown (remote, SHUT_RD);
1073 setsockopt (local, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (const char *) &linger, sizeof (linger));
1074 #else /* WINDOWS_PORT */
1075 setsockopt (local, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &linger, sizeof (linger));
1076 #endif /* WINDOWS_PORT */
1077 shutdown (local, SHUT_WR);
1078 } else if (send (local, buf, sz, RECV_FLAGS) != sz) {
1079 break; // communication error
1081 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat sent %d bytes to local %d", (int) sz, local);
1084 inout [0].revents &= ~(POLLIN | POLLHUP); // Thy copying cat?
1085 inout [1].revents &= ~(POLLIN | POLLHUP); // Retract thee claws!
1086 if ((inout [0].revents | inout [1].revents) & ~POLLIN) {
1087 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat data connection polling returned a special condition");
1088 break; // Apparently, one of POLLERR, POLLHUP, POLLNVAL
1090 #ifndef WINDOWS_PORT
1091 if (inout [2].revents & ~POLLIN) {
1093 // This case is currently not ever triggered
1094 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat control connection polling returned a special condition");
1095 break; // Apparently, one of POLLERR, POLLHUP, POLLNVAL
1097 inout [2].fd = client;
1098 have_client = inout [2].fd >= 0;
1100 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat signalling_fd polling raised a signal to set control fd to %d", inout [2].fd);
1102 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Copycat signalling_fd polling raised a signal that could be ignored");
1107 #endif /* !WINDOWS_PORT */
1109 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Ending copycat cycle for local=%d, remote=%d", local, remote);
1114 /* The callback function that retrieves certification information from either
1115 * the client or the server in the course of the handshake procedure.
1117 gtls_error clisrv_cert_retrieve (gnutls_session_t session,
1118 const gnutls_datum_t* req_ca_dn,
1120 const gnutls_pk_algorithm_t* pk_algos,
1121 int pk_algos_length,
1122 gnutls_pcert_st** pcert,
1123 unsigned int *pcert_length,
1124 gnutls_privkey_t *pkey) {
1125 gnutls_certificate_type_t certtp;
1126 gnutls_pcert_st *pc = NULL;
1127 struct command *cmd;
1129 gnutls_datum_t privdatum = { NULL, 0 };
1130 gnutls_datum_t certdatum = { NULL, 0 };
1131 gnutls_openpgp_crt_t pgpcert = NULL;
1132 gnutls_openpgp_privkey_t pgppriv = NULL;
1133 int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
1137 char sni [sizeof (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid)];
1138 size_t snilen = sizeof (sni);
1139 unsigned int snitype;
1145 gtls_error fetch_local_credentials (struct command *cmd);
1146 gnutls_pcert_st *load_certificate_chain (uint32_t flags, unsigned int *chainlen, gnutls_datum_t *certdatum);
1149 // Setup a number of common references and structures
1152 cmd = (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (session);
1154 E_g2e ("No data pointer with session",
1155 GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION);
1158 if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT) {
1159 lidrole = LID_ROLE_CLIENT;
1161 } else if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER) {
1162 lidrole = LID_ROLE_SERVER;
1165 E_g2e ("TLS Pool command supports neither local client nor local server role",
1166 GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION);
1169 lid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid;
1170 rid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
1173 // On a server, lookup the server name and match it against lid.
1174 // TODO: For now assume a single server name in SNI (as that is normal).
1175 if (lidrole == LID_ROLE_SERVER) {
1176 if (gnutls_server_name_get (session, sni, &snilen, &snitype, 0) || (snitype != GNUTLS_NAME_DNS)) {
1177 E_g2e ("Requested SNI error or not a DNS name",
1178 GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND);
1183 for (atidx=128; atidx > 0; atidx--) {
1184 if (lid [atidx-1] == '@') {
1188 if (strncmp (sni, lid + atidx, sizeof (sni)-atidx) != 0) {
1189 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "SNI %s does not match preset local identity %s", sni, lid);
1190 E_g2e ("Requested SNI does not match local identity",
1191 GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND);
1195 // TODO: Should ask for permission before accepting SNI
1196 memcpy (lid, sni, sizeof (sni));
1201 // Setup the lidtype parameter for responding
1203 certtp = gnutls_certificate_type_get_ours (session);
1205 certtp = gnutls_certificate_type_get (session);
1207 if (certtp == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
1208 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "Serving OpenPGP certificate request as a %s", rolestr);
1209 lidtype = LID_TYPE_PGP;
1210 } else if (certtp == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
1211 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "Serving X.509 certificate request as a %s", rolestr);
1212 lidtype = LID_TYPE_X509;
1214 } else if (certtp == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
1215 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "Serving Kerberos Ticket request as a %s", rolestr);
1216 lidtype = LID_TYPE_KRB5;
1219 // GNUTLS_CRT_RAW, GNUTLS_CRT_UNKNOWN, or other
1220 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "Funny sort of certificate %d retrieval attempted as a %s", certtp, rolestr);
1221 E_g2e ("Requested certtype is neither X.509 nor OpenPGP",
1222 GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR);
1227 // Find the prefetched local identity to use towards this remote
1228 // Send a callback to the user if none is available and accessible
1229 if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALID_CHECK) {
1230 uint32_t oldcmd = cmd->cmd.pio_cmd;
1231 struct command *resp;
1232 cmd->cmd.pio_cmd = PIOC_STARTTLS_LOCALID_V2;
1233 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_DEBUG, "Calling send_callback_and_await_response with PIOC_STARTTLS_LOCALID_V2");
1234 resp = send_callback_and_await_response (cmd, 0);
1235 assert (resp != NULL); // No timeout, should be non-NULL
1236 if (resp->cmd.pio_cmd != PIOC_STARTTLS_LOCALID_V2) {
1237 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_ERR, "Callback response has unexpected command code");
1238 cmd->cmd.pio_cmd = oldcmd;
1239 return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
1241 assert (resp == cmd); // No ERROR, so should be the same
1242 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_DEBUG, "Processing callback response that sets plainfd:=%d and lid:=\"%s\" for rid==\"%s\"", cmd->passfd, lid, rid);
1243 cmd->cmd.pio_cmd = oldcmd;
1245 // Check that new rid is a generalisation of original rid
1246 // Note: This is only of interest for client operation
1247 if (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) {
1248 selector_t newrid = donai_from_stable_string (rid, strlen (rid));
1249 donai_t oldrid = donai_from_stable_string (cmd->orig_starttls->remoteid, strlen (cmd->orig_starttls->remoteid));
1250 if (!donai_matches_selector (&oldrid, &newrid)) {
1251 return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
1255 // Now reiterate to lookup lid credentials in db_localid
1256 E_g2e ("Missing local credentials",
1257 fetch_local_credentials (cmd));
1259 if (cmd->lids [lidtype - LID_TYPE_MIN].data == NULL) {
1260 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Missing certificate for local ID %s and remote ID %s\n", lid, rid);
1261 E_g2e ("Missing certificate for local ID",
1262 GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND);
1267 // Split the credential into its various aspects
1268 ok = dbcred_interpret (
1269 &cmd->lids [lidtype - LID_TYPE_MIN],
1274 tlog (TLOG_DB, LOG_DEBUG, "BDB entry has flags=0x%08x, p11priv=\"%s\", cert.size=%d", flags, p11priv, certdatum.size);
1275 //TODO// ok = ok && verify_cert_... (...); -- keyidlookup
1277 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
1281 // Allocate response structures
1283 *pcert = load_certificate_chain (flags, pcert_length, &certdatum);
1284 if (*pcert == NULL) {
1285 E_g2e ("Failed to load certificate chain",
1286 GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR);
1289 cmd->session_certificate = (intptr_t) (void *) *pcert; //TODO// Used for session cleanup
1292 // Setup private key
1293 E_g2e ("Failed to initialise private key",
1294 gnutls_privkey_init (
1296 if ((onthefly_subjectkey != NULL) && (strcmp (p11priv, onthefly_p11uri) == 0)) {
1297 // Setup the on-the-fly certification key as private key
1298 E_g2e ("Failed to import on-the-fly subject private key",
1299 gnutls_privkey_import_x509 (
1301 onthefly_subjectkey,
1302 GNUTLS_PRIVKEY_IMPORT_COPY));
1304 } else if (lidtype == LID_TYPE_KRB5) {
1305 // Fake a private key for Kerberos (we sign it out here, not GnuTLS)
1306 E_g2e ("Failed to generate a private-key placeholder for Kerberos",
1307 gnutls_privkey_generate_krb (
1312 // Import the PKCS #11 key as the private key for use by GnuTLS
1313 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
1314 cmd->session_privatekey = (intptr_t) (void *) *pkey; //TODO// Used for session cleanup
1316 E_g2e ("Failed to import PKCS #11 private key URI",
1317 gnutls_privkey_import_pkcs11_url (
1321 E_gnutls_clear_errno ();
1323 //TODO// Moved out (start)
1326 // Setup public key certificate
1329 E_g2e ("MOVED: Failed to import X.509 certificate into chain",
1330 gnutls_pcert_import_x509_raw (
1333 GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER,
1337 E_g2e ("MOVED: Failed to import OpenPGP public key",
1338 gnutls_pcert_import_openpgp_raw (
1341 GNUTLS_OPENPGP_FMT_RAW,
1342 NULL, /* use master key */
1347 if (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) {
1349 // KDH-Only or KDH-Enhanced; fetch ticket for localid
1350 // and a TGT based on it for service/remoteid@REALM
1352 // First, try to obtain a TGT and key, in various ways
1354 krb5_creds *tgt = NULL;
1355 krb5_creds *ticket = NULL;
1356 krb5_ccache cc = NULL;
1358 memset (&key, 0, sizeof (key ));
1359 status = have_key_tgt_cc (
1366 // We never use this key ourselves
1367 krb5_free_keyblock_contents (krbctx_cli, &key);
1370 // Stop processing when no tgt was found
1371 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
1375 // Store client identity in session object
1376 if (0 != krb5_copy_principal (
1380 krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, tgt);
1383 krb5_cc_close (krbctx_cli, cc);
1386 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
1390 // Now find a service ticket to talk to, and its key
1391 //TODO// Pass credcache instead?
1392 status = have_service_ticket (
1398 // We don't need cc anymore below
1399 krb5_cc_close (krbctx_cli, cc);
1402 // Stop processing when no ticket was found
1403 krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, tgt);
1405 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
1409 // Only for KDH-Only mode can the client rely on a
1410 // server principal taken from the ticket;
1411 // So only store krbid_srv for KDH-Only mode.
1412 if ((gnutls_certificate_type_get_peers (cmd->session)
1413 == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) &&
1414 (0 != krb5_copy_principal (
1417 &cmd->krbid_srv))) {
1418 krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, ticket);
1419 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
1422 krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, tgt);
1424 if (0 != krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (
1428 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
1429 // continue, with E_g2e() skipping import
1431 certdatum.data = ticket->ticket.data;
1432 certdatum.size = ticket->ticket.length;
1433 E_g2e ("MOVED: Failed to import Kerberos ticket",
1434 gnutls_pcert_import_krb_raw (
1438 krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, ticket);
1441 // For KDH-Only, the server supplies one of:
1442 // - a TGT for user-to-user mode (for p2p exchanges)
1443 // - an DER NULL to waive u2u mode
1444 //TODO// E_g2e ("MOVED: Failed to import Kerberos ticket",
1445 //TODO// gnutls_pcert_import_krb_raw (
1447 //TODO// &certdatum, //TODO:WHATSFOUND//
1451 krb5_creds *tgt = NULL;
1453 // Determine whether we want to run in user-to-user mode
1454 // for which we should supply a TGT to the TLS client
1455 u2u = u2u || ((PIOF_STARTTLS_BOTHROLES_PEER & ~cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags) == 0);
1456 u2u = u2u || (strchr (rid, '@') != NULL);
1457 // u2u = u2u || "shaken hands on TLS symmetry extension"
1458 u2u = u2u && got_cc_srv; // We may simply not be able!
1460 // When not in user-to-user mode, deliver DER NULL
1462 static unsigned char der_null_data[] = "\x05\x00";
1463 certdatum.data = der_null_data;
1465 E_g2e ("Failed to withhold Kerberos server ticket",
1466 gnutls_pcert_import_krb_raw (
1473 // Continue specifically for user-to-user mode.
1474 //TODO// Setup server principal identity
1476 // Fetch the service's key
1477 status = have_key_tgt_cc (
1479 1, 0, 0, // Hmm... later we know kvno/etype
1482 &cmd->krb_key, &tgt, NULL);
1484 // There's no use in having just the key
1485 krb5_free_keyblock_contents (krbctx_srv, &cmd->krb_key);
1486 memset (&cmd->krb_key, 0, sizeof (cmd->krb_key));
1489 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
1490 } else if (0 != krb5_copy_principal (
1494 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
1496 certdatum.data = tgt->ticket.data;
1497 certdatum.size = tgt->ticket.length;
1498 E_g2e ("Failed to withhold Kerberos server ticket",
1499 gnutls_pcert_import_krb_raw (
1503 krb5_free_creds (krbctx_cli, tgt);
1509 /* Should not happen */
1513 //TODO// Moved out (end)
1515 #ifdef ANCIENT_CODE_WHEN_DBERRNO_RAN_IN_PARALLEL
1517 // Lap up any overseen POSIX error codes in errno
1519 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "Failing TLS on errno=%d / %s", errno, strerror (errno));
1520 cmd->session_errno = errno;
1521 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CIPHER_SUITES; /* Vaguely matching */
1526 // Return the overral error code, hopefully GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS
1527 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "Returning %d / %s from clisrv_cert_retrieve()", gtls_errno, gnutls_strerror (gtls_errno));
1528 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: clisrv_cert_retrieve() sets *pcert to 0x%lx (length %d)... {pubkey = 0x%lx, cert= {data = 0x%lx, size=%ld}, type=%ld}\n", (long) *pcert, *pcert_length, (long) (*pcert)->pubkey, (long) (*pcert)->cert.data, (long) (*pcert)->cert.size, (long) (*pcert)->type);
1532 /* Load a single certificate in the given gnutls_pcert_st from the given
1533 * gnutls_datum_t. Use the lidtype to determine how to do this.
1535 gtls_error load_certificate (int lidtype, gnutls_pcert_st *pcert, gnutls_datum_t *certdatum) {
1536 int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
1538 // Setup public key certificate
1541 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: About to import %d bytes worth of X.509 certificate into chain: %02x %02x %02x %02x...\n", certdatum->size, certdatum->data[0], certdatum->data[1], certdatum->data[2], certdatum->data[3]);
1542 E_g2e ("Failed to import X.509 certificate into chain",
1543 gnutls_pcert_import_x509_raw (
1546 GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER,
1550 E_g2e ("Failed to import OpenPGP certificate",
1551 gnutls_pcert_import_openpgp_raw (
1554 GNUTLS_OPENPGP_FMT_RAW,
1555 NULL, /* use master key */
1559 /* Binary information is currently moot, so do not load it */
1562 /* Should not happen */
1569 /* Load a certificate chain. This returns a value for a retrieval function's
1570 * pcert, and also modifies the chainlen. The latter starts at 0, and is
1571 * incremented in a nested procedure that unrolls until all certificates are
1574 gnutls_pcert_st *load_certificate_chain (uint32_t flags, unsigned int *chainlen, gnutls_datum_t *certdatum) {
1575 gnutls_pcert_st *chain;
1576 unsigned int mypos = *chainlen;
1577 int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
1580 // Quick and easy: No chaining required, just add the literal data.
1581 // Note however, this may be the end of a chain, so allocate all
1582 // structures and load the single one at the end.
1583 if ((flags & (LID_CHAINED | LID_NEEDS_CHAIN)) == 0) {
1585 chain = (gnutls_pcert_st *) calloc (*chainlen, sizeof (gnutls_pcert_st));
1586 if (chain != NULL) {
1589 (*chainlen) * sizeof (gnutls_pcert_st));
1591 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
1593 E_g2e ("Failed to load certificate into chain",
1595 flags & LID_TYPE_MASK,
1598 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
1609 // First extended case. Chain certs in response to LID_CHAINED.
1610 // Recursive calls are depth-first, so we only add our first cert
1611 // after a recursive call succeeds. Any LID_NEEDS_CHAIN work is
1612 // added after LID_CHAINED, so is higher up in the hierarchy, but
1613 // it is loaded as part of the recursion. To support that, a
1614 // recursive call with certdatum.size==0 is possible when the
1615 // LID_NEEDS_CHAIN flag is set, and this section then skips.
1616 // Note that this code is also used to load the certificate chain
1617 // provided by LID_NEEDS_CHAIN, but by then the flag in a recursive
1618 // call is replaced with LID_CHAINED and no more LID_NEEDS_CHAIN.
1619 if (((flags & LID_CHAINED) != 0) && (certdatum->size > 0)) {
1622 gnutls_datum_t nextdatum;
1624 // Note: Accept BER because the outside SEQUENCE is not signed
1625 certlen = asn1_get_length_ber (
1626 (certdatum->data) + 1,
1629 certlen += 1 + lenlen;
1630 tlog (TLOG_CERT, LOG_DEBUG, "Found LID_CHAINED certificate size %d", certlen);
1631 if (certlen > certdatum->size) {
1632 tlog (TLOG_CERT, LOG_ERR, "Refusing LID_CHAINED certificate beyond data size %d", certdatum->size);
1635 } else if (certlen <= 0) {
1636 tlog (TLOG_CERT, LOG_ERR, "Refusing LID_CHAINED certificate of too-modest data size %d", certlen);
1640 nextdatum.data = (certdatum->data) + certlen;
1641 nextdatum.size = certdatum->size - certlen;
1642 certdatum->size = certlen;
1643 nextlen = asn1_get_length_ber (
1647 nextlen += 1 + lenlen;
1648 if (nextlen == nextdatum.size) {
1649 // The last cert is loaded thinking it is not CHAINED,
1650 // but NEEDS_CHAIN can still be present for expansion.
1651 flags &= ~LID_CHAINED;
1654 chain = load_certificate_chain (flags, chainlen, &nextdatum);
1655 if (chain != NULL) {
1656 E_g2e ("Failed to add chained certificate",
1658 flags & LID_TYPE_MASK,
1661 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
1671 // Second extended case. Chain certs in response to LID_NEEDS_CHAIN.
1672 // These are the highest-up in the hierarchy, above any LID_CHAINED
1673 // certificates. The procedure for adding them is looking them up
1674 // in a central database by their authority key identifier. What is
1675 // found is assumed to be a chain, and will be unrolled by replacing
1676 // the LID_NEEDS_CHAIN flag with LID_CHAINED and calling recursively.
1677 if (((flags & LID_NEEDS_CHAIN) != 0) && (certdatum->size == 0)) {
1678 //TODO//CODE// lookup new certdatum
1679 flags &= ~LID_NEEDS_CHAIN;
1680 flags |= LID_CHAINED;
1681 //TODO//CODE// recursive call
1682 //TODO//CODE// no structures to fill here
1683 //TODO//CODE// cleanup new certdatum
1687 // Final judgement. Nothing worked. Return failure.
1694 /********** KERBEROS SUPPORT FUNCTIONS FOR TLS-KDH **********/
1698 /* Prepare the Kerberos resources for use by clients and/or servers.
1701 static int setup_starttls_kerberos (void) {
1704 int retval = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
1705 krb5_ccache krb_cc_tmp;
1706 const char *cctype_cli = NULL;
1707 const char *cctype_srv = NULL;
1710 krbctx_cli = krbctx_srv = NULL;
1711 krb_kt_cli = krb_kt_srv = NULL;
1712 got_cc_cli = got_cc_srv = 0;
1714 // Construct credentials caching for Kerberos
1716 k5err = krb5_init_context (&krbctx_cli);
1719 k5err = krb5_init_context (&krbctx_srv);
1722 // Load the various configuration variables
1723 cfg = cfg_krb_client_keytab ();
1724 if ((k5err == 0) && (cfg != NULL)) {
1725 k5err = krb5_kt_resolve (krbctx_cli, cfg, &krb_kt_cli);
1727 cfg = cfg_krb_server_keytab ();
1728 if ((k5err == 0) && (cfg != NULL)) {
1729 k5err = krb5_kt_resolve (krbctx_srv, cfg, &krb_kt_srv);
1731 cfg = cfg_krb_client_credcache ();
1732 #if 0 /* Temporary bypass of cctype checks */
1733 if ((k5err == 0) && (cfg != NULL)) {
1734 k5err = krb5_cc_set_default_name (krbctx_cli, cfg);
1736 k5err = krb5_cc_default (krbctx_cli, &krb_cc_tmp);
1740 cctype_cli = krb5_cc_get_type (krbctx_cli, krb_cc_tmp);
1741 krb5_cc_close (krbctx_cli, krb_cc_tmp);
1745 cfg = cfg_krb_server_credcache ();
1746 #if 0 /* Temporary bypass of cctype checks */
1747 if ((k5err == 0) && (cfg != NULL)) {
1748 k5err = krb5_cc_set_default_name (krbctx_srv, cfg);
1750 k5err = krb5_cc_default (krbctx_srv, &krb_cc_tmp);
1754 cctype_srv = krb5_cc_get_type (krbctx_cli, krb_cc_tmp);
1755 krb5_cc_close (krbctx_srv, krb_cc_tmp);
1760 // Check for consistency and log helpful messages for the sysop
1762 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "Error during STARTTLS setup: %s (acting on %s)",
1763 krb5_get_error_message (krbctx_cli, k5err),
1765 retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
1767 if (krb_kt_cli != NULL) {
1768 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring the configured kerberos_client_keytab -- it is not implemented yet");
1770 if (krb_kt_srv == NULL) {
1771 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "No kerberos_server_keytab configured, so Kerberos cannot work at all");
1772 retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
1773 /* TODO: Only for MIT krb5 1.11 and up
1774 } else if (0 == krb5_kt_have_content (krb_ctx, krb_kt_srv)) {
1775 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "Keytab in kerberos_server_keytab is absent or empty");
1776 retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
1779 if (krbctx_cli == NULL) {
1780 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "No kerberos_client_credcache configured, so Kerberos cannot work at all");
1781 retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
1782 #if 0 /* Temporary bypass of cctype checks */
1783 } else if (!krb5_cc_support_switch (
1784 krbctx_cli, cctype_cli)) {
1785 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "Your kerberos_client_credcache does not support multilpe identities");
1786 retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
1789 if (krbctx_srv == NULL) {
1790 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_WARNING, "No kerberos_server_credcache configured, so user-to-user Kerberos will not work");
1791 #if 0 /* Temporary bypass of cctype checks */
1792 } else if (!krb5_cc_support_switch (
1793 krbctx_srv, cctype_srv)) {
1794 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON | TLOG_KERBEROS, LOG_ERR, "Your kerberos_server_credcache does not support multilpe identities");
1795 retval = GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM;
1798 if (retval != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
1799 cleanup_starttls_kerberos ();
1806 /* Cleanup Kerberos resources. This must be an idempotent function, because
1807 * it is called when Kerberos panics as well as when
1810 static void cleanup_starttls_kerberos (void) {
1811 if (krb_kt_srv != NULL) {
1812 krb5_kt_close (krbctx_srv, krb_kt_srv);
1815 if (krb_kt_cli != NULL) {
1816 krb5_kt_close (krbctx_cli, krb_kt_cli);
1819 if (krbctx_srv != NULL) {
1820 krb5_free_context (krbctx_srv);
1823 if (krbctx_cli != NULL) {
1824 krb5_free_context (krbctx_cli);
1831 /* Prompter callback function for PKCS #11.
1833 * TODO: Use "struct pkcs11iter" as data, possibly interact with the user,
1834 * and keep a score on where we stand with password entry and changes.
1835 * Create clisrv_p11krb_setup() and clisrv_p11krb_cleanup() functions.
1837 * In the current release for Kerberos, we have a very minimal mode for
1838 * doing this. We may embellish it later or, preferrably, turn to a more
1839 * PKCS #11 styled approach, perhaps PKINIT or FAST.
1842 static krb5_error_code clisrv_p11krb_callback (krb5_context ctx,
1847 krb5_prompt prompts []) {
1848 struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
1850 krb5_prompt_type *codes = krb5_get_prompt_types (ctx);
1852 static const char *token_url = "pkcs11:manufacturer=Kerberos+infrastructure;model=TLS+Pool;serial=%28none%29";
1853 static const char *token_label = "Kerberos infrastructure";
1854 for (i=0; i<num_prompts; i++) {
1856 // Visit each prompt in turn, setting responses or return failure
1857 switch (codes [i]) {
1858 case KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PASSWORD:
1859 //TODO// Read a password from PKCS #11
1860 //TODO// Do we need to cycle passwords to cover retry?
1861 //TODO// Delete any failed passwords?
1863 if (attempt >= MAX_P11ITER_ATTEMPTS) {
1864 return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
1866 // Nothing in PKCS #11 --> so fallback on manual entry
1867 if (!pin_callback (attempt,
1868 token_url, "Enter Kerberos password:",
1869 prompts [i].reply->data,
1870 prompts [i].reply->length)) {
1871 memset (prompts [i].reply->data, 0, prompts [i].reply->length);
1872 return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
1874 //TODO// Manage data structure
1875 prompts [i].reply->length = strlen (prompts [i].reply->data);
1877 case KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_NEW_PASSWORD:
1878 case KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_NEW_PASSWORD_AGAIN:
1879 //TODO// Setup new password in PKCS #11
1880 case KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH:
1881 //TODO// Use FAST, PKINIT, and so on...
1883 // Unrecognised and unimplemented prompt types end here
1884 return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
1892 /* Find a Kerberos keyblock and ticket to use for the localid. Do not look
1893 * into services yet in this function. This function implements a simple
1894 * procedure, based on optional arguments p11uri, keytab, credcache. It
1895 * produces <key,tgt> or <key,NULL> or (for errors) <NULL,NULL>.
1897 * The procedure followed, fully written out, is outlined below:
1899 * IF have(credcache) AND acceptable (renewable) time
1900 * THEN RETURN <key,tgt>
1901 * ELSE IF have (keytab) AND found a suitable key
1902 * THEN IF have(credcache) and it works
1903 * THEN fetch cred tgt and key (auth with key in keytab)
1906 * ELSE RETURN <key,NULL>
1907 * ELSE IF have(p11uri) AND it works
1908 * THEN fetch cred tgt and key (auth with pwd in p11uri)
1911 * ELSE RETURN <NULL,NULL>
1913 * The function returns a status value counting the number of values returned,
1914 * so 0 means error, 1 means key only and 2 means key and tgt.
1917 static int have_key_tgt_cc (struct command *cmd, // in, session context
1918 krb5_context ctx, // in, kerberos context
1919 bool use_cc, // in, whether to use cc
1920 krb5_kvno kvno, // in, kvno (0 for highest)
1921 krb5_enctype enctype,// in, enctype (0 for any)
1922 char *p11uri, // in/opt, PKCS #11 pwd URI
1923 krb5_keytab kt, // in/opt, keytab
1924 krb5_keyblock *key, // opt/opt session key
1925 krb5_creds **tgt, // out/opt, tkt granting tkt
1926 krb5_ccache *cc) { // out/opt, cred cache
1928 krb5_ccache newcc = NULL;
1929 krb5_principal sought = NULL;
1930 krb5_principal sought1 = NULL;
1931 krb5_principal tgtname = NULL;
1932 krb5_keytab_entry ktentry;
1933 const char *svc = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.service;
1934 const char *lid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid;
1939 uint32_t nametype, nametype_alt;
1942 // Assertions, and initialise variables
1943 assert ( cmd != NULL);
1944 assert ( ctx != NULL);
1945 assert ( key != NULL);
1946 assert (*tgt == NULL);
1947 krb5_free_keyblock_contents (ctx, key);
1952 // Construct the realm name
1953 liddom = strrchr (lid, '@');
1954 if (liddom != NULL) {
1955 lid1len = ((intptr_t) liddom) - ((intptr_t) lid);
1956 liddom++; // Skip '@'
1958 liddom = lid; // localid is a host
1959 lid1len = strnlen (lid, 128);
1961 k5err = krb5_get_host_realm (ctx, liddom, &realms);
1962 if ((k5err == 0) && (realms [0] != NULL) && (*realms [0] != '\0')) {
1963 strncpy (realm, realms [0], sizeof (realm));
1964 realm [sizeof (realm)-1] = '\0';
1968 realm [i] = toupper (liddom [i]);
1970 } while (liddom [i-1] != '\0');
1973 krb5_free_host_realm (ctx, realms);
1978 // Construct a sought principal name in a given naming style,
1979 // and try to locate it in the existing cache.
1980 // With @, try liduser@liddom@REALM or else liduser@REALM
1981 // Without @, try svc/liddom@REALM
1982 nametype = (lid == liddom) ? KRB5_NT_SRV_HST : KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL;
1984 nametype_alt = nametype;
1986 case KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL:
1987 nametype_alt = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL;
1988 k5err = krb5_build_principal_ext (ctx, &sought,
1989 strlen (realm), realm,
1990 strnlen (lid, 128), lid,
1993 case KRB5_NT_SRV_HST:
1994 if (strcmp (svc, "http") == 0) {
1997 k5err = krb5_build_principal_ext (ctx, &sought,
1998 strlen (realm), realm,
2003 case KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL:
2004 k5err = krb5_build_principal_ext (ctx, &sought,
2005 strlen (realm), realm,
2011 sought->type = nametype;
2015 k5err = krb5_cc_cache_match (ctx, sought, &newcc);
2017 if ((nametype_alt != nametype) && (sought1 == NULL)) {
2018 nametype = nametype_alt;
2024 // We failed to find an *existing* credentials cache
2025 // for the local identity.
2027 // Our new hope is to create a fresh credential, and add
2028 // it to the current credcache. To that end, we now try
2029 // to overrule k5err by getting hold of our default cc.
2033 // Construct the TGT name
2034 k5err = krb5_build_principal_ext (ctx, &tgtname,
2035 strlen (realm), realm,
2037 strlen (realm), realm,
2043 tgtname->type = KRB5_NT_SRV_INST;
2045 // Try to get the service ticket for the TGT name from the cache
2047 memset (&credreq, 0, sizeof (credreq));
2048 credreq.client = sought;
2049 credreq.server = tgtname;
2050 k5err = krb5_get_credentials (ctx,
2051 /* KRB5_GC_USER_USER ?|? */
2052 ( use_cc ? 0 : KRB5_GC_CACHED ),
2057 && (now + 300 > (*tgt)->times.endtime)
2058 && (now + 300 < (*tgt)->times.renew_till)) {
2059 //TODO:NOTHERE// krb5_free_creds (ctx, *tgt);
2060 //TODO:NOTHERE// *tgt = NULL;
2061 // Try to renew the ticket
2062 k5err = krb5_get_renewed_creds (ctx,
2066 NULL); /* krbtgt/REALM@REALM */
2069 && (now + 300 > (*tgt)->times.endtime)) {
2070 // Thanks, but no thanks!
2071 krb5_free_creds (ctx, *tgt);
2076 // First case worked -- return <key,tgt> from credout
2077 k5err = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (ctx,
2080 // On failure, key shows failure
2089 // Prior attempts failed. Instead, look for keytab or p11uri presence.
2090 // This is skipped when the use_cc option below welcomes krb5_creds.
2091 if ((key->contents == NULL) && (p11uri == NULL) && (kt == NULL)) {
2092 // We cannot obtain a new krbtgt
2093 // We simply return what we've got (which may be nothing)
2096 if ((kt == NULL) && (!use_cc)) {
2097 // We have nowhere to store a new krbtgt if we got it
2098 // We simply return what we've got (which is at least a key)
2102 // Either we have a keytab key, or we have a p11uri,
2103 // so we can attempt to create a new credcache with a new krbtgt
2105 if (newcc == NULL) {
2106 k5err = krb5_cc_default (ctx, &newcc);
2108 // Utter failure to do even the simplest thing
2112 *tgt = malloc (sizeof (**tgt));
2117 memset (*tgt, 0, sizeof (**tgt));
2118 if ((sought != NULL) && (sought1 == NULL)) {
2119 // We only tried one name
2124 if (sought1 == NULL) {
2127 if (p11uri == NULL) {
2128 k5err = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab (
2133 0, /* start now please */
2134 NULL, /* get a TGT please */
2135 NULL); //TODO// opts needed?
2137 //TODO// Prepare PKCS #11 access
2138 k5err = krb5_get_init_creds_password (
2143 NULL, // Use callbacks for password
2144 clisrv_p11krb_callback,
2149 cmd, /* callback data pointer */
2150 0, /* start now please */
2151 NULL, /* get a TGT please */
2152 NULL); //TODO// opts needed?
2153 //TODO// End PKCS #11 access
2155 krb5_free_principal (ctx, sought1);
2158 } while (k5err != 0);
2160 // Failed to initiate new credentials
2161 krb5_free_creds (ctx, *tgt);
2165 // Try to store the credential, if it was found
2166 if (sought1 != NULL) {
2167 k5err = krb5_cc_initialize (ctx, newcc, sought1);
2169 k5err = krb5_cc_store_cred (ctx, newcc, *tgt);
2172 // Copy the keyblock; any failure will show up in key
2173 krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (ctx,
2174 &(*tgt)->keyblock, //TODO:UNINIT// &ktentry.key,
2177 // We succeeded in setting up a new Ticket Granting Ticket!
2185 // As a last resort, dig up a key directly from the keytab;
2186 // this is the only place where kvno and enctype are used
2188 //NOTE// Might be more direct as krb5_kt_read_service_key()
2189 k5err = krb5_kt_get_entry (
2195 k5err = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (ctx,
2198 krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents (ctx, &ktentry);
2199 // On failure, key shows failure.
2208 // Nothing more to try, so we continue into cleanup
2211 // Cleanup and return the <key,tgt> values as they were delivered
2212 if (sought1 != NULL) {
2213 krb5_free_principal (ctx, sought1);
2216 if (sought != NULL) {
2217 krb5_free_principal (ctx, sought);
2220 if (tgtname != NULL) {
2221 krb5_free_principal (ctx, tgtname);
2224 if (newcc != NULL) {
2225 krb5_cc_close (ctx, newcc);
2228 if (key->contents == NULL) {
2230 const char *errmsg = krb5_get_error_message (ctx, k5err);
2231 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON, LOG_ERR, "Kerberos error in have_key_tgt_cc: %s", errmsg);
2232 krb5_free_error_message (ctx, errmsg);
2235 krb5_free_creds (ctx, *tgt);
2238 if ((cc != NULL) && (*cc != NULL)) {
2239 krb5_cc_close (ctx, *cc);
2243 } else if (tgt == NULL) {
2244 if ((cc != NULL) && (*cc != NULL)) {
2245 krb5_cc_close (ctx, *cc);
2249 } else if ((cc == NULL) || (*cc == NULL)) {
2258 /* Have a ticket for the remote service. Do this as a client. The client
2259 * principal and realm are provided, and the ticket to be returned will
2260 * also provide the accompanying key.
2262 * This function will incorporate the peer TGT, when it is provided. This
2263 * is the case in KDH-Only exchanges with a non-empty Server Certificate.
2265 * TODO: We are not currently serving backend tickets, but these could be
2266 * passed in as authorization data along with the credential request.
2267 * Note however, that authorization data is copied by default from the TGT,
2268 * but not necessarily from the request. Not without KDC modifications.
2269 * But then again, the KDC should have responded with an error that it was
2270 * missing backend services; this is not something the client should decide
2271 * on, and certainly not after being requested by the service. The error
2272 * and recovery could be implemented here (if we can get the error info out
2273 * of the libkrb5 API). Alternatively, we might consider passing the
2274 * authorization data in the authenticator since we get to control it.
2275 * What will the specification say?
2277 * The return value indicates how many of the requested output values have
2278 * been provided, counting from the first. So, 0 means a total failure and
2279 * anything higher is a (partial) success.
2282 static int have_service_ticket (
2283 struct command *cmd, // in, session context
2284 krb5_context ctx, // in, kerberos context
2285 krb5_ccache cc_opt, // in/opt, credcache
2286 krb5_principal cli, // in, client principal
2287 krb5_creds **ticket) {// out, tkt granting tkt
2289 krb5_ccache cc = cc_opt;
2291 krb5_principal srv = NULL;
2295 // Sanity checks and initialisation
2296 memset (&tkt_srv, 0, sizeof (tkt_srv));
2297 memset (&credreq, 0, sizeof (credreq));
2300 // Determine the optional cc parameter if it was not provided
2301 //TODO// This can go if we always get it passed from have_key_tgt_cc()
2303 k5err = krb5_cc_cache_match (ctx, cli, &cc);
2309 // Build the server's principal name
2310 const char *svc = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.service;
2311 const char *rid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
2315 riddom = strrchr (rid, '@');
2316 if (riddom != NULL) {
2317 riddom++; // Skip '@'
2319 riddom = rid; // localid is a host
2321 k5err = krb5_get_host_realm (ctx, riddom, &realms);
2322 if ((k5err == 0) && (realms [0] != NULL) && (*realms [0] != '\0')) {
2323 strncpy (realm, realms [0], sizeof (realm));
2324 realm [sizeof (realm)-1] = '\0';
2328 realm [i] = toupper (riddom [i]);
2330 } while (riddom [i-1] != '\0');
2333 krb5_free_host_realm (ctx, realms);
2337 if (strcmp (svc, "http") == 0) {
2340 k5err = krb5_build_principal_ext (ctx, &srv,
2341 strlen (realm), realm,
2348 srv->type = KRB5_NT_SRV_HST;
2350 // Construct credential request
2351 credreq.client = cli;
2352 credreq.server = srv;
2353 //TODO// credreq.authdata may be used for backend service tickets
2355 // See if our peer provided us with a TGT
2356 // - we are sure of GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE because we implement it now
2357 // - we must ensure that this is KDH-Only (remote GNUTLS_CRT_KRB)
2358 // - we must ensure that the remote provided a non-empty ticket
2359 if (gnutls_certificate_type_get_peers (cmd->session) == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
2360 // This is KDH-Only -- and the server may present a TGT
2361 const gnutls_datum_t *opt_srv_tkt;
2362 unsigned int srv_tkt_count;
2363 opt_srv_tkt = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (cmd->session, &srv_tkt_count);
2364 if ((opt_srv_tkt != NULL) && (srv_tkt_count >= 1) && (opt_srv_tkt [0].size > 5)) {
2365 // Looks good, we'll use only the first (normally only) one
2366 credreq.second_ticket.data = opt_srv_tkt [0].data;
2367 credreq.second_ticket.length = opt_srv_tkt [0].size;
2368 u2u = KRB5_GC_USER_USER;
2372 // Fetch the ticket for the service
2373 k5err = krb5_get_credentials (ctx, u2u, cc, &credreq, ticket);
2375 // Cleanup and return; the return value depends on k5err
2377 if ((cc != NULL) && (cc_opt == NULL)) {
2378 //TODO// This can go if we always get it passed from have_key_tgt_cc()
2379 krb5_cc_close (ctx, cc);
2383 krb5_free_principal (ctx, srv);
2385 return (k5err == 0) ? 1 : 0;
2390 /* DER utility: This should probably appear in Quick DER sometime soon.
2392 * Pack an Int32 or UInt32 and return the number of bytes. Do not pack a header
2393 * around it. The function returns the number of bytes taken, even 0 is valid.
2395 typedef uint8_t QDERBUF_INT32_T [4];
2396 dercursor qder2b_pack_int32 (uint8_t *target_4b, int32_t value) {
2399 retval.derptr = target_4b;
2401 while (shift >= 0) {
2402 if ((retval.derlen == 0) && (shift > 0)) {
2403 // Skip sign-extending initial bytes
2404 uint32_t neutro = (value >> (shift - 1) ) & 0x000001ff;
2405 if ((neutro == 0x000001ff) || (neutro == 0x00000000)) {
2410 target_4b [retval.derlen] = (value >> shift) & 0xff;
2416 typedef uint8_t QDERBUF_UINT32_T [5];
2417 dercursor qder2b_pack_uint32 (uint8_t *target_5b, uint32_t value) {
2420 if (value & 0x80000000) {
2424 retval = qder2b_pack_int32 (target_5b + ofs, (int32_t) value);
2425 retval.derptr -= ofs;
2426 retval.derlen += ofs;
2431 /* DER utility: This should probably appear in Quick DER sometime soon.
2433 * Unpack an Int32 or UInt32 from a given number of bytes. Do not assume a header
2434 * around it. The function returns the value found.
2436 * Out of range values are returned as 0. This value only indicates invalid
2437 * return when len > 1, so check for that.
2439 int32_t qder2b_unpack_int32 (dercursor data4) {
2442 if (data4.derlen > 4) {
2445 if ((data4.derlen > 0) && (0x80 & *data4.derptr)) {
2448 for (idx=0; idx<data4.derlen; idx++) {
2450 retval += data4.derptr [idx];
2455 uint32_t qder2b_unpack_uint32 (dercursor data5) {
2456 uint32_t retval = 0;
2458 if (data5.derlen > 5) {
2461 if (data5.derlen == 5) {
2462 if (*data5.derptr != 0x00) {
2465 // Modify the local copy on our stack
2469 retval = (uint32_t) qder2b_unpack_int32 (data5);
2476 /* TODO: Debugging function for printing (descr,ptr,len) ranges */
2477 static inline void prange (char *descr, uint8_t *ptr, int len) {
2478 fprintf (stderr, "%s #%04d: %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x...%02x %02x %02x %02x\n",
2480 ptr [0], ptr [1], ptr [2], ptr [3],
2481 ptr [4], ptr [5], ptr [6], ptr [7],
2482 ptr [len-4], ptr [len-3], ptr [len-2], ptr [len-1]);
2484 static inline void prangefull (char *descr, uint8_t *ptr, int len) {
2485 fprintf (stderr, "%s #%04d:", descr, len);
2487 fprintf (stderr, " %02x", *ptr++);
2489 fprintf (stderr, "\n");
2494 /* The callback function that retrieves a TLS-KDH "signature", which is kept
2495 * outside of GnuTLS. The callback computes an authenticator encrypted to
2496 * the session's Kerberos key.
2499 static gtls_error cli_kdhsig_encode (gnutls_session_t session,
2500 gnutls_datum_t *enc_authenticator,
2501 gnutls_datum_t *dec_authenticator,
2502 const gnutls_datum_t *hash,
2503 int32_t checksum_type) {
2505 // Variables, sanity checking, initialisation
2506 struct command *cmd;
2508 authenticator_t auth;
2509 QDERBUF_INT32_T derv5;
2510 QDERBUF_INT32_T dernametype;
2511 QDERBUF_INT32_T dercksumtype;
2512 krb5_keyblock subkey;
2513 gnutls_certificate_type_t peercert;
2514 QDERBUF_INT32_T dersubkey;
2515 krb5_timestamp now_s;
2516 char derctime [100];
2518 QDERBUF_INT32_T dercusec;
2519 cmd = (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (session);
2520 memset (&auth, 0, sizeof (auth));
2521 memset (&subkey, 0, sizeof (subkey));
2522 assert (cmd->krbid_cli != NULL);
2523 assert (cmd->krb_key.contents != NULL);
2524 static const uint8_t auth_packer [] = {
2525 DER_PACK_rfc4120_Authenticator, DER_PACK_END };
2526 static const uint8_t encdata_packer [] = {
2527 DER_PACK_rfc4120_EncryptedData, DER_PACK_END };
2529 // Setup secure hash in authenticator (never optional for TLS-KDH)
2530 auth.cksum.cksumtype = qder2b_pack_int32 (dercksumtype, checksum_type);
2531 auth.cksum.checksum.derptr = hash->data;
2532 auth.cksum.checksum.derlen = hash->size;
2534 // Optionally include a subkey (namely, for KDH-Only)
2535 peercert = gnutls_certificate_type_get_peers (session);
2536 if (peercert == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
2537 // This is KDH-Only, for which we MUST create a random subkey
2538 k5err = krb5_c_make_random_key (
2540 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
2543 return GNUTLS_E_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
2545 auth.subkey.keytype = qder2b_pack_int32 (dersubkey, subkey.enctype);
2546 auth.subkey.keyvalue.derptr = subkey.contents;
2547 auth.subkey.keyvalue.derlen = subkey.length;
2548 prange ("cli_K", subkey.contents, subkey.length);
2551 // Setup the client realm and principal name
2552 auth.crealm.derptr = cmd->krbid_cli->realm.data;
2553 auth.crealm.derlen = cmd->krbid_cli->realm.length;
2554 auth.cname.name_type = qder2b_pack_int32 (dernametype, cmd->krbid_cli->type);
2555 // The SEQUENCE OF with just one component is trivial to prepack
2556 auth.cname.name_string.derptr = cmd->krbid_cli->data [0].data;
2557 auth.cname.name_string.derlen = cmd->krbid_cli->data [0].length;
2559 // Setup the Kerberos version number (5)
2560 auth.authenticator_vno = qder2b_pack_int32 (derv5, 5);
2562 // Setup the obliged microsecond timer values (ignore error returns)
2563 krb5_us_timeofday (krbctx_cli, &now_s, &now_us);
2564 krb5_timestamp_to_string (now_s, derctime, sizeof (derctime));
2565 derctime [sizeof (derctime)-1] = '\0';
2566 auth.ctime.derptr = derctime;
2567 auth.ctime.derlen = strlen (derctime);
2568 auth.cusec = qder2b_pack_int32 (dercusec, now_us);
2570 // Pack the decoded result into dec_authenticator
2571 size_t declen = der_pack ( auth_packer,
2572 (const dercursor *) &auth,
2573 NULL // Measure length, no output yet
2575 uint8_t *decptr = gnutls_malloc (declen);
2576 if (decptr == NULL) {
2577 return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
2579 der_pack ( auth_packer,
2580 (const dercursor *) &auth,
2582 krb5_free_keyblock_contents (krbctx_cli, &subkey);
2583 prangefull ("cli_A", decptr, declen);
2585 if (0 != krb5_c_encrypt_length (krbctx_cli,
2586 cmd->krb_key.enctype,
2589 gnutls_free (decptr);
2590 return GNUTLS_E_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
2592 uint8_t *rawptr = gnutls_malloc (rawlen);
2593 if (rawptr == NULL) {
2594 gnutls_free (decptr);
2595 return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
2598 krb5_enc_data rawdata;
2599 memset (&decdata, 0, sizeof (decdata));
2600 memset (&rawdata, 0, sizeof (rawdata));
2601 decdata.data = decptr;
2602 decdata.length = declen;
2603 rawdata.ciphertext.data = rawptr;
2604 rawdata.ciphertext.length = rawlen;
2605 if (0 != krb5_c_encrypt ( krbctx_cli,
2607 11 /* stealing key usage from AP-REQ */,
2611 gnutls_free (rawptr);
2612 gnutls_free (decptr);
2613 return GNUTLS_E_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
2616 // Prepare the header information
2617 QDERBUF_INT32_T deretype;
2618 QDERBUF_UINT32_T derkvno;
2619 encrypted_data_t encdata;
2620 memset (&encdata, 0, sizeof (encdata));
2621 encdata.etype = qder2b_pack_int32 (deretype, cmd->krb_key.enctype);
2622 //NOT// encdata.kvno = qder2b_pack_int32 (derkvno, cmd->krb_key.kvno);
2623 encdata.cipher.derptr = rawdata.ciphertext.data;
2624 encdata.cipher.derlen = rawdata.ciphertext.length;
2626 // Prepare for packing the header and rawdata as EncryptedData
2627 size_t enclen = der_pack ( encdata_packer,
2628 (const dercursor *) &encdata,
2629 NULL // Measure length, no output yet
2631 uint8_t *encptr = gnutls_malloc (enclen);
2632 if (encptr == NULL) {
2633 gnutls_free (rawptr);
2634 gnutls_free (decptr);
2635 return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
2637 der_pack ( encdata_packer,
2638 (const dercursor *) &encdata,
2640 gnutls_free (rawptr);
2642 // Return our final verdict on the generation of the Authenticator
2643 dec_authenticator->data = decptr;
2644 dec_authenticator->size = declen;
2645 enc_authenticator->data = encptr;
2646 enc_authenticator->size = enclen;
2647 prange ("cli_D", decptr, declen);
2648 prange ("cli_E", encptr, enclen);
2654 /* The callback function that verifies a TLS-KDH "signature", which is kept
2655 * outside of GnuTLS. The callback verifies the authenticator against the
2656 * provided session hash and returns the decrypted authenticator.
2659 static int srv_kdhsig_decode (gnutls_session_t session,
2660 const gnutls_datum_t *enc_authenticator,
2661 gnutls_datum_t *dec_authenticator,
2662 gnutls_datum_t *hash,
2663 int32_t *checksum_type) {
2665 // Variables, sanity checks and initialisation
2667 struct command *cmd;
2668 static const uint8_t encdata_packer [] = {
2669 DER_PACK_rfc4120_EncryptedData, DER_PACK_END };
2670 static const uint8_t auth_packer [] = {
2671 DER_PACK_rfc4120_Authenticator, DER_PACK_END };
2672 encrypted_data_t encdata;
2673 cmd = (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (session);
2674 prange ("srv_E", enc_authenticator->data, enc_authenticator->size);
2676 // Retrieve the session key and store it in cmd->krb_key.
2678 // Prior setting of cmd->krb_key would be due to user-to-user mode
2679 // having been setup with this as the server-supplied TGT key, in
2680 // which case cmd->krb_key would need to be overwritten by the
2683 // When no prior cmd->krb_key is available, use the keytab to
2684 // decode the client's ticket.
2685 assert (gnutls_certificate_type_get_peers (session) == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB);
2686 const gnutls_datum_t *certs;
2687 unsigned int num_certs;
2688 certs = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (cmd->session, &num_certs);
2689 if (num_certs != 1) {
2690 return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
2694 krbcert.data = certs [0].data;
2695 krbcert.length = certs [0].size;
2696 prange ("srv_C", certs [0].data, certs [0].size);
2697 if (0 != krb5_decode_ticket (&krbcert, &tkt)) {
2698 return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
2700 if (cmd->krb_key.contents != NULL) {
2701 // user-to-user mode
2702 k5err = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part (
2706 krb5_free_keyblock_contents (
2710 // client-to-server mode
2711 k5err = krb5_server_decrypt_ticket_keytab (
2717 k5err = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (
2719 tkt->enc_part2->session,
2723 k5err = krb5_copy_principal (
2725 tkt->enc_part2->client,
2729 if (cmd->krbid_srv != NULL) {
2730 k5err = krb5_principal_compare (
2734 // Server name changed since u2u setup => k5err
2736 k5err = krb5_copy_principal (
2742 krb5_free_ticket (krbctx_srv, tkt);
2744 const char *errmsg = krb5_get_error_message (krbctx_srv, k5err);
2745 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON, LOG_ERR, "Kerberos error in srv_kdhsig_decode: %s", errmsg);
2746 krb5_free_error_message (krbctx_srv, errmsg);
2747 return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
2750 // Harvest the EncryptedData fields from the enc_authenticator
2751 dercursor enctransport;
2752 enctransport.derptr = enc_authenticator->data;
2753 enctransport.derlen = enc_authenticator->size;
2754 prangefull ("EncData2unpack", enctransport.derptr, enctransport.derlen);
2755 memset (&encdata, 0, sizeof (encdata));
2756 if (0 != der_unpack ( &enctransport,
2758 (dercursor *) &encdata,
2760 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON, LOG_ERR, "Failed to der_unpack(EncryptedData) in server: %s", strerror (errno));
2761 return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
2763 if (encdata.kvno.derptr != NULL) {
2764 //TODO//NOTYET//ANDWHY// return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
2766 int32_t etype = qder2b_unpack_int32 (encdata.etype);
2768 // Decrypt the EncryptedData fields into the dec_authenticator
2769 krb5_enc_data rawdata;
2771 memset (&rawdata, 0, sizeof (rawdata));
2772 memset (&decdata, 0, sizeof (decdata));
2773 rawdata.enctype = etype;
2774 rawdata.ciphertext.data = encdata.cipher.derptr;
2775 rawdata.ciphertext.length = encdata.cipher.derlen;
2776 prange ("srv_R", encdata.cipher.derptr, encdata.cipher.derlen);
2777 decdata.data = dec_authenticator->data;
2778 decdata.length = dec_authenticator->size;
2779 if (0 != krb5_c_decrypt ( krbctx_srv,
2781 11 /* stealing key usage from AP-REQ */,
2785 return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
2787 dec_authenticator->size = decdata.length;
2788 prange ("srv_D", decdata.data, decdata.length);
2790 // Unpack the decrypted Authenticator
2791 dercursor decsyntax;
2792 decsyntax.derptr = decdata.data;
2793 decsyntax.derlen = decdata.length;
2794 prangefull ("srv_A", decdata.data, decdata.length);
2795 authenticator_t auth;
2796 memset (&auth, 0, sizeof (auth));
2797 if (0 != der_unpack ( &decsyntax,
2799 (dercursor *) &auth,
2801 tlog (TLOG_DAEMON, LOG_ERR, "Failed to der_unpack(Authenticator) in server: %s", strerror (errno));
2802 return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
2805 // Validate the contents of the Authenticator
2806 if (qder2b_unpack_int32 (auth.authenticator_vno) != 5) {
2807 return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
2809 if (auth.cksum.checksum.derptr == NULL) {
2810 return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
2812 if (auth.cksum.checksum.derlen < 16) {
2813 return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
2815 //TODO// Optionally, for KDH-Only, ensure presence and size of a subkey
2817 // Produce the requested content from the Authenticator and return
2818 *checksum_type = qder2b_unpack_int32 (auth.cksum.cksumtype);
2819 hash->data = auth.cksum.checksum.derptr;
2820 hash->size = auth.cksum.checksum.derlen;
2827 /********** VALIDATION EXPRESSION LINKUP TO GNUTLS **********/
2832 * The following functions implement the various validation expression
2833 * components in terms of the GnuTLS sessions of this code file.
2834 * Some work is repeated in various expression variables, notably the
2835 * lookup of a session's peer credentials, and possibly importing them
2836 * into X.509 structures. We may at some point decide to instead do
2837 * this ahead of time, ath the expense of some compleity and possibly
2838 * slow-down of the start of the computations.
2843 /* valexp_store_final -- store the valexp outcome in cmd->valexp_result.
2845 static void valexp_store_final (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, bool result) {
2846 ((struct command *) vcmd)->valexp_result = result;
2849 /* valexp_valflag_set -- set a validation flag bit for an uppercase predicate.
2851 static void valexp_valflag_set (struct command *cmd, char pred) {
2852 int len = strlen (cmd->valflags);
2853 cmd->valflags [len++] = pred;
2854 cmd->valflags [len ] = '\0';
2857 /* valexp_valflag_start -- get a prior set bit with validation information.
2858 * Where cmd->valflags is a string of uppercase letters that were ensured.
2860 static void valexp_valflag_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
2861 struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
2862 pred &= 0xdf; // lowercase->uppercase
2863 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, NULL != strchr (cmd->valflags, pred));
2866 /* valexp_0_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
2867 * This function immediately sends failure on something impossible.
2869 static void valexp_0_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
2870 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
2873 /* valexp_1_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
2874 * This function immediately sends success on something trivial.
2876 static void valexp_1_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
2877 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 1);
2880 //TODO// valexp_L_start, valexp_l_start
2882 /* valexp_I_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
2883 * This function ensures that the remote peer provides an identity.
2884 * TODO: We should compare the hostname as well, or compare if in remoteid
2885 * TODO: We may need to support more than just X509/PGP certificates
2887 static void valexp_I_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
2888 struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
2890 ok = ok && (cmd->remote_auth_type == GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE);
2891 ok = ok && (cmd->remote_cert_count > 0);
2892 // Accept most certificates, but not for example GNUTLS_CRT_RAW
2894 #ifdef GNUTLS_CRT_KRB
2895 (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) ||
2897 (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) ||
2898 (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) );
2899 // peer-returned "certs" points into GnuTLS' internal data structures
2900 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, ok);
2903 /* valexp_i_start -- is opportunistic and will always succeed
2905 #define valexp_i_start valexp_1_start
2907 /* valexp_Ff_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
2908 * This functin ensures that forward secrecy is applied.
2909 * While _F_ only accepts DHE, _f_ will also accept DH.
2910 * Note: GnuTLS does not seem to show DH that is not also DHE.
2912 static void valexp_Ff_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
2913 struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
2914 gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx = gnutls_kx_get (cmd->session);
2916 case GNUTLS_KX_UNKNOWN:
2918 case GNUTLS_KX_RSA_EXPORT:
2921 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
2923 case GNUTLS_KX_DHE_DSS:
2924 case GNUTLS_KX_DHE_RSA:
2926 case GNUTLS_KX_SRP_RSA:
2927 case GNUTLS_KX_SRP_DSS:
2928 case GNUTLS_KX_DHE_PSK:
2929 case GNUTLS_KX_ECDHE_RSA:
2930 case GNUTLS_KX_ECDHE_ECDSA:
2931 case GNUTLS_KX_ECDHE_PSK:
2932 case GNUTLS_KX_ANON_ECDH: // Assume DHE is in fact implemented
2933 case GNUTLS_KX_ANON_DH: // Assume DHE is in fact implemented
2934 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 1);
2936 // case GNUTLS_KX_xxx_DH:
2937 // valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, pred != 'F');
2942 /* valexp_A_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
2943 * This function ensures that an anonymising precursor is used.
2945 #define valexp_A_start valexp_valflag_start
2947 /* valexp_a_start -- is opportunistic and will always succeed */
2948 #define valexp_a_start valexp_1_start
2950 /* valexp_Tt_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
2951 * This function ensures trust based on a trusted certificate/key list.
2952 * In the _t_ case, self-signed certificates are also accepted.
2954 static void valexp_Tt_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
2955 struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
2957 unsigned int vfyresult;
2960 if (cmd->vfystatus != 0) {
2963 if (cmd->remote_auth_type != GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE) {
2967 // Handle self-signed peer certificates in a special way
2968 if (cmd->remote_cert_count == 1) {
2970 bad = bad || (pred == 'T'); // Reject self-signed
2971 if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
2973 bad = bad || gnutls_x509_crt_verify (
2974 (gnutls_x509_crt_t ) cmd->remote_cert [0],
2975 (gnutls_x509_crt_t *) &cmd->remote_cert [0], 1,
2976 GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN,
2978 // Apply the most stringent test. This includes all of
2979 // GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID (always set, often with others)
2980 // GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED
2981 // GNUTLS_CERT_EXPIRED
2982 // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE
2983 // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND
2984 // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA => oops...
2985 // stopped with GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN
2986 // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
2987 // GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM
2988 bad = bad || (vfyresult != 0);
2993 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
2994 //TODO// Prefer to actually check PGP self-signature
2995 //TODO// But only value is check private-key ownership
2998 #ifdef GNUTLS_CRT_KRB
2999 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
3000 // Kerberos has authenticated the ticket for us
3001 //TODO// Should we try reading from the ticket/auth?
3010 if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
3011 // Now check the certificate chain, taking CA bits into account
3012 for (i=1; i<cmd->remote_cert_count; i++) {
3014 bad = bad || gnutls_x509_crt_verify (
3015 (gnutls_x509_crt_t ) cmd->remote_cert [i-1],
3016 (gnutls_x509_crt_t *) &cmd->remote_cert [i], 1,
3019 // Apply the most stringent test. This includes all of
3020 // GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID (always set, often with others)
3021 // GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED
3022 // GNUTLS_CERT_EXPIRED
3023 // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE
3024 // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND
3025 // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA => oops...
3026 // stopped with GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN
3027 // GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
3028 // GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM
3029 bad = bad || (vfyresult != 0);
3031 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
3032 ; //TODO// Check PGP direct signature (and also use in self-sig)
3033 #ifdef GNUTLS_CRT_KRB
3034 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
3035 ; // Trust has already been validated through Kerberos
3039 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, flagval);
3042 /* valexp_Dd_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
3043 * This function validates through DNSSEC.
3044 * While _D_ enforces DNSSEC, _d_ also accepts opted-out security.
3046 static void valexp_Dd_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3047 struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
3050 unsigned int vfystat;
3054 struct sockaddr peername;
3055 socklen_t peernamesz = sizeof (peername);
3057 host = strchr (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid, '@');
3059 host = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
3061 switch (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.ipproto) {
3068 #ifndef WINDOWS_PORT
3076 sox = gnutls_transport_get_int (cmd->session);
3080 if (getpeername (sox, &peername, &peernamesz) != 0) {
3083 if ((peername.sa_family == AF_INET) &&
3084 (peernamesz == sizeof (struct sockaddr_in))) {
3085 port = ntohs (((struct sockaddr_in *) &peername)->sin_port);
3086 } else if ((peername.sa_family == AF_INET6) &&
3087 (peernamesz == sizeof (struct sockaddr_in6))) {
3089 port = ntohs (((struct sockaddr_in6 *) &peername)->sin6_port);
3092 //TODO// We might use online.c code instead?
3093 if (dane_state_init (&stat, /*TODO:*/ 0) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
3096 if (dane_verify_session_crt (stat,
3102 DANE_VFLAG_FAIL_IF_NOT_CHECKED,
3103 &vfystat) == DANE_E_SUCCESS) {
3104 if ((pred == 'D') && (vfystat & DANE_VERIFY_UNKNOWN_DANE_INFO)) {
3105 dane_state_deinit (stat);
3108 flagval = ((vfystat & ~DANE_VERIFY_UNKNOWN_DANE_INFO) == 0);
3110 dane_state_deinit (stat);
3112 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, flagval);
3115 /* valexp_Rr_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
3116 * This function validates through a CRL.
3117 * While _R_ requires the CRL to be present, _r_ accepts confirmed absense.
3118 * TODO: This is not implemented yet.
3120 static void valexp_Rr_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3122 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
3125 /* valexp_Ee_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
3126 * This function validates certificate extensions for the named service.
3127 * While _E_ required OIDs to be marked critical, _e_ also accepts non-crit.
3129 static void valexp_Ee_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3131 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
3134 /* valexp_Oo_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
3135 * This function validates with online/live information.
3136 * While _O_ required positive confirmation, _o_ also accepts unknown.
3137 * -> For X.509, look in OCSP or CRL or Global Directory
3138 * -> For OpenPGP, redirect O->G, o->g
3139 * -> For Kerberos, accept anything as sufficiently live / online
3141 static void valexp_Oo_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3142 struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
3144 online2success_t o2vf;
3146 gnutls_datum_t *raw;
3147 if (cmd->remote_auth_type != GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE) {
3148 // No authentication types other than certificates yet
3151 if ((pred >= 'a') && (pred <= 'z')) {
3152 o2vf = online2success_optional;
3154 o2vf = online2success_enforced;
3156 rid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
3157 raw = (gnutls_datum_t *) cmd->remote_cert_raw;
3158 if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
3159 valflag = o2vf (online_globaldir_pgp (
3161 raw->data, raw->size));
3162 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
3163 // OCSP inquiry or globaldir
3164 valflag = o2vf (online_globaldir_x509 (
3166 raw->data, raw->size));
3168 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
3169 // Kerberos is sufficiently "live" to be pass O
3174 // GNUTLS_CRT_RAW, GNUTLS_CRT_UNKNOWN, or other
3179 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, valflag);
3182 /* valexp_Gg_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
3183 * This function validates through the LDAP global directory.
3184 * While _G_ requires information to be present, _g_ also accepts absense.
3185 * -> For X.509, lookup userCertificate
3186 * -> For OpenPGP, lookup pgpKey
3187 * -> For KDH, lookup krbPrincipalName
3188 * -> For SRP, nothing is defined
3189 * -> For OpenSSH, no TLS support
3191 static void valexp_Gg_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3192 struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
3194 online2success_t o2vf;
3196 gnutls_datum_t *raw;
3197 if (cmd->remote_auth_type != GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE) {
3198 // No authentication types other than certificates yet
3201 if ((pred >= 'a') && (pred <= 'z')) {
3202 o2vf = online2success_optional;
3204 o2vf = online2success_enforced;
3206 rid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
3207 raw = (gnutls_datum_t *) cmd->remote_cert_raw;
3208 if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
3209 valflag = o2vf (online_globaldir_pgp (
3211 raw->data, raw->size));
3212 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
3213 //TODO// OCSP inquiry or globaldir
3214 valflag = o2vf (online_globaldir_x509 (
3216 raw->data, raw->size));
3217 #ifdef GNUTLS_CRT_KRB
3218 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
3220 //TODO// valflag = o2vf (online_globaldir_kerberos (
3222 //TODO// raw->data, raw->size));
3225 // GNUTLS_CRT_RAW, GNUTLS_CRT_UNKNOWN, or other
3230 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, valflag);
3233 /* valexp_Pp_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
3234 * This function validates through pinning information.
3235 * While _P_ requires pinning to be present, _p_ will Trust On First Use.
3237 static void valexp_Pp_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3239 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
3242 /* valexp_U_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
3243 * This function validates a matching username.
3245 static void valexp_U_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3247 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
3250 /* valexp_Ss_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
3251 * This function ensures that the local end is a server.
3252 * While _S_ denies credentials also usable for clients, _s_ permits them.
3254 static void valexp_Ss_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3255 struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
3257 if ((pred == 'S') && (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT)) {
3260 flagval = (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER) != 0;
3262 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, flagval);
3265 /* valexp_Cc_start -- validation function for the GnuTLS backend.
3266 * This function ensures that the local end is a client.
3267 * While _C_ denies credentials also usable for servers, _c_ permits them.
3269 static void valexp_Cc_start (void *vcmd, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3270 struct command *cmd = (struct command *) vcmd;
3272 if ((pred == 'C') && (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER)) {
3275 flagval = (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT) != 0;
3277 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, flagval);
3281 static void valexp_error_start (void *handler_data, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3284 static void valexp_ignore_stop (void *handler_data, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3287 static void valexp_ignore_final (void *handler_data, struct valexp *ve, bool value) {
3292 /* Given a predicate, invoke its start routine.
3294 static void valexp_switch_start (void *handler_data, struct valexp *ve, char pred) {
3297 valexp_I_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3300 valexp_i_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3304 valexp_Ff_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3307 valexp_A_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3310 valexp_a_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3314 valexp_Tt_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3318 valexp_Dd_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3322 valexp_Rr_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3326 valexp_Ee_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3330 valexp_Oo_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3334 valexp_Gg_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3338 valexp_Pp_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3341 valexp_U_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3345 valexp_Ss_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3349 valexp_Cc_start (handler_data, ve, pred);
3352 // Called on an unregistered symbol, that spells failure
3353 valexp_setpredicate (ve, pred, 0);
3358 /* Return a shared constant structure for valexp_handling with GnuTLS.
3359 * This function does not fail; it always returns a non-NULL value.
3361 static const struct valexp_handling *have_starttls_validation (void) {
3362 static const struct valexp_handling starttls_valexp_handling = {
3363 .handler_start = valexp_switch_start,
3364 .handler_stop = valexp_ignore_stop,
3365 .handler_final = valexp_store_final,
3367 return &starttls_valexp_handling;
3372 /* If any remote credentials are noted, cleanup on them. This removes
3373 * any remote_cert[...] entries, counting up to remote_cert_count which
3374 * is naturally set to 0 initially, as well as after this has run.
3376 static void cleanup_any_remote_credentials (struct command *cmd) {
3377 while (cmd->remote_cert_count > 0) {
3378 gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (
3379 cmd->remote_cert [--cmd->remote_cert_count]);
3381 memset (cmd->remote_cert, 0, sizeof (cmd->remote_cert));
3384 /* Fetch remote credentials. This can be done after TLS handshaking has
3385 * completed, to find the certificates or other credentials provided by
3386 * the peer to establish its identity. The validation expression routines
3387 * can then refer to this resource, and won't have to request the same
3388 * information over and over again. To this end, the information is stored
3389 * in the session object. The arrays in which this information is stored
3390 * are size-constrained, but that is also a good security precaution.
3392 * The information ends up in the following variables:
3393 * - remote_auth_type
3394 * - remote_cert_type (if remote_auth_type == GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE)
3395 * - remote_cert[...] (if remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE)
3396 * - remote_cert_count is the number of entries in remote_cert (up to root)
3398 * When certificates are used, the root certificate is looked up, for
3401 * After running successfully, a call to cleanup_any_remote_credentials()
3402 * must be called to clean up any data in the cmd structure. This may be
3403 * done on cmd at any time after initialisation, even multiple times and
3404 * even when this call fails. This call actually cleans up anything it
3405 * setup in the past, before setting up the data anew.
3407 static gtls_error fetch_remote_credentials (struct command *cmd) {
3408 gtls_error gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
3409 const gnutls_datum_t *certs;
3410 unsigned int num_certs;
3411 gnutls_x509_crt_t x509peers [11]; // Peers + Root for GNUTLS_CRT_X509
3416 // Did we run this before? Then cleanup.
3417 cleanup_any_remote_credentials (cmd);
3418 //INVOLVES// memset (cmd->remote_cert, 0, sizeof (cmd->remote_cert));
3419 //INVOLVES// cmd->remote_cert_count = 0;
3420 // Prepare as-yet-unset default return values
3421 cmd->remote_auth_type = -1;
3422 cmd->remote_cert_raw = NULL;
3424 // Obtain the authentication type for the peer
3425 cmd->remote_auth_type = gnutls_auth_get_type (cmd->session);
3426 switch (cmd->remote_auth_type) {
3427 case GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE:
3428 // Continue loading certificates in the GnuTLS format
3430 case GNUTLS_CRD_ANON:
3431 // No basis for any identity claim
3432 cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid [0] = '\0';
3433 return GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
3434 case GNUTLS_CRD_SRP:
3435 return GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
3436 case GNUTLS_CRD_PSK:
3437 return GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
3439 return GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR;
3442 // Continue loading the certificate information: X.509, PGP, ...
3444 cmd->remote_cert_type = gnutls_certificate_type_get_peers (cmd->session);
3445 certs = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (cmd->session, &num_certs);
3446 // Note: server's certs _may_ be DER NULL due to mutual auth in Kerberos
3448 cmd->remote_cert_type = gnutls_certificate_type_get (cmd->session);
3449 certs = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (cmd->session, &num_certs);
3451 if (certs == NULL) {
3454 // "certs" points into GnuTLS' internal data structures
3455 if ((num_certs < 1) || (num_certs > CERTS_MAX_DEPTH)) {
3456 return GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR;
3458 cmd->remote_cert_raw = (void *) &certs [0];
3460 // Turn certificate data into GnuTLS' data structures (to be cleaned)
3461 if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
3462 peer_tad = TAD_TYPE_X509;
3463 for (i=0; i < num_certs; i++) {
3464 E_g2e ("Failed to initialise peer X.509 certificate",
3465 gnutls_x509_crt_init (
3466 (gnutls_x509_crt_t *) &cmd->remote_cert [i]));
3467 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
3468 cmd->remote_cert_count++;
3470 E_g2e ("Failed to import peer X.509 certificate",
3471 gnutls_x509_crt_import (
3472 cmd->remote_cert [i],
3473 &certs [i], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER));
3475 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
3478 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
3479 peer_tad = TAD_TYPE_PGP;
3480 E_g2e ("Failed to initialise peer PGP key",
3481 gnutls_x509_crt_init (
3482 (gnutls_x509_crt_t *) &cmd->remote_cert [0]));
3483 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
3484 cmd->remote_cert_count = 1;
3486 E_g2e ("Failed to import peer PGP key",
3487 gnutls_openpgp_crt_import (
3488 cmd->remote_cert [0],
3489 &certs [0], GNUTLS_OPENPGP_FMT_RAW));
3490 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
3496 // Lookup the trusted party that the peers certificates is promoting.
3497 // Note that even if the peer ends in a CA cert (which it may not
3498 // always send along) then we can still add it ourselves again :-)
3499 // Only worry might be that CA certs require no AuthorityKeyIdentifier.
3500 if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
3501 // Retrieve the AuthorityKeyIdentifier from last (or semi-last)
3506 DBC *crs_trust = NULL;
3508 gnutls_datum_t anchor_gnutls;
3509 gnutls_x509_crt_t dbroot;
3510 dbt_init_empty (&rootca);
3511 dbt_init_empty (&anchor);
3513 gtls_errno = gnutls_x509_crt_get_authority_key_id (
3514 cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count-1],
3517 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) {
3518 // Only retry if the last is a signer, possibly CA
3519 if (cmd->remote_cert_count == 1) {
3520 // Permit self-signed certificate evaluation
3521 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
3522 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_count > 1) {
3523 // Assume the last is a root cert, as it lacks authid
3524 gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (
3525 cmd->remote_cert [--cmd->remote_cert_count]);
3526 cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count] = NULL;
3528 gtls_errno = gnutls_x509_crt_get_authority_key_id (
3529 cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count-1],
3534 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
3537 // Get root cert from trustdb into remote_cert [_count++]
3538 dbt_init_fixbuf (&rootca, id, idsz);
3539 dbt_init_malloc (&anchor);
3540 E_d2e ("Failed to create db_disclose cursor",
3546 E_d2e ("X.509 authority key identifier not found in trust database",
3548 crs_trust, &rootca, &anchor));
3549 while (db_errno == 0) {
3550 // Process "anchor" entry (inasfar as meaningful)
3551 uint32_t anchorflags;
3554 char *valexp; //TODO// Initiate this before cleanup
3555 int tstatus = trust_interpret (&anchor, &anchorflags, &valexp, &trustdata, &trustdatalen);
3557 if (tstatus != TAD_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
3558 // Signal any DB error to bail out of this loop
3559 db_errno = DB_KEYEMPTY;
3560 } else if ((anchorflags & TAD_TYPE_MASK) != peer_tad) {
3561 ; // Skip unsought trust database entry
3562 } else if ((anchorflags & TAD_TYPE_MASK) == TAD_TYPE_X509) {
3563 E_g2e ("Certificate chain too long",
3564 (cmd->remote_cert_count >= CERTS_MAX_DEPTH)
3565 ? GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR
3566 : GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
3567 // Turn the anchor into an X.509 certificate
3568 E_g2e ("Failet to initialise X.509 peer trust anchor",
3569 gnutls_x509_crt_init ((gnutls_x509_crt_t *) &cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count]));
3570 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
3571 cmd->remote_cert_count++;
3572 anchor_gnutls.data = anchor.data;
3573 anchor_gnutls.size = anchor.size;
3574 E_g2e ("Failed to import X.509 peer trust anchor",
3575 gnutls_x509_crt_import (cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count-1], &anchor_gnutls, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER));
3577 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
3578 // Everything worked, we have a chain
3580 if (cmd->trust_valexp) {
3581 free (cmd->trust_valexp);
3583 cmd->trust_valexp = strdup (valexp);
3585 // Signal arbitrary DB error
3586 db_errno = DB_KEYEMPTY;
3588 } else if ((anchorflags & TAD_TYPE_MASK) == TAD_TYPE_REVOKE_X509) {
3589 //TODO// Possibly verify end cert revocation
3591 /* Ignore entry, continue with the next */;
3593 db_errno = dba_trust_iterate (crs_trust, &rootca, &anchor);
3595 if (crs_trust != NULL) {
3596 crs_trust->close (crs_trust);
3600 // No dbt_free (&rootca) because it is set to a fixed buffer
3601 if (db_errno != DB_NOTFOUND) {
3604 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_OPENPGP) {
3605 ; //TODO// Attempt to load PGP direct signer(s)
3606 ; //OPTION// May use the _count for alternative signers!
3607 ; //OPTION// May setup/reload a keyring based on trust.db
3608 #ifdef GNUTLS_CRT_KRB
3609 } else if (cmd->remote_cert_type == GNUTLS_CRT_KRB) {
3610 ; //TODO// Process as appropriate for Kerberos (store Ticket?)
3614 // Cleanup (when returning an error code) and return
3616 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
3617 cleanup_any_remote_credentials (cmd);
3619 while ((!got_chain) && (cmd->remote_cert_count > 1)) {
3620 --cmd->remote_cert_count;
3621 gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (
3622 cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count]);
3623 cmd->remote_cert [cmd->remote_cert_count] = NULL;
3629 /* Fetch local credentials. This can be done before TLS is started, to find
3630 * the possible authentication forms that can be offered. The function
3631 * can additionally be used after interaction with the client to establish
3632 * a local identity that was not initially provided, or that was not
3633 * considered public at the time.
3635 gtls_error fetch_local_credentials (struct command *cmd) {
3638 DBC *crs_disclose = NULL;
3639 DBC *crs_localid = NULL;
3643 selector_t remote_selector;
3647 gtls_error certificate_onthefly (struct command *cmd);
3650 // When applicable, try to create an on-the-fly certificate
3651 if (((cmd->cmd.pio_cmd == PIOC_STARTTLS_V2) &&
3652 (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALID_ONTHEFLY))
3653 || ((cmd->cmd.pio_cmd == PIOC_LIDENTRY_CALLBACK_V2) &&
3654 (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_lidentry.flags & PIOF_LIDENTRY_ONTHEFLY))) {
3655 gtls_errno = certificate_onthefly (cmd);
3656 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) {
3657 // This includes GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS
3658 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: otfcert retrieval returned %d\n", gtls_errno);
3661 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: otfcert retrieval returned GNUTLS_E_AGAIN, so skip it\n");
3662 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS; // Attempt failed, ignore
3667 // Setup a number of common references and structures
3668 // Note: Current GnuTLS cannot support being a peer
3669 if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT) {
3670 lidrole = LID_ROLE_CLIENT;
3671 } else if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER) {
3672 lidrole = LID_ROLE_SERVER;
3674 E_g2e ("TLS Pool command supports neither local client nor local server role",
3675 GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION);
3678 lid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid;
3679 rid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
3682 // Refuse to disclose client credentials when the server name is unset;
3683 // note that server-claimed identities are unproven during handshake.
3684 if ((lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) && (*rid == '\0')) {
3685 tlog (TLOG_USER, LOG_ERR, "No remote identity (server name) set, so no client credential disclosure");
3686 E_g2e ("Missing remote ID",
3687 GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND);
3691 // Setup database iterators to map identities to credentials
3692 if (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) {
3693 E_d2e ("Failed to create db_disclose cursor",
3694 dbh_disclose->cursor (
3700 E_d2e ("Failed to create db_localid cursor",
3701 dbh_localid->cursor (
3707 // Prepare for iteration over possible local identities / credentials
3710 if (gtls_errno != 0) {
3712 } else if (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT) {
3713 memcpy (cid, rid, sizeof (cid));
3714 dbt_init_fixbuf (&discpatn, cid, strlen (cid));
3715 dbt_init_fixbuf (&keydata, mid, sizeof (mid)-1);
3716 dbt_init_malloc (&creddata);
3718 donai_t remote_donai = donai_from_stable_string (rid, strlen (rid));
3719 if (!selector_iterate_init (&remote_selector, &remote_donai)) {
3720 E_g2e ("Syntax of remote ID unsuitable for selector",
3721 GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
3723 E_d2e ("Failed to start iterator on remote ID selector",
3724 dbcred_iterate_from_remoteid_selector (
3733 dbt_init_fixbuf (&discpatn, "", 0); // Unused but good style
3734 dbt_init_fixbuf (&keydata, lid, strlen (lid));
3735 dbt_init_malloc (&creddata);
3736 E_d2e ("Failed to start iterator on local ID",
3737 dbcred_iterate_from_localid (
3742 if (db_errno != 0) {
3743 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_DB_ERROR;
3747 // Now store the local identities inasfar as they are usable
3749 while ((gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) && (db_errno == 0)) {
3754 tlog (TLOG_DB, LOG_DEBUG, "Found BDB entry %s disclosed to %s", creddata.data + 4, (lidrole == LID_ROLE_CLIENT)? rid: "all clients");
3758 lidtype = flags & LID_TYPE_MASK;
3759 ok = ok && ((flags & lidrole) != 0);
3760 ok = ok && ((flags & LID_NO_PKCS11) == 0);
3761 ok = ok && (lidtype >= LID_TYPE_MIN);
3762 ok = ok && (lidtype <= LID_TYPE_MAX);
3764 // For current/simple Kerberos, refuse data after PKCS #11 URI
3765 ok = ok && ((lidtype != LID_TYPE_KRB5) || (NULL == memchr (creddata.data + 4, '\0', creddata.size - 4 - 1)));
3767 tlog (TLOG_DB, LOG_DEBUG, "BDB entry has flags=0x%08x, so we (%04x/%04x) %s it", flags, lidrole, LID_ROLE_MASK, ok? "store": "skip ");
3769 if (cmd->lids [lidtype - LID_TYPE_MIN].data != NULL) {
3770 free (cmd->lids [lidtype - LID_TYPE_MIN].data);
3772 // Move the credential into the command structure
3773 dbt_store (&creddata,
3774 &cmd->lids [lidtype - LID_TYPE_MIN]);
3775 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Storing cmd->lids[%d].data %p\n", lidtype-LID_TYPE_MIN, cmd->lids [lidtype-LID_TYPE_MIN].data);
3778 // Skip the credential by freeing its data structure
3779 dbt_free (&creddata);
3781 db_errno = dbcred_iterate_next (crs_disclose, crs_localid, &discpatn, &keydata, &creddata);
3784 if (db_errno == DB_NOTFOUND) {
3786 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
3789 if (crs_localid != NULL) {
3790 crs_localid->close (crs_localid);
3793 if (crs_disclose != NULL) {
3794 crs_disclose->close (crs_disclose);
3795 crs_disclose = NULL;
3802 * Check if a given cmd has the given LID_TYPE setup.
3803 * Return 1 for yes or 0 for no; this is used in priority strings.
3805 static inline int lidtpsup (struct command *cmd, int lidtp) {
3806 return cmd->lids [lidtp - LID_TYPE_MIN].data != NULL;
3809 /* Configure the GnuTLS session with suitable credentials and priority string.
3810 * The anonpre_ok flag should be non-zero to permit Anonymous Precursor.
3812 * The credential setup is optional; when creds is NULL, no changes will
3815 static int configure_session (struct command *cmd,
3816 gnutls_session_t session,
3817 struct credinfo *creds,
3821 int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
3823 // Install the shared credentials for the client or server role
3824 if (creds != NULL) {
3825 gnutls_credentials_clear (session);
3826 for (i=0; i<credcount; i++) {
3827 E_g2e ("Failed to install credentials into TLS session",
3828 gnutls_credentials_set (
3835 // Setup the priority string for this session; this avoids future
3836 // credential callbacks that ask for something impossible or
3839 // Variation factors:
3840 // - starting configuration (can it be empty?)
3841 // - Configured security parameters (database? variable?)
3842 // - CTYPEs, SRP, ANON-or-not --> fill in as + or - characters
3843 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
3846 snprintf (priostr, sizeof (priostr)-1,
3847 // "NORMAL:-RSA:" -- also ECDH-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, ...DSA...
3849 "%%ASYM_CERT_TYPES:"
3850 "+VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-DTLS-ALL:"
3852 "+CIPHER-ALL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+MAC-ALL:"
3854 "+ECDHE-KRB:" // +ECDHE-KRB-RSA:+ECDHE-KRB-ECDHE:" // opt?
3855 "+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+DHE-DSS:+RSA:" //TODO//
3856 "+CTYPE-SRV-KRB:+CTYPE-SRV-X.509:+CTYPE-SRV-OPENPGP:"
3858 "%cCTYPE-CLI-X.509:"
3859 "%cCTYPE-CLI-OPENPGP:"
3860 "%cSRP:%cSRP-RSA:%cSRP-DSS",
3861 anonpre_ok ?'+':'-',
3862 1 /* lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_KRB5)*/ ?'+':'-',
3863 1 /*lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_X509)*/ ?'+':'-',
3864 1 /*lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_PGP)*/ ?'+':'-',
3865 //TODO// Temporarily patched out SRP
3866 lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_SRP) ?'+':'-',
3867 lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_SRP) ?'+':'-',
3868 lidtpsup (cmd, LID_TYPE_SRP) ?'+':'-');
3870 // It's not possible to make good decisions on certificate type
3871 // for both sides based on knowledge of local authentication
3872 // abilities. So we permit all (but would like to be subtler).
3873 snprintf (priostr, sizeof (priostr)-1,
3874 // "NORMAL:-RSA:" -- also ECDH-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, ...DSA...
3876 "+VERS-TLS-ALL:+VERS-DTLS-ALL:"
3878 "+CIPHER-ALL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+MAC-ALL:"
3880 "+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+DHE-DSS:+RSA:" //TODO//
3883 "%cSRP:%cSRP-RSA:%cSRP-DSS",
3884 anonpre_ok ?'+':'-',
3887 //TODO// Temporarily patched out SRP
3892 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "Constructed priority string %s for local ID %s",
3893 priostr, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid);
3894 E_g2e ("Failed to set GnuTLS priority string",
3895 gnutls_priority_set_direct (
3901 // Return the application GNUTLS_E_ code including _SUCCESS
3905 /* The callback functions retrieve various bits of information for the client
3906 * or server in the course of the handshake procedure.
3908 * The logic here is based on client-sent information, such as:
3909 * - TLS hints -- X.509 or alternatives like OpenPGP, SRP, PSK
3910 * - TLS hints -- Server Name Indication
3911 * - User hints -- local and remote identities provided
3913 static int srv_clienthello (gnutls_session_t session, unsigned int htype, unsigned int post, unsigned int incoming, const gnutls_datum_t *msg) {
3914 struct command *cmd;
3915 int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
3916 char sni [sizeof (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid)]; // static
3917 size_t snilen = sizeof (sni);
3918 unsigned int snitype;
3921 tlog (LOG_DAEMON, LOG_INFO, "Invoked %sprocessor for Client Hello, htype=%d, incoming=%d\n",
3922 post ? "post" : "pre",
3926 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
3928 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
3932 // Setup a number of common references
3933 cmd = (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (session);
3935 return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
3939 // Setup server-specific credentials and priority string
3940 //TODO// get anonpre value here
3941 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got gtls_errno = %d at %d\n", gtls_errno, __LINE__);
3942 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
3943 E_g2e ("Failed to reconfigure GnuTLS as a server",
3944 configure_session (cmd,
3946 srv_creds, srv_credcount,
3947 cmd->anonpre & ANONPRE_SERVER));
3948 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got gtls_errno = %d at %d\n", gtls_errno, __LINE__);
3953 // Setup a number of common references
3954 cmd = (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (session);
3956 return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
3958 lid = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid;
3961 // Setup to ignore/request/require remote identity (from client)
3962 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
3963 if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_IGNORE_REMOTEID) {
3964 // Neither Request nor Require remoteid; ignore it
3966 } else if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_REQUEST_REMOTEID) {
3967 // Use Request instead of Require for remoteid
3968 ( //RETURNS_VOID// E_g2e ("Failed to request remote identity",
3969 gnutls_certificate_server_set_request (
3971 GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST));
3972 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got gtls_errno = %d at %d\n", gtls_errno, __LINE__);
3974 // Require a remoteid from the client (default)
3975 ( //RETURNS_VOID// E_g2e ("Failed to require remote identity (the default)",
3976 gnutls_certificate_server_set_request (
3978 GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE));
3979 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got gtls_errno = %d at %d\n", gtls_errno, __LINE__);
3983 // Find the client-helloed ServerNameIndication, or the service name
3984 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
3986 if (gnutls_server_name_get (session, sni, &snilen, &snitype, 0) == 0) {
3987 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
3989 case GNUTLS_NAME_DNS:
3991 // Note: In theory, other name types could be sent, and it would
3992 // be useful to access indexes beyond 0. In practice, nobody
3993 // uses other name types than exactly one GNUTLS_NAME_DNS.
3996 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "Received an unexpected SNI type; that is possible but uncommon; skipping SNI");
3997 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
4001 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
4002 if (sni [0] != '\0') {
4005 for (atidx=128; atidx > 0; atidx--) {
4006 if (lid [atidx-1] == '@') {
4010 if (strncmp (sni, lid + atidx, sizeof (sni)-atidx) != 0) {
4011 tlog (TLOG_USER | TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "Mismatch between client-sent SNI %s and local identity %s", sni, lid);
4012 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
4013 return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE_PACKET;
4016 memcpy (lid, sni, sizeof (sni));
4017 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
4020 memcpy (sni, lid, sizeof (sni)-1);
4021 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
4022 sni [sizeof (sni) - 1] = '\0';
4024 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got gtls_errno = %d at %d\n", gtls_errno, __LINE__);
4028 // Lap up any unnoticed POSIX error messages
4030 cmd->session_errno = errno;
4031 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got errno = %d / %s at %d\n", errno, strerror (errno), __LINE__);
4032 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_NO_CIPHER_SUITES; /* Vaguely matching */
4033 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got gtls_errno = %d at %d\n", gtls_errno, __LINE__);
4037 // Round off with an overal judgement
4038 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Returning gtls_errno = %d or \"%s\" from srv_clihello()\n", gtls_errno, gnutls_strerror (gtls_errno));
4043 int cli_srpcreds_retrieve (gnutls_session_t session,
4047 tlog (TLOG_CRYPTO, LOG_DEBUG, "Picking up SRP credentials");
4048 *username = strdup ("tester");
4049 *password = strdup ("test");
4050 return GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
4054 /* Setup credentials to be shared by all clients and servers.
4055 * Credentials are generally implemented through callback functions.
4056 * This should be called after setting up DH parameters.
4058 static int setup_starttls_credentials (void) {
4059 gnutls_anon_server_credentials_t srv_anoncred = NULL;
4060 gnutls_anon_client_credentials_t cli_anoncred = NULL;
4061 gnutls_certificate_credentials_t clisrv_certcred = NULL;
4062 //TODO:NOTHERE// int srpbits;
4063 gnutls_srp_server_credentials_t srv_srpcred = NULL;
4064 gnutls_srp_client_credentials_t cli_srpcred = NULL;
4065 //TODO// gnutls_kdh_server_credentials_t srv_kdhcred = NULL;
4066 //TODO// gnutls_kdh_server_credentials_t cli_kdhcred = NULL;
4067 int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
4068 int gtls_errno_stack0 = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
4071 // Construct anonymous server credentials
4072 E_g2e ("Failed to allocate ANON-DH server credentials",
4073 gnutls_anon_allocate_server_credentials (
4075 if (!have_error_codes ()) /* E_g2e (...) */ gnutls_anon_set_server_dh_params (
4078 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4079 tlog (TLOG_CRYPTO, LOG_INFO, "Setting server anonymous credentials");
4080 srv_creds [srv_credcount].credtp = GNUTLS_CRD_ANON;
4081 srv_creds [srv_credcount].cred = (void *) srv_anoncred;
4083 } else if (srv_anoncred != NULL) {
4084 gnutls_anon_free_server_credentials (srv_anoncred);
4085 srv_anoncred = NULL;
4089 // Construct anonymous client credentials
4090 gtls_errno = gtls_errno_stack0; // Don't pop, just forget last failures
4091 E_g2e ("Failed to allocate ANON-DH client credentials",
4092 gnutls_anon_allocate_client_credentials (
4094 #ifdef MIRROR_IMAGE_OF_SERVER_ANONYMOUS_CREDENTIALS
4095 // NOTE: This is not done under TLS; server always provides DH params
4096 if (!have_error_codes ()) gnutls_anon_set_client_dh_params (
4100 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4101 tlog (TLOG_CRYPTO, LOG_INFO, "Setting client anonymous credentials");
4102 cli_creds [cli_credcount].credtp = GNUTLS_CRD_ANON;
4103 cli_creds [cli_credcount].cred = (void *) cli_anoncred;
4105 } else if (cli_anoncred != NULL) {
4106 gnutls_anon_free_client_credentials (cli_anoncred);
4107 cli_anoncred = NULL;
4111 // Construct certificate credentials for X.509 and OpenPGP cli/srv
4112 gtls_errno = gtls_errno_stack0; // Don't pop, just forget last failures
4113 E_g2e ("Failed to allocate certificate credentials",
4114 gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials (
4116 //TODO// What to do here when we add locking on DH params?
4117 gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params (
4120 gtls_errno_stack0 = gtls_errno;
4121 /* TODO: Bad code. GnuTLS 3.2.1 ignores retrieve_function2 when
4122 * checking if it can handle the OpenPGP certificate type in
4123 * _gnutls_session_cert_type_supported (gnutls_status.c:175) but
4124 * it does see the "1" version field. It does not callback the
4125 * "1" version if "2" is present though.
4127 if (!have_error_codes ()) /* TODO:GnuTLSversions E_g2e (...) */ gnutls_certificate_set_retrieve_function (
4130 if (!have_error_codes ()) /* TODO:GnuTLSversions E_g2e (...) */ gnutls_certificate_set_retrieve_function2 (
4132 clisrv_cert_retrieve);
4134 E_g2e ("Failed to set encoding callback for Kerberos Authenticators",
4135 gnutls_authenticator_set_encode_function (
4137 cli_kdhsig_encode));
4138 E_g2e ("Failed to set decoding callback for Kerberos Authenticators",
4139 gnutls_authenticator_set_decode_function (
4141 srv_kdhsig_decode));
4143 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4144 // Setup for certificates
4145 tlog (TLOG_CERT, LOG_INFO, "Setting client and server certificate credentials");
4146 cli_creds [cli_credcount].credtp = GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE;
4147 cli_creds [cli_credcount].cred = (void *) clisrv_certcred;
4149 srv_creds [srv_credcount].credtp = GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE;
4150 srv_creds [srv_credcount].cred = (void *) clisrv_certcred;
4152 } else if (clisrv_certcred != NULL) {
4153 gnutls_certificate_free_credentials (clisrv_certcred);
4154 clisrv_certcred = NULL;
4158 // Construct server credentials for SRP authentication
4159 gtls_errno = gtls_errno_stack0; // Don't pop, just forget last failures
4160 E_g2e ("Failed to allocate SRP server credentials",
4161 gnutls_srp_allocate_server_credentials (
4163 E_g2e ("Failed to set SRP server credentials",
4164 gnutls_srp_set_server_credentials_file (
4166 "../testdata/tlspool-test-srp.passwd",
4167 "../testdata/tlspool-test-srp.conf"));
4168 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4169 tlog (TLOG_CRYPTO, LOG_INFO, "Setting server SRP credentials");
4170 srv_creds [srv_credcount].credtp = GNUTLS_CRD_SRP;
4171 srv_creds [srv_credcount].cred = (void *) srv_srpcred;
4173 } else if (srv_srpcred != NULL) {
4174 gnutls_srp_free_server_credentials (srv_srpcred);
4179 // Construct client credentials for SRP authentication
4180 gtls_errno = gtls_errno_stack0; // Don't pop, just forget last failures
4181 E_g2e ("Failed to allocate SRP client credentials",
4182 gnutls_srp_allocate_client_credentials (
4184 if (!have_error_codes ()) gnutls_srp_set_client_credentials_function (
4186 cli_srpcreds_retrieve);
4187 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4188 tlog (TLOG_CRYPTO, LOG_INFO, "Setting client SRP credentials");
4189 cli_creds [cli_credcount].credtp = GNUTLS_CRD_SRP;
4190 cli_creds [cli_credcount].cred = (void *) cli_srpcred;
4192 } else if (cli_srpcred != NULL) {
4193 gnutls_srp_free_client_credentials (cli_srpcred);
4198 // Construct server credentials for KDH authentication
4199 //TODO// gtls_errno = gtls_errno_stack0; // Don't pop, just forget last failures
4200 //TODO// E_g2e ("Failed to allocate KDH server credentials",
4201 //TODO// gnutls_kdh_allocate_server_credentials (
4202 //TODO// &srv_kdhcred));
4203 //TODO// E_g2e ("Failed to set KDH server DH params",
4204 //TODO// gnutls_kdh_set_server_dh_params (
4205 //TODO// srv_kdhcred,
4206 //TODO// dh_params));
4207 //TODO// if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4208 //TODO// tlog (TLOG_CRYPTO, LOG_INFO, "Setting server KDH credentials");
4209 //TODO// srv_creds [srv_credcount].credtp = GNUTLS_CRD_KDH;
4210 //TODO// srv_creds [srv_credcount].cred = (void *) srv_kdhcred;
4211 //TODO// srv_credcount++;
4212 //TODO// } else if (srv_kdhcred != NULL) {
4213 //TODO// gnutls_kdh_free_server_credentials (srv_kdhcred);
4214 //TODO// srv_kdhcred = NULL;
4218 // Construct client credentials for KDH
4219 //TODO// gtls_errno = gtls_errno_stack0; // Don't pop, just forget last failures
4220 //TODO// E_g2e ("Failed to allocate KDH client credentials",
4221 //TODO// gnutls_kdh_allocate_client_credentials (
4222 //TODO// &cli_kdhcred));
4223 //TODO// E_g2e ("Failed to set KDH client credentials",
4224 //TODO// gnutls_kdh_set_client_credentials_function (
4225 //TODO// cli_kdhcred,
4226 //TODO// cli_kdh_retrieve));
4227 //TODO// if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4228 //TODO// tlog (TLOG_CRYPTO, LOG_INFO, "Setting client KDH credentials");
4229 //TODO// cli_creds [cli_credcount].credtp = GNUTLS_CRD_KDH;
4230 //TODO// cli_creds [cli_credcount].cred = (void *) cli_kdhcred;
4231 //TODO// cli_credcount++;
4232 //TODO// } else if (cli_kdhcred != NULL) {
4233 //TODO// gnutls_kdh_free_client_credentials (cli_kdhcred);
4234 //TODO// cli_kdhcred = NULL;
4238 // Ensure that at least one credential has been set
4239 // TODO: Look at the counters; but at boot, we can require all okay
4240 if ((gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) &&
4241 ( (cli_credcount != EXPECTED_CLI_CREDCOUNT) ||
4242 (srv_credcount != EXPECTED_SRV_CREDCOUNT) ) ) {
4243 tlog (TLOG_CRYPTO, LOG_ERR, "Not all credential types could be setup (cli %d/%d, srv %d/%d, gtls_errno %d)", cli_credcount, EXPECTED_CLI_CREDCOUNT, srv_credcount, EXPECTED_SRV_CREDCOUNT, gtls_errno);
4244 E_g2e ("Not all credentials could be setup",
4245 GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS);
4249 // Report overall error or success
4254 /* Cleanup all credentials created, just before exiting the daemon.
4256 static void cleanup_starttls_credentials (void) {
4257 while (srv_credcount-- > 0) {
4258 struct credinfo *crd = &srv_creds [srv_credcount];
4259 switch (crd->credtp) {
4260 case GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE:
4261 // Shared with client; skipped in server and removed in client
4262 // gnutls_certificate_free_credentials (crd->cred);
4264 case GNUTLS_CRD_ANON:
4265 gnutls_anon_free_server_credentials (crd->cred);
4267 case GNUTLS_CRD_SRP:
4268 gnutls_srp_free_server_credentials (crd->cred);
4270 case GNUTLS_CRD_PSK:
4274 //TODO// case GNUTLS_CRD_KDH:
4275 //TODO// gnutls_kdh_free_server_credentials (crd->cred);
4279 while (cli_credcount-- > 0) {
4280 struct credinfo *crd = &cli_creds [cli_credcount];
4281 switch (crd->credtp) {
4282 case GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE:
4283 // Shared with client; skipped in server and removed in client
4284 gnutls_certificate_free_credentials (crd->cred);
4286 case GNUTLS_CRD_ANON:
4287 gnutls_anon_free_client_credentials (crd->cred);
4289 case GNUTLS_CRD_SRP:
4290 gnutls_srp_free_client_credentials (crd->cred);
4292 case GNUTLS_CRD_PSK:
4296 //TODO// case GNUTLS_CRD_KDH:
4297 //TODO// gnutls_kdh_free_client_credentials (crd->cred);
4305 * The starttls_thread is a main program for the setup of a TLS connection,
4306 * either in client mode or server mode. Note that the distinction between
4307 * client and server mode is only a TLS concern, but not of interest to the
4308 * application or the records exchanged.
4310 * If the STARTTLS operation succeeds, this will be reported back to the
4311 * application, but the TLS pool will continue to be active in a copycat
4312 * procedure: encrypting outgoing traffic and decrypting incoming traffic.
4314 * A new handshake may be initiated with a STARTTLS command with the special
4315 * flag PIOF_STARTTLS_RENEGOTIATE and the ctlkey set to a previously setup
4316 * TLS connection. This command runs in a new thread, that cancels the old
4317 * one (which it can only do while it is waiting in copycat) and then join
4318 * that thread (and its data) with the current one. This is based on the
4319 * ctlkey, which serves to lookup the old thread's data. When the
4320 * connection ends for other reasons than a permitted cancel by another
4321 * thread, will the thread cleanup its own resources. In these situations,
4322 * the new command determines the negotiation parameters, and returns identity
4325 * In addition, the remote side may initiate renegotiation. This is accepted
4326 * without further ado (although future versions of the TLS Pool may add a
4327 * callback mechanism to get it approved). The renegotiation now runs under
4328 * the originally supplied negotiation parameters. In case it needs a new
4329 * local identity, it may also perform callbacks. Possibly repeating what
4330 * happened before -- but most often, a server will start processing a
4331 * protocol and determine that it requires more for the requested level of
4332 * service, and then renegotiate. This is common, for example, with HTTPS
4333 * connections that decide they need a client certificate for certain URLs.
4334 * The implementation of this facility is currently as unstructured as the
4335 * facility itself, namely through a goto. We may come to the conclusion
4336 * that a loop is in fact a warranted alternative, but we're not yet
4337 * convinced that this would match with other "structures" in TLS.
4339 * In conclusion, there are three possible ways of running this code:
4340 * 1. For a new connection. Many variables are not known and build up
4341 * in the course of running the function.
4342 * 2. After a command requesting renegotiation. This overtakes the prior
4343 * connection's thread, and copies its data from the ctlkeynode_tls.
4344 * The resulting code has a number of variables filled in already at
4346 * 3. After a remote request for renegotiation. This loops back to an
4347 * earlier phase, but after the thread takeover and ctlkeynode_tls copy
4348 * of the explicit command for renegotation. Its behaviour is subtly
4349 * different in that it has no command to act on, and so it cannot
4350 * send responses or error codes. It will however log and shutdown
4351 * as the command-driven options would. It will not perform callbacks
4352 * for PIOC_STARTTLS_LOCALID_V2 or PIOC_PLAINTEXT_CONNECT_V2. It will
4353 * however trigger the PIOC_LIDENTRY_CALLBACK_V2 through the separate
4354 * callback command, if one is registered.
4355 * Yeah, it's great fun, coding TLS and keeping it both flexible and secure.
4357 static void *starttls_thread (void *cmd_void) {
4358 struct command *cmd, *replycmd;
4359 struct command cmd_copy; // for relooping during renegotiation
4360 struct pioc_starttls orig_starttls;
4361 uint32_t orig_cmdcode;
4364 gnutls_session_t session;
4365 int got_session = 0;
4366 int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
4368 struct ctlkeynode_tls *ckn = NULL;
4371 int want_remoteid = 1;
4372 int got_remoteid = 0;
4373 int renegotiating = 0;
4374 char *preauth = NULL;
4375 unsigned int preauthlen = 0;
4376 int taking_over = 0;
4377 int my_maxpreauth = 0;
4381 // Block thread cancellation -- and re-enable it in copycat()
4382 assert (pthread_setcancelstate (PTHREAD_CANCEL_DISABLE, NULL) == 0);
4385 // General thread setup
4386 replycmd = cmd = (struct command *) cmd_void;
4388 send_error (replycmd, EINVAL, "Command structure not received");
4389 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
4392 *cmd->valflags = '\0';
4393 cmd->session_errno = 0;
4395 orig_cmdcode = cmd->cmd.pio_cmd;
4396 memcpy (&orig_starttls, &cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls, sizeof (orig_starttls));
4397 cmd->orig_starttls = &orig_starttls;
4398 cryptfd = cmd->passfd;
4400 //TODO:TEST Removed here because it is tested below
4403 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_ERR, "No ciphertext file descriptor supplied to TLS Pool");
4404 send_error (replycmd, EINVAL, "No ciphertext file descriptor supplied to TLS Pool");
4405 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
4409 cmd->session_certificate = (intptr_t) (void *) NULL;
4410 cmd->session_privatekey = (intptr_t) (void *) NULL;
4413 // In case of renegotiation, lookup the previous ctlkeynode by its
4414 // ctlkey. The fact that we have ckn != NULL indicates that we are
4415 // renegotiating in the code below; it will supply information as
4416 // we continue to run the TLS process.
4417 if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_RENEGOTIATE) {
4418 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got a request to renegotiate existing TLS connection\n");
4420 // Check that no FD was passed (and ended up in cryptfd)
4422 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_ERR, "Renegotiation started with extraneous file descriptor");
4423 send_error (replycmd, EPROTO, "File handle supplied for renegotiation");
4425 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
4429 // First find the ctlkeynode_tls
4430 ckn = (struct ctlkeynode_tls *) ctlkey_find (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.ctlkey, security_tls, cmd->clientfd);
4431 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Got ckn == %p\n", (void *) ckn);
4433 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_ERR, "Failed to find TLS connection for renegotiation by its ctlkey");
4434 send_error (replycmd, ESRCH, "Cannot find TLS connection for renegotiation");
4435 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
4439 // Now cancel the pthread for this process
4440 errno = pthread_cancel (ckn->owner);
4441 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: pthread_cancel returned %d\n", errno);
4444 errno = pthread_join (ckn->owner, &retval);
4445 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: pthread_join returned %d\n", errno);
4448 // We have now synchronised with the cancelled thread
4449 // Cleanup any _remote data in ckn->session->cmd
4450 cleanup_any_remote_credentials (
4451 (struct command *) gnutls_session_get_ptr (
4455 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_ERR, "Failed to interrupt TLS connection for renegotiation");
4456 send_error (replycmd, errno, "Cannot interrupt TLS connection for renegotiation");
4457 ctlkey_unfind (&ckn->regent);
4458 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
4459 // Do not free the ckn, as the other thread still runs
4463 // We are in control! Assimilate the TLS connection data.
4465 plainfd = ckn->plainfd;
4466 cryptfd = ckn->cryptfd;
4467 session = ckn->session;
4470 ctlkey_unfind (&ckn->regent);
4473 // Then follows the unstructured entry point for the unstructured
4474 // request to a TLS connection to renegotiate its security parameters.
4475 // Doing this in any other way than with goto would add a lot of
4476 // make-belief structure that only existed to make this looping
4477 // possible. We'd rather be honest and admit the lack of structure
4478 // that TLS has in this respect. Maybe we'll capture it one giant loop
4479 // at some point, but for now that does not seem to add any relief.
4481 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Renegotiating = %d, anonpost = %d, plainfd = %d, cryptfd = %d, flags = 0x%x, session = %p, got_session = %d, lid = \"%s\", rid = \"%s\"\n", renegotiating, anonpost, plainfd, cryptfd, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags, session, got_session, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid);
4484 // If this is server renegotiating, send a request to that end
4485 //TODO// Only invoke gnutls_rehandshake() on the server
4486 if (renegotiating && (taking_over || anonpost) && (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)) {
4487 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Invoking gnutls_rehandshake in renegotiation loop\n");
4488 gtls_errno = gnutls_rehandshake (session);
4489 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST) {
4490 // Clients should not do this; be forgiving
4491 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
4492 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Client-side invocation flagged as wrong; compensated error\n");
4497 // When renegotiating TLS security, ensure that it is done securely
4498 if (renegotiating && (gnutls_safe_renegotiation_status (session) == 0)) {
4499 send_error (replycmd, EPROTO, "Renegotiation requested while secure renegotiation is unavailable on remote");
4509 if (ctlkey_unregister (ckn->regent.ctlkey)) {
4514 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
4519 // Potentially decouple the controlling fd (ctlkey is in orig_starttls)
4520 if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_FORK) {
4521 cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags &= ~PIOF_STARTTLS_FORK;
4526 // Setup BDB transactions and reset credential datum fields
4528 memset (&cmd->lids, 0, sizeof (cmd->lids));
4529 manage_txn_begin (&cmd->txn);
4533 // Permit cancellation of this thread -- TODO: Cleanup?
4534 //TODO:TEST// Defer setcancelstate until copycat() activity
4536 errno = pthread_setcancelstate (PTHREAD_CANCEL_ENABLE, NULL);
4538 send_error (replycmd, ESRCH, "STARTTLS handler thread cancellability refused");
4548 if (ctlkey_unregister (ckn->regent.ctlkey)) {
4553 manage_txn_rollback (&cmd->txn);
4554 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
4559 // Check and setup the plaintext file handle
4561 send_error (replycmd, EPROTO, "You must supply a TLS-protected socket");
4566 fprintf (stderr, "ctlkey_unregister under ckn=%p at %d\n", (void *)ckn, __LINE__);
4567 if (ckn != NULL) { /* TODO: CHECK NEEDED? */
4568 if (ctlkey_unregister (ckn->regent.ctlkey)) {
4573 manage_txn_rollback (&cmd->txn);
4574 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
4579 // Decide on support for the Anonymous Precursor, based on the
4580 // service name and its appearance in the anonpre_registry.
4581 // If the remoteid is not interesting to the client then also
4582 // support an Anonymous Precursor; we have nothing to loose.
4583 cmd->anonpre &= ~ANONPRE_EITHER;
4584 if (renegotiating) {
4585 ; // Indeed, during renegotiation we always disable ANON-DH
4586 } else if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_IGNORE_REMOTEID) {
4587 cmd->anonpre = ANONPRE_EITHER;
4590 int anonpre_regidx = anonpre_registry_size >> 1;
4591 int anonpre_regjmp = (anonpre_registry_size + 1) >> 1;
4593 while (anonpre_regjmp > 0) {
4594 anonpre_regjmp = anonpre_regjmp >> 1;
4595 cmp = strncasecmp (anonpre_registry [anonpre_regidx].service,
4596 (const char *)cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.service,
4597 TLSPOOL_SERVICELEN);
4598 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: anonpre_determination, comparing [%d] %s to %s, found cmp==%d\n", anonpre_regidx, anonpre_registry [anonpre_regidx].service, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.service, cmp);
4600 // anonpre_regent matches
4601 cmd->anonpre = anonpre_registry [anonpre_regidx].flags;
4603 } else if (cmp > 0) {
4604 // anonpre_regent too high
4605 anonpre_regidx -= 1 + anonpre_regjmp;
4606 if (anonpre_regidx < 0) {
4610 // anonpre_regent too low
4611 anonpre_regidx += 1 + anonpre_regjmp;
4612 if (anonpre_regidx >= anonpre_registry_size) {
4613 anonpre_regidx = anonpre_registry_size - 1;
4620 // Setup flags for client and/or server roles (make sure there is one)
4621 if ((!renegotiating) && ((cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_REMOTEROLE_CLIENT) == 0)) {
4622 cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags &= ~PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER;
4624 if ((!renegotiating) && ((cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_REMOTEROLE_SERVER) == 0)) {
4625 cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags &= ~PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT;
4627 if ((cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & (PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT | PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER)) == 0) {
4629 // Neither a TLS client nor a TLS server
4631 send_error (replycmd, ENOTSUP, "Command not supported");
4637 fprintf (stderr, "ctlkey_unregister under ckn=%p at %d\n", (void *)ckn, __LINE__);
4638 if (ckn != NULL) { /* TODO: CHECK NEEDED? */
4639 if (ctlkey_unregister (ckn->regent.ctlkey)) {
4644 manage_txn_rollback (&cmd->txn);
4645 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
4650 // Setup the TLS session. Also see doc/p2p-tls.*
4652 // TODO: GnuTLS cannot yet setup p2p connections
4654 gnutls_session_set_ptr (
4657 //TODO:DONE?// Clear various settings... creds, flags, modes? CLI/SRV?
4659 E_g2e ("Failed to initialise GnuTLS peer session",
4662 (((cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT)? GNUTLS_CLIENT: 0) |
4663 ((cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER)? GNUTLS_SERVER: 0))
4665 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4667 gnutls_session_set_ptr (
4672 cmd->session = session;
4674 // Setup client-specific behaviour if needed
4675 if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT) {
4676 if (!renegotiating) { //TODO:TEST//
4678 // Setup as a TLS client
4682 // Require a minimum security level for SRP
4684 //TODO:CRASH// if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) gnutls_srp_set_prime_bits (
4685 //TODO:CRASH// session,
4686 //TODO:CRASH// srpbits);
4688 // Setup as a TLS client
4690 // Setup for potential sending of SNI
4691 if ((cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_WITHOUT_SNI) == 0) {
4692 char *str = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid;
4695 while (str [len] && (len < 128)) {
4696 if (str [len] == '@') {
4701 // If no usable remoteid was setup, ignore it
4702 if ((len > ofs) && (len < 128)) {
4703 cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid [sizeof (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid)-1] = '\0';
4704 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "Sending ServerNameIndication \"%.*s\"", len - ofs, str + ofs);
4705 E_g2e ("Client failed to setup SNI",
4706 gnutls_server_name_set (
4715 // Setup for client credential installation in this session
4717 // Setup client-specific credentials and priority string
4718 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Configuring client credentials\n");
4719 E_g2e ("Failed to configure GnuTLS as a client",
4720 configure_session (cmd,
4722 anonpost? NULL: cli_creds,
4723 anonpost? 0: cli_credcount,
4724 cmd->anonpre & ANONPRE_CLIENT));
4727 // Setup callback to server-specific behaviour if needed
4728 if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_SERVER) {
4729 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Configuring for server credentials callback if %d==0\n", gtls_errno);
4730 if (!renegotiating) { //TODO:TEST//
4731 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4732 gnutls_handshake_set_hook_function (
4734 GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO,
4739 //TODO:TEST// configure_session _if_ not setup as a client (too)
4741 // Setup for server credential installation in this session
4743 // Setup server-specific credentials and priority string
4745 if (! (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT)) {
4746 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Configuring server credentials (because it is not a client)\n");
4747 E_g2e ("Failed to configure GnuTLS as a server",
4748 configure_session (cmd,
4750 anonpost? NULL: srv_creds,
4751 anonpost? 0: srv_credcount,
4752 cmd->anonpre & ANONPRE_SERVER));
4758 // Prefetch local identities that might be used in this session
4760 E_g2e ("Failed to fetch local credentials",
4761 fetch_local_credentials (cmd));
4765 // Setup a temporary priority string so handshaking can start
4766 if ((cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALROLE_CLIENT) == 0) {
4767 E_g2e ("Failed to preconfigure server token priority string",
4768 gnutls_priority_set (
4774 // Check if past code stored an error code through POSIX
4775 if (cmd->session_errno) {
4776 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_USER_ERROR;
4780 // Setup a timeout value as specified in the command, where TLS Pool
4781 // defines 0 as default and ~0 as infinite (GnuTLS has 0 as infinite).
4782 tout = cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.timeout;
4783 if (renegotiating) {
4784 ; // Do not set timeout
4786 if (tout == TLSPOOL_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT) {
4787 gnutls_handshake_set_timeout (session, GNUTLS_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT);
4788 } else if (tout == TLSPOOL_TIMEOUT_INFINITE) {
4789 gnutls_handshake_set_timeout (session, 0);
4791 gnutls_handshake_set_timeout (session, tout);
4795 // Now setup for the GnuTLS handshake
4797 if (renegotiating) {
4798 ; // Do not setup cryptfd
4800 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4801 gnutls_transport_set_int (session, cryptfd);
4803 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4804 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "Failed to prepare for TLS: %s", gnutls_strerror (gtls_errno));
4805 if (cmd->session_errno) {
4806 send_error (replycmd, cmd->session_errno, error_getstring ());
4808 send_error (replycmd, EIO, "Failed to prepare for TLS");
4811 fprintf (stderr, "gnutls_deinit (%p) at %d\n", (void *)session, __LINE__);
4812 gnutls_deinit (session);
4820 fprintf (stderr, "ctlkey_unregister under ckn=%p at %d\n", (void *)ckn, __LINE__);
4821 if (ckn != NULL) { /* TODO: CHECK NEEDED? */
4822 if (ctlkey_unregister (ckn->regent.ctlkey)) {
4827 manage_txn_rollback (&cmd->txn);
4828 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
4831 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK | TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "TLS handshake started over %d", cryptfd);
4834 // Take a rehandshaking step forward.
4836 gtls_errno = gnutls_handshake (session);
4838 // When data is sent before completing
4839 // the rehandshake, then it's something
4840 // harmless, given the criteria for the
4841 // anonpre_registry. We pass it on and
4842 // don't worry about it. We do report
4845 // Note: Applications should be willing
4846 // to buffer or process such early data
4847 // before the handshake is over or else
4848 // the handshake will bail out in error.
4850 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_GOT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
4851 if (my_maxpreauth <= 0) {
4852 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_ERR, "Received unwanted early data before authentication is complete");
4853 break; // Terminate the handshake
4854 } else if (preauth == NULL) {
4855 preauth = malloc (my_maxpreauth);
4856 if (preauth == NULL) {
4857 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
4858 break; // Terminate the handshake
4862 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_GOT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
4863 if (preauthlen >= my_maxpreauth) {
4864 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_ERR, "Received more early data than willing to receive (%d bytes)", my_maxpreauth);
4865 break; // Terminate the handshake
4868 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_GOT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
4870 sz = gnutls_record_recv (session, preauth + preauthlen, my_maxpreauth - preauthlen);
4871 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Received %d remote bytes (or error if <0) from %d during anonymous precursor\n", (int) sz, cryptfd);
4874 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
4876 gtls_errno = sz; // It's actually an error code
4879 } while ((gtls_errno < 0) &&
4880 //DROPPED// (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_GOT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
4881 //DROPPED// (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_WARNING_ALERT_RECEIVED) &&
4882 (gnutls_error_is_fatal (gtls_errno) == 0));
4884 // Handshake done -- initialise remote_xxx, vfystatus, got_remoteid
4885 if ((gtls_errno == 0) && !(cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_IGNORE_REMOTEID)) {
4886 // We want to try to authenticate the peer
4887 E_g2e ("Failed to retrieve peer credentials",
4888 fetch_remote_credentials (cmd));
4889 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR) {
4890 if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_REQUEST_REMOTEID) {
4891 // We do not _require_ authentication of the peer
4896 if (gtls_errno == 0) {
4897 const gnutls_datum_t *certs;
4898 unsigned int num_certs;
4900 switch (cmd->remote_auth_type) { // Peer's cred type
4901 case GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE:
4902 if (cmd->remote_cert_count >= 1) {
4905 #ifdef PHASED_OUT_DIRECT_VALIDATION
4906 E_g2e ("Failed to validate peer",
4907 gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2 (
4913 case GNUTLS_CRD_PSK:
4914 // Difficult... what did the history say about this?
4916 cmd->vfystatus = GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
4918 case GNUTLS_CRD_SRP:
4919 // Got a credential, validation follows later on
4920 //TODO// SRP does not really auth the server
4922 cmd->vfystatus = GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
4924 case GNUTLS_CRD_ANON:
4925 // Did not get a credential, perhaps due to anonpre
4927 cmd->vfystatus = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID | GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
4930 // Inner Application extension is no true credential
4931 // Should we compare the client-requested service?
4932 // Should we renegotiate into the ALPN protocol?
4934 cmd->vfystatus = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID | GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
4937 // Unknown creds cautiously considered unauthentitcated
4939 cmd->vfystatus = ~ (unsigned short) 0; // It's all bad
4943 // Now recognise and handle the Anonymous Precursor
4944 if (((cmd->anonpre & ANONPRE_EITHER) != 0)
4945 && want_remoteid && !got_remoteid) {
4946 assert (anonpost == 0);
4947 valexp_valflag_set (cmd, 'A');
4948 // Disable ANON-protocols but keep creds from before
4949 //TODO:ELSEWHERE// tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "Reconfiguring TLS over %d without Anonymous Precursor\n", cryptfd);
4950 //TODO:ELSEWHERE// E_g2e ("Failed to reconfigure GnuTLS without anonymous precursor",
4951 //TODO:ELSEWHERE// configure_session (cmd,
4952 //TODO:ELSEWHERE// session,
4953 //TODO:ELSEWHERE// NULL, 0,
4954 //TODO:ELSEWHERE// 0));
4955 // We do not want to use ANON-DH if the flag
4956 // ANONPRE_EXTEND_MASTER_SECRET is set for the protocol
4957 // but the remote peer does not support it. Only if
4958 // this problem cannot possibly occur, permit
4959 // my_maxpreauth > 0 for early data acceptance.
4961 if (cmd->anonpre & ANONPRE_EXTEND_MASTER_SECRET) {
4962 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030400
4963 gnutls_ext_priv_data_t ext;
4964 if (!gnutls_ext_get_data (session, 23, &ext)) {
4965 my_maxpreauth = maxpreauth;
4969 my_maxpreauth = maxpreauth;
4971 if (gtls_errno == 0) {
4972 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK | TLOG_TLS, LOG_DEBUG, "TLS handshake continued over %d after anonymous precursor", cryptfd);
4973 renegotiating = 1; // (de)selects steps
4974 anonpost = 1; // (de)selects steps
4979 if ((gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) && cmd->session_errno) {
4980 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_USER_ERROR;
4985 // Run the validation expression logic, using expressions we ran into
4986 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Prior to valexp, gtls_errno = %d\n", gtls_errno);
4987 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
4988 struct valexp *verun = NULL;
4989 char *valexp_conj [3];
4990 int valexp_conj_count = 0;
4991 // Setup for validation expression runthrough
4992 cmd->valexp_result = -1;
4993 if ((cmd->trust_valexp != NULL) && (0 != strcmp (cmd->trust_valexp, "1"))) {
4994 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Trust valexp \"%s\" @ %p\n", cmd->trust_valexp, (void *) cmd->trust_valexp);
4995 valexp_conj [valexp_conj_count++] = cmd->trust_valexp;
4997 if (cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_VALEXP - LID_TYPE_MIN].data != NULL) {
4998 // Interpret the entry, abuse p11uri as valexp
5002 gnutls_datum_t ignored;
5003 ok = dbcred_interpret (
5004 &cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_VALEXP - LID_TYPE_MIN],
5009 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: LocalID valexp \"%s\" @ %p (ok=%d)\n", lid_valexp, (void *) lid_valexp, ok);
5010 if (ok && (lid_valexp != NULL)) {
5011 valexp_conj [valexp_conj_count++] = lid_valexp;
5013 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR;
5016 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Number of valexp is %d, gtls_errno=%d\n", valexp_conj_count, gtls_errno);
5017 // Optionally start computing the validation expression
5018 if ((gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) && (valexp_conj_count > 0)) {
5019 valexp_conj [valexp_conj_count] = NULL;
5020 verun = valexp_register (
5022 have_starttls_validation (),
5024 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Registered to verun = %p\n", (void *) verun);
5025 if (verun == NULL) {
5026 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR;
5029 // When setup, run the validation expressions to completion
5030 if (verun != NULL) {
5031 while (cmd->valexp_result == -1) {
5032 ; //TODO: Tickle async predicate run completion
5034 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Finishing tickling \"async\" predicates for valexp\n");
5035 if (cmd->valexp_result != 1) {
5036 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "TLS validation expression result is %d", cmd->valexp_result);
5037 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_AUTH_ERROR;
5038 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: valexp returns NEGATIVE result\n");
5040 else fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: valexp returns POSITIVE result\n");
5041 valexp_unregister (verun);
5042 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Unregistered verun %p\n", (void *) verun);
5047 // Cleanup any prefetched identities
5048 for (i=LID_TYPE_MIN; i<=LID_TYPE_MAX; i++) {
5049 if (cmd->lids [i - LID_TYPE_MIN].data != NULL) {
5050 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Freeing cmd->lids[%d].data %p\n", i-LID_TYPE_MIN, (void *)(cmd->lids [i-LID_TYPE_MIN].data));
5051 free (cmd->lids [i - LID_TYPE_MIN].data);
5054 memset (cmd->lids, 0, sizeof (cmd->lids));
5056 // Cleanup any trust_valexp duplicate string
5057 if (cmd->trust_valexp != NULL) {
5058 free (cmd->trust_valexp);
5059 cmd->trust_valexp = NULL;
5062 // Cleanup any Kerberos session key -- it served its purpose
5063 if (cmd->krb_key.contents != NULL) {
5064 // RATHER BLUNT: It shouldn't matter which krbctx_ is used...
5065 krb5_free_keyblock_contents (krbctx_srv, &cmd->krb_key);
5066 memset (&cmd->krb_key, 0, sizeof (cmd->krb_key));
5068 if (cmd->krbid_srv != NULL) {
5069 // RATHER BLUNT: It shouldn't matter which krbctx_ is used...
5070 krb5_free_principal (krbctx_srv, cmd->krbid_srv);
5071 cmd->krbid_srv = NULL;
5073 if (cmd->krbid_cli != NULL) {
5074 // RATHER BLUNT: It shouldn't matter which krbctx_ is used...
5075 krb5_free_principal (krbctx_srv, cmd->krbid_cli);
5076 cmd->krbid_cli = NULL;
5080 /* This is not proper. gnutls_certificate_set_key() suggests that these are
5081 * automatically cleaned up, and although this is not repeated in
5082 * gnutls_certificate_set_retrieve_function2() it is likely to be related.
5083 * Plus, renegotiation with this code in place bogged down on failed pcerts;
5084 * they were detected in _gnutls_selected_cert_supported_kx() but their
5085 * key exchange algorithm was never found.
5087 if (NULL != (void *) cmd->session_privatekey) {
5088 gnutls_privkey_deinit ((void *) cmd->session_privatekey);
5089 cmd->session_privatekey = (intptr_t) (void *) NULL;
5091 if (NULL != (void *) cmd->session_certificate) {
5092 gnutls_pcert_deinit ((void *) cmd->session_certificate);
5093 free ((void *) cmd->session_certificate);
5094 cmd->session_certificate = (intptr_t) (void *) NULL;
5099 // From here, assume nothing about the cmd->cmd structure; as part of
5100 // the handshake, it may have passed through the client's control, as
5101 // part of a callback. So, reinitialise the entire return structure.
5102 //TODO// Or backup the (struct pioc_starttls) before handshaking
5103 cmd->cmd.pio_cmd = orig_cmdcode;
5104 cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid [0] =
5105 cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid [0] = '\0';
5108 // Respond to positive or negative outcome of the handshake
5109 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
5110 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "TLS handshake failed: %s", gnutls_strerror (gtls_errno));
5111 if (cmd->session_errno) {
5113 tlog (TLOG_TLS, LOG_ERR, "Underlying cause may be: %s", strerror (cmd->session_errno));
5114 errstr = error_getstring ();
5115 if (errstr == NULL) {
5116 errstr = "TLS handshake failed";
5118 send_error (replycmd, cmd->session_errno, errstr);
5120 send_error (replycmd, EPERM, "TLS handshake failed");
5126 fprintf (stderr, "gnutls_deinit (%p) at %d\n", (void *)session, __LINE__);
5127 gnutls_deinit (session);
5135 fprintf (stderr, "ctlkey_unregister under ckn=%p at %d\n", (void *)ckn, __LINE__);
5136 if (ckn != NULL) { /* TODO: CHECK NEEDED? */
5137 if (ctlkey_unregister (ckn->regent.ctlkey)) {
5142 manage_txn_rollback (&cmd->txn);
5143 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
5146 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK | TLOG_TLS, LOG_INFO, "TLS handshake succeeded over %d", cryptfd);
5147 //TODO// extract_authenticated_remote_identity (cmd);
5151 // Request the plaintext file descriptor with a callback
5153 uint32_t oldcmd = cmd->cmd.pio_cmd;
5154 struct command *resp;
5155 cmd->cmd.pio_cmd = PIOC_PLAINTEXT_CONNECT_V2;
5156 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_DEBUG, "Calling send_callback_and_await_response with PIOC_PLAINTEXT_CONNECT_V2");
5157 resp = send_callback_and_await_response (replycmd, 0);
5158 assert (resp != NULL); // No timeout, should be non-NULL
5159 if (resp->cmd.pio_cmd != PIOC_PLAINTEXT_CONNECT_V2) {
5160 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_ERR, "Callback response has unexpected command code");
5161 send_error (replycmd, EINVAL, "Callback response has bad command code");
5166 fprintf (stderr, "gnutls_deinit (%p) at %d\n", (void *)session, __LINE__);
5167 gnutls_deinit (session);
5171 fprintf (stderr, "ctlkey_unregister under ckn=%p at %d\n", (void *)ckn, __LINE__);
5172 if (ckn) { /* TODO: CHECK NEEDED? PRACTICE=>YES */
5173 if (ctlkey_unregister (ckn->regent.ctlkey)) {
5178 manage_txn_rollback (&cmd->txn);
5179 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
5182 cmd->cmd.pio_cmd = oldcmd;
5183 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_DEBUG, "Processing callback response that set plainfd:=%d for lid==\"%s\" and rid==\"%s\"", cmd->passfd, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid);
5184 plainfd = resp->passfd;
5188 tlog (TLOG_UNIXSOCK, LOG_ERR, "No plaintext file descriptor supplied to TLS Pool");
5189 send_error (replycmd, EINVAL, "No plaintext file descriptor supplied to TLS Pool");
5194 fprintf (stderr, "gnutls_deinit (%p) at %d\n", (void *)session, __LINE__);
5195 gnutls_deinit (session);
5199 fprintf (stderr, "ctlkey_unregister under ckn=%p at %d\n", (void *)ckn, __LINE__);
5200 if (ckn != NULL) { /* TODO: CHECK NEEDED? */
5201 if (ctlkey_unregister (ckn->regent.ctlkey)) {
5206 manage_txn_rollback (&cmd->txn);
5207 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
5210 //DEFERRED// send_command (replycmd, -1); // app sent plainfd to us
5213 // Copy TLS records until the connection is closed
5214 manage_txn_commit (&cmd->txn);
5215 if (!renegotiating) {
5216 ckn = (struct ctlkeynode_tls *) malloc (sizeof (struct ctlkeynode_tls));
5219 send_error (replycmd, ENOMEM, "Out of memory allocating control key structure");
5221 int detach = (orig_starttls.flags & PIOF_STARTTLS_DETACH) != 0;
5222 ckn->session = session;
5223 ckn->owner = pthread_self ();
5224 ckn->cryptfd = cryptfd;
5225 ckn->plainfd = plainfd;
5226 //DEBUG// fprintf (stderr, "Registering control key\n");
5227 if (renegotiating || (ctlkey_register (orig_starttls.ctlkey, &ckn->regent, security_tls, detach ? INVALID_POOL_HANDLE : cmd->clientfd, forked) == 0)) {
5228 int copied = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
5229 send_command (replycmd, -1); // app sent plainfd to us
5233 // Check on extended master secret if desired
5234 if (cmd->anonpre & ANONPRE_EXTEND_MASTER_SECRET) {
5235 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030400
5236 gnutls_ext_priv_data_t ext;
5237 if (!gnutls_ext_get_data (session, 23, &ext)) {
5238 cmd->anonpre &= ~ANONPRE_EXTEND_MASTER_SECRET;
5242 if (cmd->anonpre & ANONPRE_EXTEND_MASTER_SECRET) {
5243 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_ERR, "Received %d remote bytes from anonymous precursor but lacking %s-required authentication through extended master secret", orig_starttls.service);
5244 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_LARGE_PACKET;
5247 } else if (write (plainfd, preauth, preauthlen) == preauthlen) {
5248 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Passed on %d remote bytes from anonymous precursor to %d\n", preauthlen, plainfd);
5251 copied = copycat (plainfd, cryptfd, session, detach ? INVALID_POOL_HANDLE : cmd->clientfd);
5253 tlog (TLOG_COPYCAT, LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to pass on %d remote bytes from anonymous precursor to %d\n", preauthlen, plainfd);
5256 copied = copycat (plainfd, cryptfd, session, detach ? INVALID_POOL_HANDLE : cmd->clientfd);
5258 // Renegotiate if copycat asked us to
5259 if (copied == GNUTLS_E_REHANDSHAKE) {
5260 // Yes, goto is a dirty technique. On the
5261 // other hand, so is forcing unstructured
5262 // code flows into a make-belief structure
5263 // that needs changing over and over again.
5264 // I fear goto is the most reasonable way
5265 // of handling this rather obtuse structure
5266 // of renegotiation of security in TLS :(
5267 //TODO// Ensure secure renegotiation!!!
5269 replycmd = NULL; // Bypass all send_XXX()
5270 memcpy (&cmd_copy, cmd, sizeof (cmd_copy));
5272 memcpy (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, orig_starttls.localid, sizeof (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid));
5273 memcpy (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid, orig_starttls.remoteid, sizeof (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid));
5274 cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags = orig_starttls.flags & ~PIOF_STARTTLS_LOCALID_CHECK;
5275 // Disabling the flag causing LOCALID_CHECK
5276 // ...and plainfd >= 0 so no PLAINTEXT_CONNECT
5277 // ...so there will be no callbacks to cmd
5278 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: Goto renegotiate with cmd.lid = \"%s\" and orig_cmd.lid = \"%s\" and cmd.rid = \"%s\" and orig_cmd.rid = \"%s\" and cmd.flags = 0x%x and orig_cmd.flags = 0x%x\n", cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, orig_starttls.localid, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.remoteid, orig_starttls.remoteid, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.flags, orig_starttls.flags);
5281 //DEBUG// fprintf (stderr, "Unregistering control key\n");
5282 // Unregister by ctlkey, which should always succeed
5283 // if the TLS connection hadn't been closed down yet;
5284 // and if it does, the memory can be freed. Note that
5285 // the ctlkey is not taken from the ckn, which may
5286 // already have been freed if the ctlfd was closed
5287 // and the connection could not continue detached
5288 // (such as after forking it).
5289 fprintf (stderr, "ctlkey_unregister under ckn=%p at %d\n", (void *)ckn, __LINE__);
5290 if (ctlkey_unregister (orig_starttls.ctlkey)) {
5294 //DEBUG// fprintf (stderr, "Unregistered control key\n");
5296 send_error (replycmd, ENOENT, "Failed to register control key for TLS connection");
5305 cleanup_any_remote_credentials (cmd);
5307 fprintf (stderr, "gnutls_deinit (%p) at %d\n", (void *)session, __LINE__);
5308 gnutls_deinit (session);
5311 assert (pthread_detach (pthread_self ()) == 0);
5317 * The starttls function responds to an application's request to
5318 * setup TLS for a given file descriptor, and return a file descriptor
5319 * with the unencrypted view when done. The main thing done here is to
5320 * spark off a new thread that handles the operations.
5322 void starttls (struct command *cmd) {
5323 /* Create a thread and, if successful, wait for it to unlock cmd */
5324 errno = pthread_create (&cmd->handler, NULL, starttls_thread, (void *) cmd);
5326 send_error (cmd, ESRCH, "STARTTLS thread refused");
5329 //TODO:TEST// Thread detaches itself before terminating w/o followup
5331 errno = pthread_detach (cmd->handler);
5333 pthread_cancel (cmd->handler);
5334 send_error (cmd, ESRCH, "STARTTLS thread detachment refused");
5342 * Run the PRNG for a TLS connection, identified by its control key. If the connection
5343 * is not a TLS connection, or if the control key is not found, reply with ERROR;
5344 * otherwise, the session should help to create pseudo-random bytes.
5346 void starttls_prng (struct command *cmd) {
5347 uint8_t in1 [TLSPOOL_PRNGBUFLEN];
5348 uint8_t in2 [TLSPOOL_PRNGBUFLEN];
5349 int16_t in1len, in2len, prnglen;
5350 struct ctlkeynode_tls *ckn = NULL;
5353 int gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
5354 struct pioc_prng *prng = &cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_prng;
5356 // Find arguments and validate them
5357 in1len = prng->in1_len;
5358 in2len = prng->in2_len;
5359 prnglen = prng->prng_len;
5360 err = err || (in1len <= 0);
5361 err = err || (prnglen > TLSPOOL_PRNGBUFLEN);
5362 err = err || ((TLSPOOL_CTLKEYLEN + in1len + (in2len >= 0? in2len: 0))
5363 > TLSPOOL_PRNGBUFLEN);
5365 memcpy (in1, prng->buffer + TLSPOOL_CTLKEYLEN , in1len);
5367 memcpy (in2, prng->buffer + TLSPOOL_CTLKEYLEN + in1len, in2len);
5370 // - check the label string
5371 prefixes = tlsprng_label_prefixes;
5372 while ((!err) && (*prefixes)) {
5373 char *pf = *prefixes++;
5374 if (strlen (pf) != in1len) {
5377 if (strcmp (pf, (const char *)in1) != 0) {
5381 if (*prefixes == NULL) {
5382 // RFC 5705 defines a private-use prefix "EXPERIMENTAL"
5383 if ((in1len <= 12) || (strncmp ((const char *)in1, "EXPERIMENTAL", 12) != 0)) {
5387 // - check the ctlkey (and ensure it is for TLS)
5389 //DEBUG// fprintf (stderr, "Hoping to find control key\n");
5390 ckn = (struct ctlkeynode_tls *) ctlkey_find (prng->buffer, security_tls, cmd->clientfd);
5393 // Now wipe the PRNG buffer to get rid of any sensitive bytes
5394 memset (prng->buffer, 0, TLSPOOL_PRNGBUFLEN);
5396 // If an error occurrend with the command, report it now
5398 send_error (cmd, EINVAL, "TLS PRNG request invalid");
5399 // ckn is NULL if err != 0, so no need for ctlkey_unfind()
5403 send_error (cmd, ENOENT, "Invalid control key");
5407 // Now actually invoke the PRNG command in the GnuTLS backend
5409 E_g2e ("GnuTLS PRNG based on session master key failed",
5410 gnutls_prf_rfc5705 (ckn->session,
5411 in1len, (const char *)in1,
5412 (in2len >= 0)? in2len: 0,
5413 (const char *)((in2len >= 0) ? in2: NULL),
5414 prnglen, (char *)prng->buffer));
5415 err = err || (errno != 0);
5417 // Wipe temporary data / buffers for security reasons
5418 memset (in1, 0, sizeof (in1));
5419 memset (in2, 0, sizeof (in2));
5420 ctlkey_unfind ((struct ctlkeynode *) ckn);
5422 // Return the outcome to the user
5424 send_error (cmd, errno? errno: EIO, "PRNG in TLS backend failed");
5426 send_command (cmd, -1);
5431 /* Flying signer functionality. Create an on-the-fly certificate because
5432 * the lidentry daemon and/or application asks for this to represent the
5433 * local identity. Note that this will only work if the remote party
5434 * accepts the root identity under which on-the-signing is done.
5436 * When no root credentials have been configured, this function will
5437 * fail with GNUTLS_E_AGAIN; it may be used as a hint to try through
5438 * other (more conventional) means to obtain a client certificate.
5440 * The API of this function matches that of fetch_local_credentials()
5441 * and that is not a coincidence; this is a drop-in replacement in some
5444 * Limitations: The current implementation only supports X.509 certificates
5445 * to be generated on the fly. So, this will set LID_TYPE_X509, if anything.
5447 gtls_error certificate_onthefly (struct command *cmd) {
5448 gtls_error gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
5449 gnutls_x509_crt_t otfcert;
5451 gnutls_x509_subject_alt_name_t altnmtp;
5456 if ((onthefly_issuercrt == NULL) || (onthefly_issuerkey == NULL) || (onthefly_subjectkey == NULL)) {
5457 // Not able to supply on-the-fly certificates; try someway else
5458 return GNUTLS_E_AGAIN;
5460 if (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid [0] == '\0') {
5461 return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
5463 if (cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].data != NULL) {
5464 free (cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].data);
5465 cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].data = NULL;
5466 cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].size = 0;
5470 // Create an empty certificate
5471 E_g2e ("Failed to initialise on-the-fly certificate",
5472 gnutls_x509_crt_init (&otfcert));
5473 if (gtls_errno != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
5478 // Fill the certificate with the usual field
5479 E_g2e ("Failed to set on-the-fly certificate to non-CA mode",
5480 gnutls_x509_crt_set_ca_status (otfcert, 0));
5481 E_g2e ("Failed to set on-the-fly certificate version",
5482 gnutls_x509_crt_set_version (otfcert, 3));
5483 onthefly_serial++; //TODO// Consider a random byte string
5484 E_g2e ("Failed to set on-the-fly serial number",
5485 gnutls_x509_crt_set_serial (otfcert, &onthefly_serial, sizeof (onthefly_serial)));
5486 // Skip gnutls_x509_crt_set_issuer_by_dn_by_oid(), added when signing
5488 E_g2e ("Failed to set on-the-fly activation time to now - 2 min",
5489 gnutls_x509_crt_set_activation_time (otfcert, now - 120));
5490 E_g2e ("Failed to set on-the-fly expiration time to now + 3 min",
5491 gnutls_x509_crt_set_expiration_time (otfcert, now + 180));
5492 E_g2e ("Setup certificate CN with local identity",
5493 gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid (otfcert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME, 0, cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, strnlen (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, sizeof (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid)-1))); /* TODO: Consider pioc_lidentry as well? */
5494 E_g2e ("Setup certificate OU with TLS Pool on-the-fly",
5495 gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid (otfcert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT_NAME, 0, "TLS Pool on-the-fly", 19));
5496 if (strchr (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, '@')) {
5497 // localid has the format of an emailAddress
5498 altnmtp = GNUTLS_SAN_RFC822NAME;
5500 // localid has the format of a dnsName
5501 altnmtp = GNUTLS_SAN_DNSNAME;
5503 E_g2e ("Failed to set subjectAltName to localid",
5504 gnutls_x509_crt_set_subject_alt_name (otfcert, altnmtp, &cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, strnlen (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid, sizeof (cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.localid) - 1), GNUTLS_FSAN_APPEND));
5505 //TODO:SKIP, hoping that signing adds: gnutls_x509_crt_set_authority_key_id()
5506 //TODO:SKIP, hoping that a cert without also works: gnutls_x509_crt_set_subjectkey_id()
5507 //TODO:SKIP? gnutls_x509_crt_set_extension_by_oid
5508 //TODO: gnutls_x509_crt_set_key_usage
5509 //TODO:SKIP? gnutls_x509_crt_set_ca_status
5510 for (i=0; i < svcusage_registry_size; i++) {
5511 if (strcmp (svcusage_registry [i].service, (const char *)(cmd->cmd.pio_data.pioc_starttls.service)) == 0) {
5512 const char **walker;
5513 E_g2e ("Failed to setup basic key usage during on-the-fly certificate creation",
5514 gnutls_x509_crt_set_key_usage (otfcert, svcusage_registry [i].usage));
5515 walker = svcusage_registry [i].oids_non_critical;
5518 E_g2e ("Failed to append non-critical extended key purpose during on-the-fly certificate creation",
5519 gnutls_x509_crt_set_key_purpose_oid (otfcert, *walker, 0));
5523 walker = svcusage_registry [i].oids_critical;
5526 E_g2e ("Failed to append critical extended key purpose during on-the-fly certificate creation",
5527 gnutls_x509_crt_set_key_purpose_oid (otfcert, *walker, 1));
5534 E_g2e ("Failed to et the on-the-fly subject key",
5535 gnutls_x509_crt_set_key (otfcert, onthefly_subjectkey));
5536 /* TODO: The lock below should not be necessary; it is handled by p11-kit
5537 * or at least it ought to be. What I found however, was that
5538 * a client and server would try to use the onthefly_issuerkey
5539 * at virtually the same time, and then the second call to
5540 * C_SignInit returns CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE. The lock solved this.
5541 * This makes me frown about server keys stored in PKCS #11...
5543 {gnutls_datum_t data = { 0, 0}; if (gnutls_x509_crt_print (otfcert, GNUTLS_CRT_PRINT_UNSIGNED_FULL, &data) == 0) { fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: PRESIGCERT: %s\n", data.data); gnutls_free (data.data); } else {fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: PRESIGCERT failed to print\n"); } }
5544 assert (pthread_mutex_lock (&onthefly_signer_lock) == 0);
5545 E_g2e ("Failed to sign on-the-fly certificate",
5546 gnutls_x509_crt_privkey_sign (otfcert, onthefly_issuercrt, onthefly_issuerkey, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256, 0));
5547 pthread_mutex_unlock (&onthefly_signer_lock);
5550 // Construct cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].data+size for this certificate
5551 cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].size = 0;
5552 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
5553 gtls_errno = gnutls_x509_crt_export (otfcert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, NULL, &cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].size);
5554 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) {
5555 // This is as expected, now .size will have been set
5556 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
5558 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
5559 // Something must be wrong if we receive OK
5560 gtls_errno = GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
5563 E_g2e ("Error while measuring on-the-fly certificate size",
5566 uint8_t *ptr = NULL;
5567 if (gtls_errno == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
5568 cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].size += 4 + strlen (onthefly_p11uri) + 1;
5569 ptr = malloc (cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].size);
5571 cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].size = 0;
5572 gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (otfcert);
5573 return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
5578 cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].data = ptr;
5579 * (uint32_t *) ptr = htonl (LID_TYPE_X509 | LID_ROLE_BOTH);
5581 strcpy ((char *)ptr, onthefly_p11uri);
5582 ptr += strlen (onthefly_p11uri) + 1;
5583 restsz = cmd->lids [LID_TYPE_X509 - LID_TYPE_MIN].size - 4 - strlen (onthefly_p11uri) - 1;
5584 E_g2e ("Failed to export on-the-fly certificate as a credential",
5585 gnutls_x509_crt_export (otfcert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, ptr, &restsz));
5586 char pembuf [10000];
5587 size_t pemlen = sizeof (pembuf) - 1;
5588 int exporterror = gnutls_x509_crt_export (otfcert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, pembuf, &pemlen);
5589 if (exporterror == 0) {
5590 pembuf [pemlen] = '\0';
5591 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: otfcert ::=\n%s\n", pembuf);
5593 fprintf (stderr, "DEBUG: otfcert export to PEM failed with %d, gtls_errno already was %d\n", exporterror, gtls_errno);
5598 // Cleanup the allocated and built structures
5599 gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (otfcert);
5602 // Return the overall result that might have stopped otf halfway
projects / tlspool / blob